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Science Peace Security ’19  
– An Editorial  
CHRISTIAN REUTER 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
(PEASEC), TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT 
JÜRGEN ALTMANN 
EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS III, TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY 
MALTE GÖTTSCHE 
NUCLEAR VERIFICATION AND DISARMAMENT GROUP, AICES 
GRADUATE SCHOOL AND III. INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS B, RWTH 
AACHEN UNIVERSITY 
MIRKO HIMMEL 
CARL FRIEDRICH VON WEIZSÄCKER-CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND 
PEACE RESEARCH (ZNF), UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG 
ABSTRACT 
Scientific discoveries and technological innovations have always exerted a great influence on 
peace and security. New civil and military technologies are revolutionizing warfare. Particularly 
striking areas are cyber warfare and the rapid development of unmanned weapons systems. 
Issues of nuclear disarmament, missile defence or space armament as well as chemical and 
biological weapons are again becoming more urgent. The conference SCIENCE · PEACE · 
SECURITY ’19 aimed for an accurate understanding and fruitful discussions of today’s and 
tomorrow’s peace and security challenges. This includes scientific-technical as well as inter-
disciplinary contributions, focusing on problems of international security and peace-building as 
well as contributions dedicated to transparency, trust-building, arms control, disarmament, and 
conflict management. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In July 2019, the Science Council, as the most important scientific-political advisory panel in 
Germany, published its recommendations on the further development of peace and conflict 
research. They point to an urgent need for action to strengthen scientific-technical peace and 
conflict research, which in Germany is now structurally too precarious to meet the massive 
need for political advice: In order to keep the necessary scientific and technical research and 
expertise permanently available in Germany, however, the Council considers the institutional 
development and expansion of this area in peace and conflict research to be essential and 
recommends that the Federal Government and States become active. In addition, the panel 
calls on the recently established research institutions for cyber security to increasingly address 
questions of peace and conflict research.  
As a positive example of the permanent establishment of this discipline at an university, the 
Technische Universität Darmstadt was named, the venue for the kick-off event for the new 
conference series SCIENCE · PEACE · SECURITY: From 25 to 27 September 2019 scientists 
presented and discussed the current research on interdisciplinary challenges and solutions to 
questions of international security, the creation of peace as well as transparency- and confi-
dence-building measures, arms control, disarmament and conflict management. 
 TOPICS 
To address the interdisciplinary character of the research field, five tracks have been designed:  
# Title Chair  
1 Cyber-Security, Cyber-War and Cyber-Peace Prof. Christian Reuter,  
TU Darmstadt 
 
2 Nuclear Nonproliferation / Disarmament Prof. Malte Göttsche,  
RWTH Aachen 
 
3 Biological/ Chemical Weapons  Dr. Mirko Himmel,  
University of Hamburg 
 
4 New Technologies and Arms Control Dr. Jürgen Altmann,  
TU Dortmund 
 
5 Open Track All Track Chairs  
 
The organisers invited researchers and practitioners to contribute to this conference. The con-
ference had the following characteristics:  
 3 days | 30 talks | 16 posters 
 1 pre-workshop | 1 future workshop 
 2 conference dinners | 1 award ceremony  
 >100 registered participants | 50 organisations | 10 countries  
SCIENCE PEACE SECURITY ’19  
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The program included lectures and discussions by researchers from over 50 organizations, 
ranging from the natural and engineering sciences (physics, biology, chemistry, computer sci-
ence) to the humanities and social sciences (political science, peace and conflict research, 
psychology, philosophy). It bridges the gaps between "classical" challenges of nuclear, biolog-
ical and chemical hazards and the emergence and need for regulation of "new" technologies 
such as drones, autonomous weapons or cyber weapons in "classical" and "new" spaces such 
as cyberspace or the universe. 
 CONTENTS 
On the 25th of September Prof. Alfred Nordmann (TU Darmstadt) and Dr. René von Schomberg 
(European Commission) conducted a pre-workshop on 30+ years of IANUS, which was 
founded in 1988 at the TU Darmstadt as a central institution for scientific and technical peace 
research in exchange with social sciences and humanities. In 2000, IANUS received the Göt-
tinger Friedenspreis for its outstanding interdisciplinary work. In 2018, coinciding with the es-
tablishment of PEASEC, IANUS transformed itself into a network within the TU Darmstadt, 
which is linked to the university's own funding line for interdisciplinary projects. A lecture on the 
ambivalence of science and technology (Prof. Jürgen Scheffran, University of Hamburg), which 
can be used for both good and abusive purposes, introduced the evening. 
Prof. Christian Reuter opened the conference together with the section leaders Dr. Jürgen Alt-
mann, Prof. Malte Göttsche and Dr. Mirko Himmel in the Georg-Christoph-Lichtenberg Haus 
and emphasized the pilot character of the conference format in his speech. Greetings followed 
by Prof. Ralph Bruder (Vice President of TU Darmstadt), Prof. Ulrich Schneckener (Chairman 
of the German Foundation for Peace Research) and Dr. Jürgen Altmann (Chairman of 
FONAS). Afterwards, the program on 26 and 27 September consisted of further lectures and 
discussions. 
The lectures initially analyzed the worldwide state of arms control (Dr. Oliver Meier, SWP, Ger-
man Institute for International and Security Affairs), especially in the field of chemical weapons 
(Dr. Paul Walker, International Green Cross) and biological weapons (Dr. Jonathan Forman, 
OPCW, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) as well as their current techno-
logical developments (Dr. Mirko Himmel, University of Hamburg). Challenges to the Biological 
Weapons Convention posed by biotechnological hazards were explicitly highlighted from the 
perspective of political science (Dr. Una Jakob, PRIF, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt). The 
potential for misuse of systems biology (Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, TU Darmstadt) and innovative 
genetic technologies (Dr. Johannes Frieß, BOKU (University) Vienna) were examined, as well 
as nuclear archaeology (Prof. Malte Göttsche, RWTH (University) Aachen), the politics of non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Dr. Jonas Siegel, University of Maryland), the 
modernization of airborne arms verification (Prof. Hartwig Spitzer, University of Hamburg) or 
challenges of nuclear proliferation (Dr. Matthias Englert, Oeko Institut). 
In addition to nuclear, biological and chemical hazards, the speakers dealt with new techno-
logical developments and their impact on peace and security. These include in particular sci-
entific challenges for computer science-related peace research (Prof. Christian Reuter, 
PEASEC) as well as questions on high-tech (Dr. Niklas Schörnig, PRIF) and cyber weapons 
SCIENCE PEACE SECURITY ’19  
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(Thomas Reinhold, PEASEC), cyber arms control (Dr. Matthias Schulze, SWP) and cyber at-
tribution (Thea Riebe, PEASEC). Further lectures were dedicated to critical infrastructures (Dr. 
Moritz Weiss and Felix Biermann, LMU, Ludwig Maximilian University Munich), drone swarms 
(Maaike Verbruggen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel), additive manufacturing in the military (Dr. 
Grant Christopher, VERTIC, not-for-profit non-governmental Organisation) and trustworthy 
electronics (Dr. Moritz Kütt, IFSH, Institute for Peace and Research and Security Policy; Uni-
versity Hamburg). 
Against the background of previous findings in scientific and technical peace research, further 
researchers tried to draw conclusions on future developments, such as Dr. Jürgen Altmann 
(TU Dortmund) with a view to military technologies, Prof. Götz Neuneck (IFSH Hamburg) on 
technological and political arms races and Prof. Martin Kalinowski (CTBTO) on the work of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 
An important part of the conference program were also 16 poster presentations, most of them 
presented for discussion by young scientists. They covered a broad spectrum from information 
warfare, dual use, armed drones to disarmament and arms control of weapons of mass de-
struction.  
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TRACK I: CYBER-
SECURITY, CYBER-
WAR AND CYBER-PEACE 
 
TRACK CHAIR: 
CHRISTIAN REUTER 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
(PEASEC), TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT 
INTRODUCTION  
Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development of information technol-
ogies (IT), plays a crucial role in questions of peace and security. This track addresses the 
significance and potentials of IT with respect to peace and security. For this purpose, the track 
sheds light on: IT in Peace, Conflict and Security Research, Cyber Conflicts and War (Infor-
mation Warfare, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Defence, Darknets), Cyber Peace, Dual Use and 
Technology Assessment, Confidence and Security Building Measures, Arms Control, Restraint 
Measures, Unmanned Systems, Verification in Cyberspace, Critical Infrastructures, Attribution, 
Resilient Critical Infrastructures, Critical Information Infrastructures, Open Source Intelligence, 
Situation Assessment, Human-Computer-Interaction, Culture and Social Interaction, Cyber De-
ception, Cultural Violence and Peace in Social Media, Social Media and ICT Usage in Conflict 
Areas. 
To discuss information technology for peace and security, SCIENCE · PEACE · 
SECURITY invited contributions from the fields of computer science, IT security and Human-
Computer-Interaction, as well as policy relating to technical issues. 
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Information Technology for Peace 
and Security – An Emerging 
Research Field  
CHRISTIAN REUTER 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
(PEASEC), TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT 
[#1-PAPER]  
ABSTRACT  
Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development in information technol-
ogy (IT), plays a crucial role regarding questions of peace and security. This short overview 
addresses the significance, potentials and challenges of IT for peace and security. For this 
purpose, the talk offers an introduction to peace, conflict, and security research, thereby focus-
ing on natural science, technical and computer science perspectives. In the following, it sheds 
light on fundamentals (e.g. IT in peace, conflict and security, natural science/ technical peace 
research), cyber conflicts and war (e.g. information warfare, cyber espionage, cyber defence, 
Darknet), cyber peace (e.g. dual-use, technology assessment, confidence and security building 
measures), cyber arms control (e.g. arms control in the cyberspace, unmanned systems, veri-
fication), cyber attribution and infrastructures (e.g. attribution of cyber-attacks, resilient infra-
structures, secure critical information infrastructures), culture and interaction (e.g. safety and 
security, cultural violence, social media), before an outlook is given. 
 INTRODUCTION 
In December 2017, an invasion of the German government network was discovered; This net-
work links federal ministries and authorities (see Reinhold 2018a). The attackers used the In-
tranet of the Federal College of Public Administration and the Federal Academy of Public Ad-
ministration as a gateway. This is the least secure part of the system because external partici-
pants also need to access it outside the institution, for example, for further education of the 
Foreign Office. Probably the first intervention should further penetrate the network. In order to 
gain freedom of movement on the intranet, administrative rights were claimed systematically. 
So far it could not be clarified whether parts of the used malware remained in the system (see 
Mascolo et al. 2018). 
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This incident is a good example of the increasing relevance of information technology for peace 
and security (see Reuter 2019). The innovations of scientific and technical research have al-
ways been used for military purposes and have thus strongly influenced warfare. 
 CYBERSPACE AS A WAR SCENE? 
Violent conflicts can be conducted in different domains. In addition to land, sea, air and space, 
the so-called cyberspace is one of them. Therefore, the resilience of IT infrastructures is of 
increasing importance. Nevertheless, security strategies only insufficiently consider the specific 
characteristics of IT: 
 Many of the actors involved (representing the group of potential aggressors) are either 
individuals or part of the private sector. 
 The attribution of security-threatening or offensive activities is difficult because the identity 
of the security threat is unknown. 
 Security concerns and international proliferation - that is, the proliferation of military or 
military technologies within and between states (see Altmann 2019) - increase the risk of 
military intervention as a preventive measure (see Chivvis & Dion-Schwarz 2017). 
 Many technologies can also be misused as a weapon or part of a weapon system. There-
fore, they are inherent in the risk of being misappropriated to harm a significant number of 
people. The dual-use problem (see Riebe & Reuter 2019) is of increasing relevance to IT, 
in particular, because the military use of IT systems and infrastructures phenomena such 
as cyberwar, the information war (see Ruhmann & Bernhardt 2019), (terrorist) propa-
ganda, fake news (see Kaufhold & Reuter 2019), data espionage and hacking (see 
Herrmann 2019). 
 CONCLUSION  
Existing research shows that information technology has a significant impact on warfare and 
military strategies. On the one hand, military forces increasingly rely on cyberspace, create 
capacities for offensive action in this domain, and even place it, as in the case of the United 
States, at the centre of future warfare. On the other hand, there is a lack of appropriate re-
sponses to questions regarding the international regulation of cyber conflicts and the current 
dynamics of rearmament. This circumstance is also due to the permanent ambiguity that veils 
cyberspace, its actors, and the operations it carries out: there are no dividing lines between 
internal and external security nor is it clear which cyber resources are defensive or can be 
assigned as open-minded. 
The digital revolution also continues with network-centred warfare, which has the potential to 
transform warfare permanently. Attribution and verification continue to pose problems, although 
they are indispensable for the enforcement of international law. After all, cyber-defence faces 
legal dilemmas, not least due to the lack of standards regarding pre-emption, prevention and 
counter-operations. The peculiarities of cyberspace in the context of peace and security require 
a separate consideration to address the complexity and ambiguity of the field. 
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ABSTRACT 
Whenever electronics are used to monitor and inspect states’ obligations as part of nuclear 
arms control treaties, special attention has to be given to the trustworthiness of these devices. 
Carrying out verification without electronics has been discussed by some, however, it is unlikely 
that this would be a solution for every verification task. Instead, we have to build systems that 
have a reduced likelihood of hardware backdoors and hidden switches as well as less vulner-
abilities with regard to the used software. As one idea to overcome this problem, we propose 
the use of very old electronics hardware and using physical storage media. Such vintage hard-
ware has a number of important advantages for applications where multiple parties need to 
simultaneously establish trust in the systems used. CPUs designed in the distant past, at a 
time when their use for sensitive measurements was never envisioned, drastically reduce con-
cerns that the other party implemented back-doors or hidden switches. Limited computing ca-
pabilities also limit the space of possible software manipulations. We present a prototype vin-
tage verification inspection system using the MOS 6502 processor. Using a custom designed 
digitization circuit, the device records gamma spectra from a sodium-iodine detector. It also 
offers the possibility to store reference data on physical storage media (punched cards), which 
can improve resilience against attacks. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, there are still about 15,000 nuclear weap-
ons in the arsenals of the nine nuclear weapon states. After an era of transparency, coopera-
tion, and confidence-building in the 1990s, progress in nuclear arms control has slowed down 
CHIPS, BITS & ATOMS: BUILDING TRUSTED ELECTRONICS FOR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION 
 
 
22 
in the 2000s and is currently in a crisis. New propositions are needed, and any progress toward 
nuclear disarmament will rely on robust verification measures. Whenever electronics are used 
to monitor and inspect states’ obligations as part of nuclear arms control treaties, special at-
tention has to be given to the trustworthiness of these devices. 
Disarmament Verification can include a variety of activities: Inspections of weapon production 
facilities, storage locations and deployment sites, measurements of radiation signatures of nu-
clear warheads to confirm their authenticity prior to their dismantlement, measurements esti-
mating amounts of fissile materials, or technical methods to prove the absence of weapons 
and fissile materials after disarmament took place (Göttsche et al., 2015). 
Inspections are carried out by inspecting countries or international organizations to ensure that 
a host country is in compliance with its obligations. Both host and inspector have competing 
interests. Devices used in these potentially hostile environments must, beyond providing cor-
rect measurements, be protected against malicious misuse and manipulation. One solution, 
carrying out verification without electronics has been discussed by some, however, it is unlikely 
that this would be a solution for every verification task (Glaser, 2014). Electronic-based system 
have to be developed with a reduced likelihood of hardware backdoors and hidden switches 
as well as less vulnerabilities with regard to the used software.  
Confirming the authenticities of nuclear warheads is a common application of trusted measure-
ment systems. To protect sensitive information of a warhead’s radiation signature, “information 
barriers” process the data acquired during an inspection, but only display results in a pass/fail 
manner. Information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements use either an attribute 
approach or a template approach. For the attribute approach, the device measures a number 
of properties and considers an object a treaty accountable item if the results meet specific 
criteria. Properties, thresholds, and ranges have to be negotiated prior to inspections. Infor-
mation barriers based on the template approach compare measured data to a template dataset 
that has been recorded from a trusted reference item, which can be obtained, for example, by 
randomly selecting a warhead directly from its delivery system under inspector supervision 
(Spears, 2001; Jie and Glaser, 2015). 
 CONTRIBUTION 
We focus on the issue of building an information barrier as an example of trustworthy electron-
ics. Several research efforts have produced prototype systems for such information barriers 
(Sastre, Vanier, 1988; MacArthur, 1999; Seager et al. 2001; Williams et al. 2007; Allen et al., 
2013). As a key requirement, the hosting party wants to ensure that the information barrier 
does not leak sensitive information to the inspector, neither due to an accident nor due to in-
spector intervention. Besides security concerns, the host is also concerned with the safety of 
device usage, avoiding accidents in the process of nuclear disarmament. Often, using only 
host-supplied tools in the host’s facilities is an additional requirement. The inspector requires 
that the information displayed by the device correctly reflects the physical reality. Software and 
hardware vulnerabilities are a constant concern for such devices, as they could be used for 
malicious intentions.  
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As one idea to overcome this problem, we propose building information barriers based on very 
old electronics hardware and using physical storage media. Such vintage hardware has a num-
ber of important advantages for applications where multiple parties need to simultaneously 
establish trust in the systems used. CPUs designed in the distant past, at a time when their 
use for sensitive measurements was never envisioned, drastically reduce concerns that the 
other party implemented back-doors or hidden switches. Limited computing capabilities also 
limit the space of possible software manipulations.  
We built a prototype vintage verification inspection system based on the MOS 6502 processor. 
The prototype uses an Apple IIe computer, for which we designed two custom extension cards. 
One card provides high voltage for a sodium-iodine detector, the second card records gamma 
spectra from a sodium-iodine detector. All processing, including energy calibration, is carried 
out on the 1 MHz 6502 processor. The prototype also offers the possibility to store reference 
data on physical storage media (punched cards), which can improve resilience against attacks. 
We demonstrate that the computational capabilities of the 6502 are sufficient to record and 
analyse gamma-spectra with count rates of several thousand counts per second. 
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ABSTRACT 
Although the threat of cyber-conflict rises with the ongoing digital arms race, not much ground 
has been gained with cyber arms control regimes. This is due to technical characteristics of the 
digital domain, issues of regime verification and the lack of political will. The paper analyses 
proposals for cyber arms control designed after traditional arms control regimes and concludes, 
that this is the wrong paradigm. Instead, it sketches out a regime that is modelled after the 
climate change regime, including emissions trading for 0-day vulnerabilities. Additionally, the 
paper discusses the suggestion of an International Vulnerability Equities Process as a second 
component to such a regime. 
 INTRODUCTION  
The economic damage caused by cyber-activities rises every year and now resides around 
600 billion US-Dollar annually. Cyber-espionage, both political and economic, is causing head-
aches in many governments around the world and the spectre of a full-fledged inter-state cyber-
conflict, resulting in loss of life and physical damage, features prominently in many threat as-
sessments of governments (Lawson 2013). The digital arms race is in full swing as now more 
than 100 states possess cyber-capabilities and many of them offensive military cyber-programs 
(Smeets 2018a). Since modern industrial societies are highly dependent on information tech-
nologies, which are vulnerable to hacking, the urgency rises to react to growing cyber-threats. 
Since the late 1990s, there are multiple efforts to restrict collateral damage from cyber-attacks 
and to enforce responsible state behaviour in cyber-space. Approaches taken in reigning-in 
cyber-warfare, are mainly driven via international law and the laws of armed conflict (Tallinn 
Process) & informal norms of appropriate state behaviour (UN GEE Process, Paris Call) (Hen-
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riksen 2019), Confidence Building Measures (Pawlak 2016), industry associations (Digital Ge-
neva Convention, Charter of Trust), bilateral cyber-treaties restricting economic espionage 
(US, China agreement 2015), or unilateral measures, such as national due diligence and resil-
ience (deterrence by denial), active cyber-defense and engagement (deterrence by punish-
ment) or non-escalatory policies of state-restraint. But arguably, no substantial ground has 
been made in terms of cyber arms control regimes, although calls for these are repeatedly 
uttered in international discussions (Nye 2015). The most prominent proposal in this direction 
is that of an international attribution agency to provide a collection solution to the problem of 
attributing cyber-attacks (Davis 2017). Joseph Nye describes the fragmented regulatory land-
scape in the cyber-domain as regime complex of multiple, separate governance issues that 
often lack depth (Nye 2014). These mostly normative efforts lack “punch”, since they rely on 
voluntary adoption and have no “strong” verification or enforcement mechanisms as traditional 
arms control regimes. 
The scope of the paper is to give an overview of current academic debates about cyber-arms 
control regimes. Scholars unison argue, that traditional arms control models do not easily, if at 
all, apply to the particularities of the digital domain. Therefore, a second related question is 
what best practices from other regime-types can be deduced that might apply to the character-
istics of the digital domain. Besides technical issues, there are political reasons and factors of 
regime-design, especially issues of verification of non-compliant behaviour and treaty enforce-
ment that complicate any type of digital arms control regime. Although similar issues have 
plagued other arms control regimes as well (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018), the thesis of this pa-
per is that the paradigm of arms control might not be feasible in the cyber-domain and instead 
we need to look for other regime types that regulate different things and include non-state 
actors. The climate regimes, especially emissions trading seem to be an interesting avenue to 
pursue. It is checked whether this regime type is feasible for the digital domain. The following 
section describes the state of research and presents the arguments that have been produced 
against digital arms control. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW: CHALLENGES IN REGULATING DIGITAL ARMS 
Arms control regimes typically aim to limit or reduce certain types of weapons or military be-
haviour (like testing, use or deployment) in order to prevent conflict, to limit the acceleration 
and the cost of arms races (Reinhold & Reuter 2019, 207-210). There are three major problem 
complexes that restrict the feasibility of the arms control approach in the digital domain: 1) the 
particularities of the object of regulation, 2) challenges of verification regime-enforcement and 
3) political problems. 
 CYBER-WEAPONS AS AN OBJECT OF ARMS CONTROL? 
The first problem is, that it remains unclear what exactly the object of regulation in any type of 
digital arms control regime would be. It could be prohibiting behaviour like cyber-attacks, or 
objects like “cyber-weapons”. The term cyber-attack is highly politicized and encompasses var-
ious elements such as penetrating a network with digital or social (phishing) means, implanting 
malicious code, stealing information, disrupting services or producing a destructive, or even 
QUO VADIS CYBER ARMS CONTROL?  
– A SKETCH OF AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY EQUITIES PROCESS AND A 0-DAY EMISSIONS 
TRADING REGIME 
 
 
26 
kinetic effect (Arimatsue 2010). Depending on the interpretation, cyber-attacks can be an ob-
ject, a technology or an activity/operational capacity. Likewise, there is no consensus that dig-
ital software qualifies as an object, like a weapon (Tikk 2017). The terms cyber-weapon or 
digital arms describe not one entity but a vast array of tools and techniques, from low potential 
(Distributed) Denial of Service attacks, social engineering, credential theft and the use of mal-
ware, which can be subdivided into exploits utilizing known or unknown vulnerabilities (0-day). 
High potential malware with destructive effects is most likely to be considered a cyber-weapon 
since it utilizes a launch vehicle (a means to deliver) and a payload that executes actions on 
the objective (Rid 2018, 2018, 73–75). 
If one would assume the position, that malicious code could act as a cyber-weapon, which then 
could be perceived as the object of regulation, more problems arise. Geers (2010) argues, that 
malicious code is notoriously difficult to define (Geers 2010). Unlike physical weapons, which 
are traditionally defined as devices intentionally designed to kill, injure or disable people or 
property, malware is seldom designed to kill. Digital objects like malware code have no intrinsic 
properties, unlike a war-head with a determined destructive capacity measured in kilo-tons. 
Even though malware could potentially kill someone, for example by disabling a pace-maker, 
this is always a secondary or indirect effect that is dependent on the interaction of a digital and 
a physical system (Arimatsue 2010). A computer cannot kill directly, until it is attached to a 
physical device that can, like an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle for example. The potential destruc-
tive effect of malware is highly dependent on the characteristics of the system it penetrates. 
This makes damage highly unpredictable and difficult to establish. However, this might change 
in the future since software is developing fast, which presents another challenge for finding a 
suitable definition for an arms control regime. The transitory nature of 0-day exploits, basically 
describing their limited shelf-life, might present a further issue for arms control (Eilstrup-San-
giovanni 2018; Smeets 2018b). Thus, it remains elusive, whether the weapon analogy makes 
sense at all. 
 INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS: VERIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT  
The second major challenge for a digital arms-control regime is verification. In order to be ef-
fective, arms control regimes need a mechanism to verify that regime members adhere to the 
principles outlined in a treaty. Historically, verification measures “range from methods that allow 
supervision without on-site assessment like aerial imaging or seismic sensors to the structured 
collection, submission and exchange of data between states on stockpiles and trade volumes 
and on-site inspections with counting and measuring stockpiles and facilities” (Reinhold & Reu-
ter 2019, 216). This means there must be some sort of accounting measuring the relative 
strength of cyber-arsenals and cyber-power. Cyber-power is notoriously difficult to measure. 
Since the main actors of cyber-conflict are intelligence agencies, whose activity is shrouded in 
high levels of secrecy, and considering the problem of attribution, there is no easy way to 
measure cyber-arsenals (Borghard & Lonergan 2017) or relative cyber-power. 
Digital arms in that regard share many of the problems that other dual-good items, like chemical 
agents or biological toxins, have. In fact, it could be argued, that software is more than dual 
use. Dual-use unfolds on two axes: First, most software is primarily developed in the private 
QUO VADIS CYBER ARMS CONTROL?  
– A SKETCH OF AN INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITY EQUITIES PROCESS AND A 0-DAY EMISSIONS 
TRADING REGIME  
 
27 
sector, rather than in the military domain. Everyone with sufficient knowledge can write mal-
ware on any computer around the world, even at home (Geers 2010). Malware is cheap and 
being sold on a thriving black market for crime-ware and exploits (Ablon et al. 2014). Addition-
ally, there is a thriving grey market of the traditional arms industry engaging in research and 
development and reverse engineering of vulnerabilities and exploits (Burgers & Robinson 
2018). The private sector is rather dominant in the digital domain and has shown little interest 
in regulation. The regulation would most likely be ineffective as well. Software is easy to con-
ceal, highly intangible and malleable. Software code is essentially knowledge, which can be 
easily copied and thus cannot be destroyed. The Crypto-Wars of the 1990s showed, that soft-
ware in form of encryption algorithms could even be printed out and smuggled over a border 
on paper (Schulze 2017). Thus, proliferation is easy, and the very concept of digital “disarma-
ment” does not make sense.  
The second axis is, that code can be used both defensively and offensively. Attackers and 
defenders often rely on the same toolkits. Banning or regulating software designed for cyber-
offense, might impede cyber-defense, like vulnerability research and ethical hacking 
(Dumbacher 2018). The current malware-trend called “living off the land” basically utilizes on-
board software of hijacked systems, like the Windows Powershell. In many cases, attackers 
subvert the legitimate tools of defending IT-administrators for offensive purposes. This essen-
tially makes software code “quadruple use”. All of this implies, that “artifact-centric” arms control 
mechanisms fall short in the digital age” (Dumbacher 2018, 221). 
More so, a verification for software might come with unacceptable costs and risks, since it 
would technically imply a global surveillance infrastructure that monitors what is happening on 
every single digital device on the planet. Ruhrmann (2015) suggests that global surveillance 
infrastructure set-up by NSA, with programs such as Turmoil and Turbulence, could act as a 
means of verification since it scans Internet traffic at large scale IXP (Ingo Ruhrmann 2015, 
572). Infrastructures for active cyber-defense, i.e. observing adversary behaviour and capabil-
ity at his/her network could serve a similar function, especially since more states are adopting 
these types of policy (Schulze & Herpig 2018). Given the current reactions to cyber-espionage, 
it is highly unlikely that states would voluntarily agree to monitor each other networks. Alterna-
tively, a mass-surveillance system like Chinas Great Firewall could be utilized for screening 
every data-packet at the Internet Service Provider or Internet Exchange Point Level for the 
proliferation of malicious cyber-weapons (Geers 2010). This type of intrusive monitoring would 
be more dangerous for highly digitized economies. The cost of compliance with such a regime 
thus might be higher than the actual reduction of risk that follows from such a mechanism (Ford 
2010). Additionally, a Chinese-style Great Firewall would be a direct violation of Western norms 
such as free speech and a promotion of a free and open Internet. 
Closely connected to the problem of verifying treaty-violating behaviour is the problem of en-
forcing treaty policies. How do we punish non-compliant behaviour? The attribution problem, 
i.e. the issue of identifying actors responsible for malicious cyber-activity lies at the core of the 
enforcement problem. This is a multifaceted problem. State-driven cyber-attacks often use 
proxy-actors, like hired cyber-criminals or contractors to maintain plausible deniability (Maurer 
2017). It is not just states operating in the cyber-domain, but a multitude of non-state actors 
like hackers, organized crime, and exploit-brokers, which makes determining treaty compliance 
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hard. More so, state actors hijack the offensive infrastructure of their opponents to launch at-
tacks (4th party collection) and repurpose malware of other state entities to operate under false-
flag (Guerrero-Saade & Raiu 2017). Thus, it is still relatively hard and especially time-consum-
ing to obtain tamper proof evidence that shows non-compliance. States also operate on vastly 
different skill levels or tiers. This unequal skill level makes it harder for smaller states to detect 
non-compliance of the more tech-savvy states. Additionally, the asymmetric vulnerability that 
different large and medium-sized economies face, make it harder for small-states to file viola-
tions against more powerful ones. Additionally, what would a proportionate response to non-
compliance entail? There is currently no international consensus on what a proportional re-
sponse could be (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018, 393).  
 POLITICAL PROBLEMS PREVENTING CYBER-ARMS CONTROL 
Another non-trivial issue is the question, what carrots would a regime offer that would overcome 
the lack of political will to restrict offensive cyber-capabilities. Many states regard cyber-space 
as an offense-dominant environment and thus assume that they would gain a relative ad-
vantage by building-up offensive cyber-capabilities, compared to the costs that such a build-up 
implies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018, 384-388). In many states, spending and personal for of-
fensive-operations outweigh that of cyber-defense. As of now, states don’t perceive it to be in 
their self-interest to restrict cyber-capabilities (Dumbacher 2018, 208). This was also the case 
with other types of arms control regimes that historically developed in the step-by-step process 
from no-regulation to a full-fledged regime. Oftentimes, the political will aims to regulate in-
creases after shock-situations, for example (near)-catastrophic events like the Cuban missile 
crisis, that convinced policy-makers of the risks that have grown too high (Jervis 1978). Com-
pared to the nuclear-age, the cyber-age did not witness its Hiroshima and Nagasaki wake-up 
call yet (Kaplan 2016). 
Even if a “digital pearl harbor” ought to occur, scepticism might be in order whether it increases 
political momentum for regulation. First, some argue, that “cyber-weapons” are simply not dan-
gerous enough, at least compared to nuclear weapons (Burgers & Robinson 2018). Pearl Har-
bor style strategic cyber-attacks are regarded as highly overrated in the academic literature 
(Lawson 2013). Second, even if political momentum for regulation arises, it does not guarantee 
that one aspect of cyber-activity will be regulated: cyber-espionage. States historically lack the 
will to restrict peacetime espionage which is why it is highly ambiguous with regard to interna-
tional laws since it is not explicitly condoned nor condemned and thus almost without any in-
ternational regulation (Radsan 2007). Most cyber-activity entails an espionage component, 
mainly the reconnaissance of a target (such as lateral movement) before the action on the 
objective (the payload) is executed. Computer-Network Attack and Computer-Network-Exploi-
tation share many characteristics and cannot be meaningfully separated (Lindsay 2013, 370). 
They are often indistinguishable from another, especially from the defender’s point of view, 
which is why espionage is often treated as if it was a destructive attack (Buchanan 2017). 
Likewise, military cyber-operations rely extensively on signals intelligence, so that these two 
spheres converge, neatly illustrated by the organizational dual-hat set-up of US Cybercom-
mand: the head of NSA is the head of cyber command. It is conventional wisdom in espionage 
that nobody likes it, but everyone does it. As such, regulation of cyber-capabilities that often 
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entail espionage is highly unlikely since it is in states-interest to maintain this capability. The 
problem is, that arms control regimes and the overall strategic posture must go hand-in-hand 
in order to be a feasible policy option (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018, 381). If arms control regimes 
do not complement national security behaviour and entail concrete carrots, they are less likely 
to be adopted (Lewis 2010). Since no-spy regimes typically have the same issues of verification 
and enforcement, due to the attribution problem, their strategic value remains limited. 
Final points are ideological differences and different threat perceptions regarding the digital 
domain. Cyber-security is a fuzzy, undefined concept that includes competing narratives and 
thus threat assessments (Tikk 2017). Especially Western states securitized the digital domain 
differently than authoritarian regimes (Hansen & Nissenbaum 2009). The West adheres to the 
notion of cyber-security, which is first and foremost a technical issue and has critical-infrastruc-
ture failure as its referent object. “We tend to conceive cyber conflict in terms of warfare, as a 
matter of attack and defence” (Ford 2010). This cyber-war paradigm regards cyber-attacks as 
an analogue to conventional military attacks, enacted by combatants, based on a dualism of 
war and peace. Viewing cyber-threats through that lends leads logically to the conclusion, that 
“cyber-weapons” should “be governed by the traditions embodied in the law of armed conflict”, 
including the right to self-defence and the concept of equivalence (cyber equals physical) (Ford 
2010). Likewise, if cyber-weapons targeting critical infrastructures are perceived as an existen-
tial threat, arms control follows logically as a seemingly appropriate solution. 
Russia and China perceive digital insecurities through the lens of information warfare, a much 
broader concept of which cyber-attacks are a mere sub-component. The referent objects in this 
paradigm are political and social systems that can be undermined by threats emerging from 
information weapons, such as social media platforms, mass-media, and propaganda (Tikk 
2017). The psychological effect of cyber-attacks in this view is way more important than their 
kinetic potential. The fear of a propaganda campaign that mobilizes the masses to revolt 
against the ruling elites is central in this paradigm. Information war is continuous and the dual-
ism of war and peace is abandoned (Ford 2010). The logical conclusion following from this 
problem definition is not arms control, but information control, basically meaning censorship 
and the dissolution of public discourse through disinformation and active measures (Bendiek 
& Schulze 2019). 
These two competing paradigms are irreconcilable since information control violates the core 
norms of democratic societies such as freedom of speech. Thus, the West should not fall into 
the trap of adapting to the authoritarian playbook and starting to “weaponize information” as 
well (Klimburg 2017). The ideological divide historically was one reason why so far, interna-
tional efforts, such as the United Nations Governmental Group of Experts failed and why con-
sensus is hard to achieve in other spheres of Internet Governance. China and Russia prefer 
state control over Internet data-streams and oppose the multi-stakeholder governance model 
that Western states prefer (Nye 2014). 
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 SUMMARY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLES OF CYBER-WEAPONS IN ARMS 
CONTROL 
The previous section outlined the most important aspects of the cyber-domain that any arms 
control regime has to account for in order to meaningfully restrict dangers of the digital domain: 
 The problem of the unclear definition of the object being regulated, namely software, 
cyber-attacks, malware. 
 The dual use issue (civil/military and offensive/defensive) and intangible features of the 
object being regulated. 
 The question, whether the regime should sanction behaviour, like attacking or proliferation 
weapons, or prohibit certain types of objects. 
 The question, how an unobtrusive and beneficiary verification regime could look like. 
 The attribution of non-compliant behaviour and enforcement of sanctions. 
 The problem of easy proliferation of digital goods on black markets, over the Internet as 
well as the decentralized means of production, storage and distribution of digital goods. 
 The dominant role of the private sector in the cyber-domain, accounting for 95% of all 
digital infrastructure and goods. 
 The power balance asymmetries between high-tech and low-tech actors. 
 The overcoming of the lack of political will to restrict behaviour in an offense-dominated 
cyber-space. 
 Overcoming the ambiguous nature of espionage activity. 
 Overcoming the ideological differences, i.e. paradigms of cyber- vs. information war. 
 TRADITIONAL OBSTACLES OF ARMS CONTROL REGIMES 
Besides these newer, digital-domain specific obstacles to arms control, any type of arms con-
trol regime must overcome some traditional obstacles as well. According to Eilstrup-Sangio-
vanni (2018), an effective arms control regime must ”1) secure broad participation from major 
cyber-faring states, (2) set out rules that effectively constrain state behaviour, (3) provide suf-
ficient credible information on actions in cyberspace to reduce uncertainty about state interests 
and allow effective signalling, and (4) ensure significant costs to non-compliance. Fulfilling 
these goals in tandem will be challenging.” She further outlines elemental features for effective 
arms control: 
 “Any regime must supply information to reduce uncertainty and to clarify states’ interests, 
information about their activity in order to reassure others. 
 It must constrain behaviour by defining clear rules for (im)permissible behaviour, i.e. re-
stricting the use of cyber-weapons, or prohibiting certain types of attacks, or against cer-
tain targets. 
 It must lower the risk of accidental conflict by introducing transparency and mechanisms 
for crisis management. 
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 It must entail collective attribution, since otherwise it cannot impose costs for non-compli-
ance. This would lower the costs of attribution, reduce asymmetries in attribution-capabil-
ities and thus would present an incentive to participate. 
 It must clarify the responsibility of state and non-state actors, especially of states utilizing 
cyber-proxies. 
 It must offer support (carrots) for compliance, for example by increasing access to funding, 
professional expertise or capacity-building measures” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018, 391–
398). 
 REGIME TYPES ACCOUNTING FOR THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE 
DIGITAL DOMAIN 
Having outlined the principles of effective arms control regimes, generally, as well as for the 
specifics of the digital domain, most research analyzes what arms control regimes could serve 
as a model for restricting cyber-war activities. The following arms control regimes have been 
proposed in research: 
 Nuclear arms control regime such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Borghard & Lonergan 
2018), which is generally regarded as impractical (Nye 2015), with the exemption of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). 
 The Geneva Protocol (1925) proposed by Dumbacher (2018) and the later Chemical 
Weapons Convention of 1997, as proposed by Geers (2010). 
 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention proposed by Fidler (2015) and Reinhold 
& Reuter (2019). 
 The Wassenaar Arrangement, proposed by Fidler (2015) and Reinhold & Reuter (2019). 
Other regulatory approaches that have been considered as possible regulatory frameworks, 
but have not been analysed in greater detail: 
 The Convention on Civil Aviation of 1994, proposed by Durmbacher (2018). 
 EU Cybercrime Convention 2001, Fidler (2015). 
 Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s International Information Security Agreement 2009 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). 
 The 2018 Proposal of the EU parliament for harmonized dual use export regulation Rein-
hold & Reuter (2019). 
 International Telecommunication Union Fidler (2015). 
The following table presents an overview of these studies, analysing which particularities of 
cyber-weapons introduced in section 2 of this paper are covered by these regimes, and which 
are incompatible. Note that this list does only account for the question, whether the particular-
ities of the digital domain could be accounted for or are addressed in these regimes, not 
whether how well or effective these issues are addressed. It does not answer the questions on 
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how effective these regimes would be in regulating digital arms (on the issue of regime effi-
ciency see Müller (2000)). The table uses a simple classification scheme assessing, whether 
the regime could account for the particularities of cyber-weapons: mostly, somewhat, or not at 
all. This assessment only uses a nominal scale and is based on a rough-heuristic and no quan-
titative models. Of course, since none of these regimes is a “digital-only” regime, they cannot 
account fully for the particularities of the digital domain. Whether these regimes indeed could 
serve as a model for digital arms control has to be judged with in-depth case studies in future 
research and lies beyond the scope of the paper. 
The regime accounts 
for… 
Chemical 
Weapons 
Conven-
tion 1997 
Biological 
and Toxin 
Weapons 
Conven-
tion 1975 
Wasse-
naar Ar-
range-
ment, 
1996 
Protocol for the 
Prohibition the 
Use in War of 
Asphyxiating 
Poisonous 
Gases, and of 
Bacteriological 
Methods of 
Warfare, 1925 
Conven-
tion on 
Civil Avia-
tion 1994 
Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty 
1996 
… Problem of un-
clear definitions of 
the object being reg-
ulated 
Mostly Somewhat  Somewhat  Somewhat Mostly Mostly 
… dual use issues 
and intangible fea-
tures of the object 
being regulated. 
Somewhat  Somewhat Mostly Somewhat Mostly Mostly 
… regulating behav-
iour or objects 
produc-
tion, 
stockpiling 
develop-
ment, pro-
duction, 
stockpiling, 
distribution 
Distribution Prohibiting use 
in war. Storage, 
production, 
transfer and 
peaceful use not 
included. 
Regulating 
behaviour. 
Restricts 
military avi-
ation over 
territory. 
bans all nuclear 
explosions, for 
both civilian and 
military pur-
poses, in all envi-
ronments. 
… reliable, unobtru-
sive verification 
Mostly Not at all Not at all Not at all Mostly Mostly 
… attribution of non-
compliance and en-
forcement 
Somewhat Not at all Not at all Not at all Mostly Mostly 
… the problem of 
easy proliferation 
(black markets) and 
decentralized pro-
duction of the object 
to being regulated. 
Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Somewhat Not ad-
dressed 
Somewhat 
… private sec-
tor/non-state actors 
participation in the 
problem. 
Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Somewhat Mostly Not addressed 
…balances power 
asymmetries of 
members. 
Somewhat Not ad-
dressed 
Not at all Not at all Mostly Mostly 
… overcoming lack 
of political will by of-
fering sticks and 
carrots. 
Mostly Somewhat Somewhat Somewhat Mostly Mostly 
… overcoming un-
regulated espionage 
aspects. 
Not ad-
dressed 
Not ad-
dressed 
Somewhat Not addressed Not ad-
dressed 
Not addressed 
… overcoming ideo-
logical differences 
(cyber vs. infor-
mation war) 
Not ad-
dressed 
Not ad-
dressed 
Not ad-
dressed 
Not addressed Not ad-
dressed 
Not addressed 
 
Table 1. Overview over the studies 
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From this preliminary overview, three regime types are particularly noteworthy. First, the bio-
logical weapons and toxins share some of the problems of digital arms, namely the ease of 
proliferation, the difficulties of delineating offensive and defensive use and the hard-to verify 
nature. There is an indication, that future trends such as bio-printing might lead to similar prob-
lems as in the cyber-domain, namely drop of prizes and an increase in decentralized production 
and proliferation of biological agents, for example in form of CAD files shared the Internet 
(Brockmann et al. 2019). 
Secondly, the Wassenaar Arrangement is by far the most advanced regime accounting for the 
particularities of the digital world. However, it is not without flaw. The offense/ defence dual-
use nature of some of the objects being regulated is not clear-cut, as some vulnerability re-
searchers criticize the export list of being too broad, that it covers legitimate tools as well (Gan-
non 2015). Also, the voluntary nature and the lack of a verification and enforcement mecha-
nism, make it an imperfect candidate. 
Lastly, the Convention on Civil Aviation covers accounts for the dual-use nature and the private 
sector dominance, while including verification and enforcement. This might be due to the rela-
tively uncontentious nature of the object being regulated, namely aircraft. Furthermore, since it 
deals with aircraft, the attribution issue is not as complicated as in the digital world, since air-
planes can be demarcated by transponders and national insignia. This solution does not hold 
well in the digital domain since there is no easy way to create tamper-proof digital insignia. 
Noteworthy is, that none of the aforementioned regimes cover the issue of espionage, which 
reflects its ambiguous nature in international law. 
 VULNERABILITIES AS A CHANCE? 
Since definitional issues are a problem for outlawing cyber-weapons directly, another avenue 
could be to prohibit the use of some of their subcomponents, namely zero-day or 0-day vulner-
abilities (Fidler 2014). If the cyber-weapon analogy applies, then 0-days are the munition or the 
launch-vehicles for such weapons. While certainly not totally without issues, the definition of a 
0-day is straight forward and relatively uncontested: it is a vulnerability in a soft or hardware 
that the software vendor is not aware of and that currently is not fixed by a patch. If the vendor 
is notified and a patch is released, a 0-day turns into a N-day vulnerability. Publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities are typically being collected in a public CVE database (CVE Database 2019). 
Thus, it can be easily determined ex-post facto whether a cyber-attack utilized a 0-day, without 
necessarily answering the question who used it. A regime prohibiting the use of only 0-day 
attacks, while leaving the door open for less intrusive types of N-day attacks, could be in states 
self-interest. First, 0-day attacks are typically the ones with the most destructive potential often, 
targeting critical infrastructures. Stuxnet is the prime example here. Since cyber-norms and 
confidence building measures also focus on prohibiting critical infrastructure attacks, there is 
room for consensus here (Pawlak 2016). Second, restricting only 0-days while allowing the use 
of N-days and phishing leaves states with enough room to manoeuvre for limited offensive 
operations. 0-day exploits are not a requirement for effective cyber-operations, but rather a 
luxury item. Third, there already exists a worldwide ecosystem and infrastructure for disclosing 
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and managing vulnerabilities, from CERT information sharing to coordinated vulnerability dis-
closure policies and bug-bounties within companies, that could be utilized for such a regime 
(Schulze 2019). 
To be effective, the regulation of 0-days requires at least two components: a regime that fo-
cuses on state behaviour (use of 0-days), and a second component that addresses the private 
sector dominance in emanating zero-days.  
 INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS (IVEP) 
Currently, the USA, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and China have a published vulnerabili-
ties equity process (VEP), with other countries like Germany working on one (Herpig & 
Schwartz 2019). VEPs are inter-agency processes that gauge the offensive and defensive 
value of 0-day vulnerabilities. VEPs try to answer the question, whether a government obtained 
0-day vulnerability is kept secret and being utilized for offensive purposes, or whether the 
knowledge of this vulnerability is being disclosed to the software-vendor, thus increasing de-
fence. After being notified of a vulnerability, the vendor ideally patches the vulnerability and 
thus immunizes the software system against any further attacks based on this vulnerability. 
The idea behind a VEP is to restrict certain types of offensive cyber-capability that represent a 
high-risk for a state, while permitting the use of 0-days that entail little risk (Healey 2016). Vul-
nerabilities in the core Internet or encryption protocols, would entail global and collective risks, 
because they affect everyone using the same software, while others, for example software in 
country-specific military equipment, only entail localized risks. 
Since many states started to restrict 0-days for their own use, it is reasonable to envision a 
global and collective process reducing the risk emanating from 0-day vulnerabilities, an Inter-
national Vulnerabilities Equities Process (IVEP). The concept has been brainstormed at the 
UN Disarmament Center, but not much has been published about this (United Nations Institute 
for Disarmament Research 2018). An IVEP could be grafted upon national VEP processes but 
would require an international organization that acts as a hub to which states then will disclose 
their vulnerabilities, that went through their domestic VEP in the first place. The organization, 
consisting of member-states and IT-security experts would then assess the vulnerabilities. Like 
on the national level there could be two options a) retain a vulnerability for exclusive use among 
IVEP members or b) disclosing it to the vendor. Exclusive access to vulnerability information 
could be a useful carrot to ensure membership participation, since members gain something 
from adhering to such a regime. Knowing of a 0-day before others allows to immunize systems 
first or to employ this 0-day for own offensive cyber-operations. It could be modelled after al-
ready existing threat sharing programs in cyber-security, for example the Zero Day Initiative. 
CERTS for example regular share threat indicators in rather exclusive circles to which not eve-
ryone has access. Maylin Fidler (2014) suggests, that because of trust issues, such a regime 
should focus on like-minded states first, and then gradually expand: “NATO could institute a 
group disclosure program: when one member stockpiles a vulnerability, it could also disclose 
the vulnerability to a NATO clearinghouse. NATO members could then protect themselves 
against that vulnerability, or potentially also make use of it” (Fidler 2014, 162). The IVEP sec-
retariat could also be tasked with measuring compliance. Violators of the agreement could be 
sanctioned with exclusion from relevant information streamed. An IVEP secretariat could also 
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have the role of assisting less-developed member-states with mitigation strategies or supple-
ment national VEP processes in the first place. Many smaller cyber-powers often lack the ex-
pertise and know-how to evaluate 0-day by themselves and thus are unable to set up VEP. An 
IVEP secretariat, doing the 0-day equities on a national level could inform national VEP pro-
cesses.  
There are, however, major obstacles to overcome. First, states are reluctant to share their 
“crown jewel” vulnerabilities, even among close partners such as the Five-Eyes intelligence 
alliance of NATO. Sharing knowledge of a 0-day reduces its operational value, since others 
can start to immunize themselves against attacks based on the vulnerable. 0-days are only 
valuable when nobody else knows about them (Nobody but us, or NOBUS principle). Sharing 
vulnerabilities also might uncover espionage assets and shed light on the relative operational 
capacity or cyber-power of states, which they are unwilling to uncover (Aitel & Tait 2016). 
Lastly, disclosing custom-developed vulnerabilities to an IVEP means wasted (financial) re-
sources, and thus comes with no return of investment for the disclosing state. Anonymous 
disclosure could be an option for states in sharing the vulnerabilities without revealing their 
capability and know-how.  
Second, it can be assumed that states might have different assessments regarding disclosing 
or hoarding vulnerabilities within an IVEP. One country could vote against disclosing it, be-
cause it uses it for its own offense, while others want to disclose it to the vendor. This might 
create international tension and requires an effective governance model that accounts for these 
types of disagreement. 
Third, an IVEP regime introduces another layer of complexity. Coordinated Vulnerability Dis-
closure is already a complex and fragmented endeavour (Schulze 2019). Currently, bug dis-
closure operates mostly in a decentralized: researchers commit vulnerabilities directly to the 
vendor. The same is true for states with a VEP that decide to disclose. Introducing another 
layer, another organization that debates about the very same vulnerability that has been dis-
cussed on a national level, might be inefficient, since too much time goes by before the issue 
is patched. Additionally, an IVEP secretariat might be a profound target by hostile cyber-oper-
ations and thus might have difficulties in ensuring the security and privacy of meetings and 
vulnerability information. Another option could be, that members and civil-society researchers 
could disclose vulnerabilities to the IVEP secretariat voluntarily, thus increasing its reach 
Fourth, since domestic retention of 0-days is temporary anyway, this fact could be an incentive 
to disclose 0-days at the end of their lifecycle.  
As such, this is just a rough sketch of an IVEP and more research needs to be done. 
 0-DAY EMISSIONS TRADING REGIME 
If digital assets are no weapons, maybe the cognitive heuristic of an arms control regime is 
misleading anyway. Maybe an alternative paradigm could be utilized, that treats vulnerabilities 
as a by-product or a negative emission of industrialized software production. Vulnerabilities are 
mostly caused by the private sector, due to negligence, fast software innovation cycles, agile 
software development, outsourcing, bad quality assurance, and in-house vulnerability proce-
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dures. Since an IVEP regime only addresses the state-side of the problem, a vulnerability emis-
sion-trading regime could be used to create market incentives for more secure software design, 
resulting in less vulnerabilities. The international climate regime might be a role model, since it 
focuses on both state and private actors. Vulnerabilities in a globalized, tech-interdependent 
world are comparable CO2 emissions and climate change is comparable to the problem of 
global cyber-security: it is a global, collective action problem, plagued with free-riding and in-
compatible national-interests as well. The climate regime evolved in a step-by-step process 
over the last 50 years (Bodansky 2001). It faced similar problems like these identified for the 
cyber-domain in the chapters before, like competing ideologies (climate change denial, North 
vs. South) and the issue of verification and compliance. 
The climate regime is complex, so I will focus only on one tool: emissions trading. Emissions 
are based on the idea, that a price is put on pollution, which creates an economic incentive to 
reduce emissions. A central authority must define a cap of allowed emissions per organization 
per year and watch over its compliance: 
“Once the cap has been set and covered entities specified, tradable emissions al-
lowances (rights to emit) are distributed (either auctioned or freely allocated, or some 
combination of these). Each allowance authorizes the release of a specified amount 
of Greenhouse Gas emissions, generally one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e). The total number of allowances is equivalent to the overall emissions cap 
(e.g., if a cap of one million tons of emissions is set, one million one-ton allowances 
will be issued). Covered entities must submit allowances equivalent to the level of 
emissions for which they are responsible at the end of each of the program’s com-
pliance periods” (Center for Climate Energy Solutions 2011). 
This model could be translated to the software world. Currently, it is estimated, that 1000 lines 
of software code include 10-50 bugs, some of which are vulnerabilities and even fewer of them 
can be exploited by attackers. Every year, a certain number of vulnerabilities are patched by 
each software vendor per year. For example, Vulnerability sharing programs “together pub-
lished 1,026 vulnerabilities, of which 425 (44 percent) target Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, Sun and 
Adobe products” (Frei 2014, 12). This could be a rough estimate for gauging the degree of 
tolerable 0-day emissions per year, as it scales with the size of a company and the number of 
software products it releases. Thus, companies must buy a permit to exhaust more than say 
100 vulnerabilities per year. Prices for allowances could be gauged by utilizing market prices 
that exploit brokers such as Zerodium pay to hackers. The income generated with a cap and 
trade regime could be redistributed for the mitigation of cyber-security incidents, bounty-pay-
ments for ethical hackers and vulnerability researchers, or for developing more secure software 
architectures. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The two sketched approaches could help to alleviate some of the aforementioned problems of 
digital arms control regimes. With regard to 0-days, the definitional problems are considerably 
smaller compared to the issue of cyber-weapons. VEP processes by design address the dual-
use nature of 0-days, for offensive and defensive purposes, and so would an IVEP process. 
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Combined with a 0-day emissions trading regime, the private/public dichotomy could also be 
addressed, since the vast majority of 0-day vulnerabilities is created by the industry. Both IVEP 
and 0-day emissions trading would regulate a clearly defined object, namely 0-days. Admit-
tedly, the issue of verification and regime enforcement remains unsolved, as long as the attrib-
ution problem persists. Both an IVEP and an emissions regime would have effects on 0-day 
black markets since they are likely to address the price structure that black hat hackers are 
willing to pay for 0-days (Schulze 2019). If done correctly, an IVEP regime could counter power 
balances and asymmetries between more and less advanced companies and provide a mech-
anism for lower advanced states to supplement national VEPs. If the incentive structure is done 
right, it might also be in states interest to participate, however, there is a long way to go and 
details need to be sketched out. An IVEP and an emission regime also are ideologically neutral, 
and least regarding cyber vs. information security. 0-days are an issue in authoritarian and 
democratic countries alike. However, the issue of espionage and intelligence incentives is likely 
to remain unsolved with such a regime. 
The purpose of this paper was to challenge the arms control paradigm for cyber-weapons. It 
was argued, that maybe this is not the right lens since it does not account for many of the 
characteristics of the digital domain. More private sector-oriented regimes like civil aviation or 
emissions-trading regimes could be more fruitful as an analogy. The paper proposed a very 
rough sketch of two-possible avenues to pursue, although many questions remain unsolved. 
Especially the attribution issue that lies at the core of cyber-security is a challenge. However, 
even arms control in the digital domain seems very unlikely at the moment, we should not forget 
that the situation looked equally grim for other types of regimes. The negative effects of Green-
house Gas Emissions have been known for more than a hundred years now and the climate 
change regime, as inefficient as it currently is because it does not meaningfully stop climate 
change, only took shape in the last 30 years. A similar slow process can be expected in the 
digital domain. 
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ABSTRACT 
The cyberspace increasingly becomes an important domain for military activities and regular 
hacking incidents underline the necessity for effective defensive measures. The development 
of offensive capabilities (often dubbed "cyber weapons") on the other hand raises questions, 
how such military tools can get secured and cyber arms races prevented by measures of arms 
control. Whereas the domain cyberspace with its specific features prevents the application of 
established measures, the computer sciences provides approaches that can get applied or 
adapted for the specific tasks of arms control and especially its practical measures of verifica-
tion. The contribution will discuss these possibilities, highlight applicable scenarios and identi-
fies further research questions. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK  
Over the last several years, cyber attacks had become a regularly used measure within inter-
state conflicts. Although the attribution of these attacks to specific state actors is seldom suffi-
cient, the disturbance, disruption or even destruction of IT systems increasingly becomes a 
realistic threat for states. Under this impression and the comprehension of the interconnected-
ness and dependencies of modern societies from IT systems and their services, a growing 
number of states worldwide have started to recognize the cyberspace as the next military do-
main (UNIDIR, 2013). Beside preparations for defensive measures, tactics and the necessary 
tools, the strategic planning of some military forces also involves the establishment of offensive 
capabilities. Where some states argue that this is a necessary prerequisite for deterring foreign 
malicious actors (McKenzie, 2017), others understand such capacities as appropriate 
measures to react to cyber attacks by actively disturbing or even destroying the attacker’s IT 
systems (Brangetto et al., 2014). Unfortunately, for a growing number of states cyber weapons 
are also becoming a regular part of their military, strategic and tactical planning within the com-
plex military corpus (UK Government, 2016; USA-DOD, 2018). Whereas these projects "create 
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facts", the international community still struggles with agreeing on binding norms of state be-
havior and questions how established rules of international law apply to this new domain (Tikk 
& Kerttunen, 2017). These debates include the challenge of determining an appropriate re-
sponse to lawfully regulate the ongoing militarization of cyberspace, the questions of how to 
slow down the cyber armament and prevent an arms race in this domain. Nevertheless, in the 
last years important attempts have been conducted nationally and internationally to propose 
and develop such standards as well as political measures for confidence building in cyberspace 
(Tikk, Homburger et al., 2017)⁠. Exemplary for this is the work of the OSCE (OSCE, 2016b, 
2016a)⁠⁠ and the UN (UN-GGE, 2012, 2015)⁠ as well as individual states and alliances such as 
the "Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace" (France-Gov, 2018)⁠ or the "Common-
wealth Cyber Declaration" (Commonwealth, 2018)⁠. A very important contribution had been 
made by the first and second versions of the Tallinn Manuals (NATO, 2013; Schmitt & Vihul, 
2017) by discussing the applicability of existing rules of international law to the cyberspace and 
the actions of states in this domain in times of war and peace. On the other side, the attempts 
of confining the ongoing cyber arms race by applying the concepts of established practical 
measures of arms control, non-proliferation or the "lessons learned" from other military tech-
nological developments still come quickly to a stop (Alwardt et al., 2017; Neuneck, 2014; Rein-
hold, 2019; Reinhold & Reuter, 2019)⁠. Besides misleading political perceptions of the cyber-
space and its working principles, the specific technical features of the cyberspace, that differ 
from other, and physical domains prevent the application of existing knowledge and procedures 
(Burgers & Robinson, 2018; Geers, 2010)⁠. This fact becomes exemplary obvious by the cur-
rently missing, commonly shared and binding definition for the concept of cyber weapons. 
This term is - despite its widely usage - a very misleading expression. In difference to conven-
tional military weapons, the cyberspace offers multiple different ways to spy, influence, disrupt 
or destroy foreign IT systems. The methods and tools differ for varying actors but all of them 
result more or less in the intrusion of IT systems and jeopardize its intended functionality, a 
process that can either happen open and direct or concealed and successive. Most of the 
malicious tools of the cyberspace rely on the same "base material": the knowledge of vulnera-
bilities in IT products and its practical application as so called "exploits". These are necessary 
to circumvent IT protection measures and to deploy the malicious code - the so called "payload" 
- which executes the intended operations, either espionage and data theft or the interference 
with the running IT system and its services (Wrozek, 2017).  
2. METHOD AND RESULTS  
Based on the described situation and its challenges, the talk assesses the current state of the 
militarization of the cyberspace as well as the presumably existing or actively developed cyber 
weapons. It analyses the current scientific and political perspective on cyber weapons and 
discusses the technical assumptions of its functionality. Current definitions of cyber weapons 
concentrate on the intention or the usage of malicious IT tools (Mele, 2013; Rid & McBurney, 
2012), which is sufficient for political agreements and norms that aim to regulate the handling, 
the usage or the trading of such malicious tools. In contrast, the argumentation of this contri-
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bution follows the premise that for practical arms control measures the very specific technolog-
ical features of cyber weapons, that differ from other weaponized technologies need to get 
considered independently, without misleading comparisons or analogies to established ap-
proaches for other weapons technologies like conventional weapons, biological, chemical or 
nuclear weapons (Perkovich & Levite, 2017). Starting with an assessment of existing ap-
proaches of describing and categorizing cyber weapons (Herr, 2014; Maathuis et al., 2016, 
2018; Mele, 2013; Rid, 2012), the contribution will provide a technical assessment of these 
particularities that need to get considered for cyberspace specific future arms control and non-
proliferation approaches. An important part of this assessment is the identification and evalua-
tion of physically measurable parameters that can be used to develop and implement practical 
arms control approaches (Reinhold, 2019).  
Within the efforts and debates of arms control, an important element of peace and security 
politics of the last decades had been the challenge of limiting the deliberate or undeliberate 
destruction potential of weapons technologies. Regarding the militarization of the cyberspace 
the virtuality of this domain, its absence of physical boundaries and the seamless multiplication 
of code and data undermine most of the so far developed measures and procedures for secur-
ing weapon stockpiles or mutually controlling the military systems. For the challenge of restrict-
ing and monitoring specific cyber technologies, its military application or supervising agreed 
limits of stockpiles for cyber weapons it will be necessary to point out in detail which specific 
technical aspect, component, and functions are concerned and how its control can get imple-
mented. Based on a discussion of the differences of physical domains in comparison to the 
cyberspace, the limitations of former arms control approaches and the challenges that arise 
from this situation, the contribution aims to provide an in-depth analysis of these specifics and 
design principles as well as of the cyberspace, as the underlying technology that differ from 
former weapon technologies. It follows the perspective of arms control which searches for the 
critical components and technical thresholds that transforms a technology, its development or 
deployment into a weapon (Shabashnyi, 2019) as an indicator for a necessary regulation or 
supervision. 
In strong contrast to this problematic and apparently unsolvable situation, an in-depth review 
of the core mechanisms of practical arms control measures - counting, tracing and limiting - 
reveals, that similar challenges had already been dealt with in the computer sciences in many 
other contexts. Examples are digital rights management (DRM) systems that seek to verify or 
restrict the usage of digital goods - which is basically a question of non-proliferation - or the 
blockchain mechanism that provides reliable and tamper-proof storage of data and information 
within any kind of processes, a core necessity for arms trade regulation. Additional examples 
are networking techniques like the upcoming IPv6 that allows a unique, worldwide identification 
of any IT device or the border gateway protocol (BGP) which is used to define borders and self-
contained entities with a clearly defined responsibility. Although only as a first step, the contri-
bution follows the premise that these existing developments can be applied or adapted for the 
challenges of developing necessary practical measures for cyber arms control.  
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3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
With its results, the contribution aims to present new approaches to arms control for the cyber-
space on the basis of established computer science technologies. It will illustrate the steps to 
assess, develop and implement the necessary measures and evaluate its prospects, applicable 
scenarios as well as its limitations and possible pitfalls. In conclusion, it will give an outlook on 
what questions need further research and where computer scientists can contribute to the chal-
lenge of peace, security and international stability in the cyberspace. 
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ABSTRACT 
The use of information technology (IT) in peace, conflict and security raises some questions, 
i.e. whether the use of IT can be limited exclusively to so-called advantageous purposes and 
applications and whether improper use can be prevented. This ambivalence is called a dual-
use dilemma, meaning that objects, knowledge and technology can find both useful and harm-
ful applications. Dual-use questions have been addressed in various disciplines, in particular 
in nuclear technology and the production of nuclear weapons, but also in chemistry and biology. 
In all these disciplines, dual-use topics in technical development and education have been 
discussed and addressed. Nevertheless, the importance of dual-use differs slightly, depending 
on the technology and its risks, as well as its distribution and application. Nuclear technology 
is less accessible than biotechnology, which in turn is less accessible than IT. 
 INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, NATO states recognized cyberspace as a military domain, in order to assess cyber 
operations as an attack or to become active themselves (NATO, 2016). Cyberspace forces are 
expanding worldwide, while the use of IT in all areas of life is increasing. This raises more than 
ever the question of evaluating research and development in computer science with regard to 
potential military uses of software developed for civilian use. In atomic physics, biology and 
chemistry, the dual-use risks were intensively studied (Altmann et al., 2017; Liebert et al., 2009; 
Tucker, 2012). These studies have also helped to identify techniques for evaluating and con-
trolling these same risks and have provided the basis for the concept of Dual-Use Research of 
Concern (DURC). DURC refers to research, (new) technologies, or information that has the 
potential for beneficial and harmful applications (Oltmann, 2015). The question is therefore 
whether computer science can also be used to define an IT Research and Development of 
Concern that requires a context-based dual-use impact assessment and, similar to the life sci-
ences, helps to reduce the potential for misuse during software development. 
The challenge is that the respective dual-use risk depends on the state and process of research 
and development of the respective work, while the technology remains inherently ambivalent. 
In particular, software is characterized by its versatility of use and adaptation in conducive and 
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harmful contexts, and by its indirect effect which differs substantially from directly harmful ABC 
weapons (Carr, 2013; Lin, 2016, 119). Nevertheless, in order to make evaluations and design 
decisions that take the dual-use risk into consideration, individual case studies are required 
which must be very context- and technology-specific. Such case studies not only evaluate a 
single technology, but also contribute to the development of formal and informal dual-use gov-
ernance methods (Tucker, 2012, 30–39) and the evolution of the socio-technical safety culture. 
 STATE OF RESEARCH 
Dual-use is widely and divergently applied and defined, as the term can refer to research, 
knowledge, as well as technologies and individual objects (Forge, 2010; Harris, 2016). An early 
assessment of the consequences or use of one's own research and development is particularly 
difficult if design decisions are possible with little effort (Collingridge, 1980). There are different 
methods for dual-use assessment, which are based on the assessment of technology conse-
quences (Grunwald, 2002; Liebert, 2011). The methods are scenario-based and application-
oriented, and must therefore always be integrated into the specific research or development 
project in order to be able to exclude the more pessimistic scenario by design adaptations on 
a case-by-case basis (von Schomberg, 2006). 
For software development, it is precisely against the background of the securitization of cyber-
space (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009), the military endeavour to comprehensively elucidate 
(Müller & Schörnig, 2006), and the increasing investment in strategic offensive development 
(Reinhold, 2016) the question of how developers can estimate the risk of misuse of their re-
search and development. 
So far, the dual-use debate in computer science has mainly led to cryptography (Vella, 2017) 
and to the proliferation of spyware through additions to the Wassenaar Agreement in 2013 and 
2016 (Herr, 2016). And although software dual-use is becoming a problem again and again as 
part of weapons modernization (Bernhardt & Ruhmann, 2017; Reuter & Kaufhold, 2018b), em-
pirical case studies on dual-use IT are lacking (Leng, 2013; Lin, 2016). On the one hand, mod-
ern software development is characterized by agile and iterative process models such as Ex-
treme Programming and Scrum, in which developers and managers can react flexibly to 
changes in (customer) requirements (Dingsøyr et al., 2012). Therefore, it is obvious that dual-
use potentials need to be checked not only in the initial planning of software, but process-
accompanying. On the other hand, the flexibility in using software in different application con-
texts is the essential challenge for dual-use impact assessment and therefore must be funda-
mentally different from life sciences (Lin, 2016, 119). The aim is both to minimize risks by non-
state actors, and to anticipate the risk of uncontrolled distribution of malware or misunderstand-
ings between states. 
Alongside the entrepreneurial analysis of influencers and moods, social media analytics tool 
are also playing an increasingly important role: On the one hand, they enable the identification 
of situations of use in social conflicts or crises (Reuter & Kaufhold, 2018a; Reuter et al., 2017), 
but also imply a particular potential for abuse in the context of cyber espionage (Neuneck, 
2017) or (political) persecution. Therefore, the question arises how potential dual-use compo-
nents and indicators can already be identified in software research and development. 
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 GOVERNANCE, ACTORS AND CYBERSECURITY? 
Studying cybersecurity implies investigating the interaction of technological determinants with 
the social world. Cyberspace is a material structure and, at the same time, an information en-
vironment operated and shaped by humans. In other words, it is “a ‘virtual’ layer of information 
riding on a physical layer of hardware” (Betz and Stevens, 2011: 37). The material side links it 
to territorial boundaries and thus to political authority (laws, property rights), whereas the infor-
mation facet expands beyond territorially defined political organization (Lambach, 2019: 3). 
However, the organization of political authority over cyberspace is constantly evolving and in-
herently complex (Boeke, 2018: 3). What is even more, the interaction between an ever-greater 
number of actors makes spatial and temporal distances collapse. Attribution problems multiply 
and become more acute (Rid & Buchanan, 2014). It is thus essentially contested who makes 
for what reasons decisions on cybersecurity that always involve distributive consequences for 
societies. In other words, who are the key actors of securing cyberspace? 
First, the state as manager of political authority (Genschel & Zangl, 2014) is increasingly com-
mitted to make decisions on cybersecurity and has recently enhanced its capacities to do so 
(Weiss & Jankauskas, 2019). The most intense efforts are clearly observable in the United 
States, China and, partly, Russia (Lindsay, 2015). Yet, states also need to draw on expertise 
of third parties, which are, however, often hard to control. Thus, the actor constellation within 
cyberspace is populated by two further powerful groups. Second, transnational organizations 
have a significant say in cyberspace. In contrast to postal systems or telecommunications, 
which are predominantly addressed within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
cyberspace is not organized around one specialized (inter-state) organization of the United 
Nations. Instead, transnational organizations exercise authority with respect to specific func-
tions (Glen, 2014). For instance, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) regulates 
domain names, IP addressing, and other Internet protocol resources. Meanwhile, it operates 
as part of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which has 
evolved as an independent non-profit organization that has transitioned its functions to the 
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global multi-stakeholder community instead of being a U.S. government agency. Last, but def-
initely not least, private actors in general and corporate firms, in particular, are the protagonists 
in constructing, operating and partly protecting this governance setting (Choucri, 2012: 40; 
Healey, 2013). For instance, the private sector controls about 90 percent of the critical infra-
structure in the United States (U.S.) (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 15).  
Against the backdrop of this actor constellation, our paper will focus on governance arrange-
ments between, on the one hand, governments, and the latter group, on the other. More spe-
cifically, we seek to find out how national institutions shape the way that governments employ 
private actors to protect their critical infrastructures.  
 GOVERNMENTS AND CYBERSECURITY? 
Governments’ approaches to cybersecurity have been far from uniform. To the contrary, we 
observe considerable variation across states – ranging from (i) hierarchical capacity-building, 
(ii) the establishment of public-private partnerships (PPP), and (iii) a complete reliance on pri-
vate actors. The main criterion on how to distinguish between these approaches is the extent 
to which a government exercises hierarchical authority over specific cybersecurity policies. In 
other words, does a government choose a state-driven (top-down) or operator-driven (bottom-
up) approach? First, when the state literally steps in by creating additional capacity, the bene-
ficiaries of the new technologies – mostly private actors – hardly bear the society-wide risks 
(Nye, 2017). State control is primarily preserved. Second, public-private partnerships are 
mostly an exchange relationship between the state and private actors; yet, they often lack per-
formance, when they are unable to accommodate diverging interests (Carr, 2016). Finally, the 
provision of cybersecurity may also be outsourced to private actors, yet regulated by govern-
ments so that private actors carry the burden of protection and possibly the compensation for 
damage. Their competence becomes indispensable for governments, the longer they rely on 
these actors.  
In our prior research, we found one predominant pattern of how most states sought to secure 
cyberspace (Weiss & Jankauskas, 2019). The nature of the cybersecurity problem induced the 
choice of more or less hierarchical control. While the logic of national security led governments 
to maintain close control over the defense against military attacks (i.e., threats), functional im-
peratives impelled them to mobilize third parties in order to address the diffuse cyberspace 
vulnerabilities (i.e., risks). Beyond this general pattern, however, another finding was similarly 
relevant; yet so far largely ignored. Within one domain, we found substantial variation between 
states: government responses to protect critical infrastructure vary and thus remained a lacuna. 
Some states employed hierarchical instruments with state agencies in charge, while others 
provided more leeway to private actors. Thus, our contribution to SCIENCE · PEACE · 
SECURITY ’19 will ask why some governments protect critical infrastructures through hierar-
chical control, whereas others through softer forms of inducements? 
 WHAT DRIVES VARIETIES OF CYBERSECURITY? 
Given similar challenges, but varying responses, we depart from the premise that domestic 
differences may account for the observable variation. Therefore, the coordination between the 
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government and private actors is shaped by institutional foundations rather than by technolog-
ical determinants. We argue that a comparative political economy and thus distinct types of 
institutional settings explain how governments design the protection of critical infrastructures. 
In an institutional setting, all stakeholders apply typical strategies, follow routine approaches to 
address challenges and share the same decision-making rules, so that stable expectations 
about future behavior are established. We suggest that different coordination mechanisms lead 
to comparative advantages, which generate a distinct logic of action within the national cyber-
security sector (De Vore & Weiss, 2014). 
The extent of hierarchical control that governments exercise in their protection of critical infra-
structures depends on the existence of formal and informal institutions that provide information 
for coordination. Our paper distinguishes between two ideal-typical institutional settings that 
we will apply to explore the United Kingdom and France respectively. While the UK’s market- 
and contract-based institutions suggest non-hierarchical control mechanisms, strategic coordi-
nation and informal adjustments shape a more prominent role for the traditional national secu-
rity state in France (Weiss, forthcoming). Thus, we expect a more bottom-up approach by the 
UK and, at the same time, a top-down approach in France. In both cases, however, we suggest 
that the distinct opportunities provided by the varying institutional settings generate incentives 
and routine practices, which are, in turn, assumed to shape a government’s approach to provid-
ing cybersecurity. These theoretical suggestions are substantiated by an empirical exploration 
of the liberal United Kingdom and dirigiste France and how each of them sought to protect its 
critical infrastructure since the 2010s.  
 THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND FRANCE 
What both the United Kingdom and France have in common, is their use of an operator-driven 
(“bottom - up”) approach to identifying threats to critical infrastructures. In contrast to a top-
down approach, governments have not taken a leading role in defining and prioritizing critical 
services. Instead, they have delegated this responsibility to private operators of critical infra-
structures, whom they have identified as stakeholder-operators of critical infrastructure, also 
known as Vital Operators (VOs). These VOs are requested to identify and evaluate critical 
services and systems. In both the UK and France, the responsibility is assigned to the relevant 
VOs by a responsible government body, such as the Centre for the Protection of National In-
frastructure (CPNI) for the UK and the French Network and Information Security Agency 
(ANSSI) (Breznitz, 2006).  
In addition, the UK and France are involved in the same international institutions, such as the 
informal internet governance initiative Meridian Forum for Global Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion. The latter is a forum for trust-building and consultation of more than 50 governments and 
global organizations like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013). In a similar vein, both countries 
have been members of the European Union (EU) and thus transposed the directive on security 
of network and information systems NIS) into national laws (European Parliament and Council, 
2016). The latter’s objective is to outline the minimum essential information service areas (e.g. 
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traditional critical infrastructure operators, such as energy, health, water; plus, digital service 
providers, such as online marketplaces, online search engines and cloud computing services). 
Despite these commonalities, differences between the UK and France prevail.  
The United Kingdom’s approach to protecting critical infrastructures has been heavily influ-
enced by the role model of the United States (esp. their increasing privatization and PPPs). 
For instance, the UK increasingly employed ‘supervisory control and data acquisition systems’ 
(SCADA systems), which allow for more central and remote control of critical infrastructure. 
Yet, they were also highly vulnerable, when they became connected to the internet (Carr, 2016: 
45–53). The main challenge of private-sector involvement is that private owners of critical in-
frastructure accept responsibility for securing their systems only to the point that it is profitable. 
This implies that private owners tend to secure the critical infrastructure only to the extent that 
the cost of dealing with an outage promises to cost more than preventing it (Carr, 2016: 57). In 
2015 the UK’s government allocated £650 million to the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructures (CPNI) to implement the National Cyber Security Programme. Of this funding, 
20 percent went to public and private critical cyber infrastructure, which are used by the CPNI 
to provide guidance to critical infrastructure owners on cyber threats and operates information 
exchanges to facilitate public-private information-sharing on threats and protective measures 
(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013: 50). In other words, private actors 
play a very important role in the UK’s protection of critical infrastructures.  
By contrast, France’s government agency, called the French Network and Information Security 
Agency (ANSSI), is predominantly in charge of coordinating various actors responsible for cy-
berspace (Avant & Westerwinter, 2016). With its regulatory framework for Critical Infrastruc-
tures Information Protection (CIIP law), France has presented a policy to address the vulnera-
bilities generated by a dependence on a public-private partnership. The CIIP was passed into 
law in December 2013 and applies to “more than 200 public and private operators”. Four main 
measures were introduced with its implementation: it obliged the operators to notify their cyber 
incidents; it set minimal security standards; it created a legal basis for the inspection of the 
operators to test their cybersecurity preparedness; and it laid the groundwork for more extreme 
measures “in the case of a major crisis, declared by the Prime Minister”. The goal was to reduce 
the risk of potentially successful cyberattacks by exploitation of critical infrastructures. This ef-
fort was led and implemented by ANSSI. It directly reports to the Secretary General for Defense 
and National Security and is hierarchically a government agency (Weiss & Jankauskas, 2019). 
Moreover, the government has defined 12 vital sectors which are divided in three main areas 
as follows: the state sectors (Public Services, Military Operations, Judicial Functions, Space 
and Research), the civil protection sectors (Health, Water Management, Food) and lastly the 
areas of economic and social life of the nation (Energy, Electronic communications, Audiovisual 
and Information Systems, Transport, Economy, Industry). In turn, through the establishment of 
relevant mandates, the government defines a list of Vital Operators, whereby each operator is 
related to one critical sector (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013: 21–
22). In other words, the French government plays a more prominent role when it comes to 
organizing the protection of critical infrastructures.  
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 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our paper will start by theorizing the actor constellations in cyberspace. Subsequently, we will 
conceptualize how governments develop varying strategies  
for protecting critical infrastructures. Our objective is to explain this variation by building on the 
institutional foundations of domestic political economies. This will provide a framework for ap-
proaching the different degrees of hierarchical control in the United Kingdom and France. The 
preceding section has already indicated some of the differences, which we will further explore 
in our paper. While the UK builds more strongly on public-private partnerships, France insists 
on a relatively strong role for state institutions.  
We seek to make three contributions to scholarship. First, we close a gap in the literature on 
how varying governance responses to similar disruptive technologies are based on nationally 
predominant institutional settings. Second, we supplement our research program that has 
stressed the problem structure to shape the governance design of securing cyberspace by 
addressing the theoretically indeterminate governance of critical infrastructures. The integra-
tion of an intervening variable, varieties of institutional foundations, accounts for those in-
stances, for which the initial distinction between risks and threats indicated rather than ex-
plained the choice of a governance design. Third, we seek to transfer theoretical concepts 
successful in explaining variation of traditional industries to the new digital economy. This will 
ultimately expand the scope of these theoretical approaches.  
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ABSTRACT 
Attribution consists of technical, legal and politically defined processes. However, the interna-
tional community has not yet defined processes unilaterally, even though the UN GGE has 
proposed to address the increase of cyber operations. Taking existing threat exchange stand-
ards into account, this paper presents an approach to support efforts for more effective attrib-
ution by developing a platform with the common open source threat exchange formats STIX 
and MEAC. Furthermore, the platform is evaluated in terms of usability. 
 ATTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS IN CYBER SPACE 
As in criminal courts, attribution is only a question of a degree of certainty, combining social 
and technical indicators in a legitimizing process (Davis et al., 2017; Rid & Buchanan, 2015). 
Following the recommendations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2013, the UN 
members agreed that legal and technical attribution needs to be addressed as a key challenge 
to be able to act on harmful operations through the Security Council (Wolter, 2013). However, 
the details on implementing a unilaterally supported process for legal attribution is still highly 
controversial between key actors, such as the USA, Russia and China.  
Cyber attribution has no universally accepted definition, various scholars interpret it differently. 
For example, Davis et al. claim that "the public attribution of a malicious cyber incident consists 
of identifying the responsible party behind the activity" (2017, V). For Wheeler & Larsen, attrib-
ution is "determining the identity or location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary" 
(Wheeler & Larsen, 2003, 1). In contrast, Rid & Buchanan state that "attribution is the art of 
answering a question as old as crime and punishment: who did it?" (2015, 3). Despite these 
variations, the common intent is to identify the attacker responsible for a malicious activity. The 
process of attribution not only helps to identify the motivation behind an attack but to learn 
about the technology involved in executing the attack (Davis et al., 2017; Rid & Buchanan, 
2015). Attribution can thus be considered as the basis for acting against perpetrators. Further-
more, the process of attribution helps the affected entity to detect vulnerabilities that were ex-
ploited by the threat actor and to come up with preventive measures to strengthen its defence.  
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Technical attribution is defined as determining the identity or origin or both of an attacker or 
any other intermediaries that may or may not be willingly part of the attack (Hunker et al., 2008). 
Cyber attribution is complex and poses various problems: a) attribution cannot be performed 
with the strict use of technology only, b) attribution is not highly desirable in all situations be-
cause it would destroy the internet as a means of open and free communication and c) cyberat-
tacks are not restricted to a particular region; they can span across regions, and d) the source 
of attack my not be the actual initiator. Hence cooperation from different jurisdictions is required 
with respect to attribution techniques (Hunker, 2008). Even though there are plenty of govern-
ment entities, private firms and research organizations with sufficient capacity to conduct in-
vestigations for cyber attribution do not have a standardized methodology for conducting their 
research and use their own taxonomies for their findings (Davis, 2017).  
Technical attribution paves the way for compliance with the legal framework and can be done 
without the context of International Humanitarian Law. Furthermore, in technical attribution, the 
perpetrator can have both criminal and political motives. Even though IT forensics and political 
attribution within the international community would use the same technology and perpetrators 
might even use each other’s exploits as in the example of WannaCry and NotPetya (Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 2016), the debates are led separately. Notable exam-
ples include: the Stuxnet worm unleashed on an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility (Karnous-
kos, 2011), the breach into the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that led to the 
theft of tens of millions of highly sensitive personnel records and the WannaCry ransomware 
attack. The threat actors responsible in each of these cases were identified by a combination 
of social and technical indicators using threat intelligence (Saalbach, 2019). Methods of threat 
intelligence become increasingly advanced. Nevertheless, they lack international standardiza-
tion. 
However, the sharing of threat-related information can leverage the collective knowledge of 
that sharing community and thus improve their security posture and defensive agility. In this 
regard, standardized threat exchange formats can play an important role, as well-structured 
threat information in line with shared standards can be used to facilitate threat information pro-
cessing. Moreover, it is helpful in understanding the tactics, techniques and procedures of an 
attack (Johnson et al., 2016). 
Attribution in cyberspace involves examining and interpreting hard to compare evidence (Davis, 
2017). Despite the interpretive difficulties associated with cyberattack attribution, a variety of 
experts in cyber forensics agreed upon several common indicators that provide a basis for the 
assessment of responsibility. Indicators can be technical, such as text strings, command and 
control infrastructures and malware, but also political, such as the political interest in such a 
compromise, as in the example of Stuxnet. Other indicators are found through an investigation 
into all-source intelligence, socio-cultural and economic areas (Davis II John S, 2017).  
The goal of this paper is to conceptualize a solution for producing threat intelligence and sup-
port credible attribution. This will be followed by an implementation of the proposed solution 
and an evaluation of results. The following research question will be addressed: How can 
threat exchange platforms help to improve cyber attribution?  
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 CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND EXCHANGE FORMATS 
Cyber threat intelligence is required to facilitate cyber attribution. To begin with, a cyber threat 
is defined as “any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an asset through 
unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service.” 
(ENISA, 2009). Hence, an individual or a group posing a threat are considered to be threat 
actors. Threat information is to be understood as any information related to a threat which might 
be helpful to an organization that wants to protect itself against a threat or detect the activities 
of an actor. Major types of threat information include indicators, TTPs (tactics, techniques & 
procedures), security alerts, threat intelligence reports and tool configurations. Consequently, 
threat intelligence can be described as "threat information that has been aggregated, trans-
formed, analyzed, interpreted, or enriched to provide the necessary context for decision-mak-
ing processes" (Johnson, 2016).  
There are plenty of different threat exchange formats, some are open and other are closed 
source, which can be of use for threat intelligence and cyber attribution. In this platform STIX 
(Structured Threat Information Expression) and MAEC (Malware Attribute Enumeration and 
Characterization) are combined to be able to document the relationship between malware and 
threat information, that is crucial for the quality of technical attribution. STIX (OASIS Open, 
2019) is the most popularly used standard and is able to model attack patterns, campaigns, 
identifies, indicators, intrusion sets, malware, reports, threat actors, tools and vulnerabilities. 
Even though there are plenty of other standards to describe specific aspects of a threat/mal-
ware, STIX was developed with a notion that there should be one standard which describes 
every aspect of a threat. Furthermore, MAEC captures detailed information about malware 
samples and is used by malware analysts to model behavior, collections, malware actions, 
malware families and malware instances. In contrast, STIX captures cyber threat information 
that includes only basic information about malware, but it proves to be applicable to a much 
wider audience. 
 REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN OF A THREAT INTELLIGENCE PLATFORM 
Based on a narrative literature review on cyber attribution, cyber threat intelligence, standards 
for threat exchange and existing threat intelligence platforms, which focused on scientific pub-
lications and technical documentations, we identified limitations as well as suggested improve-
ments for threat intelligence platforms. Based on this, a set of 15 technical requirements was 
identified and subsumed into three design goals: 
 User Interface and API: The interface should be responsive and easy to use with some 
basic authentication features. The API should give the possibility of adding and editing 
threat information such as malware samples. 
 Visualization: The prototype should be able to visualize a cyberattack in the form of 
graphs, in which the plotted elements are nothing but the threat actors, their TTP’s, mal-
ware used, vulnerabilities exploited, and the correlation amongst them. By this, the corre-
lation patterns can be known easily. 
 Use of Standards: The prototype should be developed by implementing the standards 
STIX and MAEC only, which is the main priority and does not involve any customization. 
THREAT INTELLIGENCE APPLICATION FOR CYBER ATTRIBUTION  
 
59 
Based on the initial set of requirements, we envision a human-centred development approach. 
Accordingly, we will implement a first version of the prototype and evaluate the functionality 
and usability of the prototype, which is intended as one input for the second iteration of proto-
type development and enhancement. For the evaluation, we plan to use scenario-based 
walkthroughs followed by semi-structured interviews with at least ten participants. Furthermore, 
participants will be encouraged to use the think-aloud protocol (Nielsen, 1992) during the 
walkthrough as it helps in understanding a participant’s perception about the application, 
thereby leading to the discovery of desired functionality, usability issues and user preferences. 
The evaluation will improve the usability of the platform. However, further research and devel-
opment on the communication and analysis of threats between states and international organ-
isations need to be done.  
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ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade, social media established an enormous impact on modern culture not only 
for everyday life uses, but also during natural and man-made crises and conflicts. For instance, 
Facebook was part of the Arabic Spring, in which the tool facilitated the communication and 
interaction between participants of political protests. However, social media is not only used 
for good purposes and offers potentials for misuse: fake news manipulate public discourses, 
cyber terrorism aims to recruit new members and disseminate ideologies, and social bots in-
fluence economic as well as political processes. Based on the notions of cultural violence and 
cultural peace as well as the phenomena of fake news, terrorism, and social bots, this paper 
outlines countermeasures to facilitate cultural peace and security. 
 INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK  
Social media are defined as a “group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological 
and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-
generated content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Besides everyday life uses, such as self-pro-
motion, relationship building, news posting or information searching (Robinson et al., 2017), 
social media are used by journalists for reporting, analysing and collecting information (Stieglitz 
et al., 2018), by organizations to monitor customer feedback and sentiment (Kaufhold et al., 
2017) but also by citizens and emergency services to respond to crises, conflicts and disasters 
(Palen & Hughes, 2018). However, social media is not only used for good purposes and offers 
potentials for misuse, such as the dissemination of fake news or conduction of cyber terrorism 
(Kaufhold & Reuter, 2019). Sometimes, such misuse is amplified by social bots, which are 
“computer algorithms which automatically generate content and interact with other people in 
social media with the aim to imitate and influence their behaviour” (Ferrara et al., 2016). In this 
paper, we view social media misuse from the perspective of cultural violence. 
In peace research, Galtung (2007) differentiates between direct, structural and cultural vio-
lence. While direct violence is the most visible form of violence (e.g. injuring or killing people), 
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structural violence is defined as “unjust economic, social and political conditions and institutions 
that harm people by preventing them from their basic needs” (Campbell et al., 2010). Based 
on this, cultural violence describes “all aspects of a culture that are used to justify direct or 
structural violence” (Galtung, 2007). In his definition, Galtung mentions the six cultural areas 
of religion, ideology, language, art, empirical and formal science that are prone to cultural vio-
lence. Accordingly, Galtung (2007) differentiates direct violence as visible as well as structural 
and cultural violence as invisible types of violence. By introducing the term of cultural peace, 
which is understood as the absence of cultural violence (Werkner, 2017, 23), Galtung ( 2007) 
enhances the term of peace to the formula: “Peace = Direct Peace + Structural Peace + Cul-
tural Peace”. To achieve cultural peace, actors must overcome attitudes and behavioural pat-
terns that justify the appliance of violence (Werkner, 2017). Furthermore, malicious practices 
such as account hijacking and malware distribution via social media threaten civil security (Reu-
ter, 2018).  
 FINDINGS 
Based on a narrative literature review, we identified characteristics of and measures against 
fake news, cyber terrorism and social bots within social media. 
 FAKE NEWS 
Fake news can be defined as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and could 
mislead readers” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). They distinguish fake news from similar phenom-
ena like unintentional reporting mistakes, rumours, conspiracy theories, obvious satire, and 
more. Similarly, Sängerlaub (2017) defines fake news as intended disinformation and de-
scribes three types of fake news: First, there are completely fictitious news which he refers to 
as fabricated content. Second, manipulated content is based on true information which is ma-
nipulated in some respects. Third, misinterpreted content refers to correct information which is 
quoted out of context or is intentionally misinterpreted by the author.  
Gatekeeping Gatekeeping is the process through which information, including fake 
news, is filtered for dissemination, e.g. for publication, broadcasting, social 
media, or some other mode of communication (Barzilai-Nahon, 2009). 
Media Literacy  The purpose of media literacy, which is a multi-dimensional process allow-
ing people to access, evaluate and create media, is to help people to pro-
tect themselves from the potentially negative effects of (mass) media (Pot-
ter, 2010). 
Regulation/ 
Law 
Laws may assist in fighting fake news and hate speech by forcing plat-
forms to quickly delete illegal contents though they potentially threaten 
freedom of speech (Müller & Denner, 2017). 
Algorithmic The algorithmic detection of fake news comprises classification-based, 
propagation-based and survey-based approaches (Viviani & Pasi, 2017). 
Table 2. Measures against fake news in social media 
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So far, there is no clear answer on how fake news can be approached the best. It is a complex 
task to identify solutions and responsibilities to prevent individuals and society from possible 
negative effects. Still, researchers have presented several approaches to detect fake news 
(Table 1). 
 CYBER TERRORISM 
Cyber terrorism includes recruiting new members and disseminating ideologies (Reuter, 
Pätsch et al., 2017). Much research about terrorist organizations and social media deals with 
terrorist organizations in general or specifically with the so-called Islamic State (IS, ISIS, ISIL, 
DEASH). Media play a significant role in terrorism: “Without a letter of confession, a farewell 
video by the assassin or a last posting in the social network a bomb attack would be nothing 
else than a capital crime. Only through the terrorist communications strategy, the crime turns 
into a terrorist act.” However, terrorists do “not rely on media-makers, themselves became the 
agent in this game” (Christoph, 2015). And there is a reason for this: “Terrorism can […] only 
gain in importance if it becomes meaningful on the media level”. Therefore, social media offer 
“the advantage of immersion, which means the merger of medium and message. The credibility 
of terrorist narrations is strengthened by spreading it about supposedly reliable portals like 
YouTube” (Christoph, 2015). A variety of different measures to counter terrorism were identified 
in research (Table 2). 
Clarification Clarification means to try answering to the terrorist propaganda with logic 
to invalidate it. It is a complete clarification in terms of a statement, which 
clarifies unknown connections (Reuter, 2017). 
Parody/Satire Parody is a hilarious satirical imitation by distortion and exaggeration. The 
satire is a genre, which criticizes and stultifies events. Both aim at express-
ing mockery about serious issues (Reuter, 2017). 
Hacking Hacking refers to illegal activities, like the blocking of accounts and the 
appeal to the population to report suspected persons as well as legal ac-
tivities by multiplying parodist media (Reuter, 2017). 
Counter- 
Narratives 
A narrative that goes against another narrative. Narratives are compelling 
storyline which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences 
can be drawn (Freedman, 2006). 
Table 3. Measures against terrorism 
 SOCIAL BOTS 
Social bots can be defined as “computer algorithms which automatically generate content and 
interact with other people in social media with the aim to imitate and influence their behaviour” 
(Ferrara, 2016). Their behaviours are already sophisticated as they can establish realistic so-
cial networks and produce credible content with human-like patterns (Ferrara, 2016). Amongst 
others, social bots are used for account hijacking, astroturfing, creation of fake accounts and 
dissemination of spam (Kaufhold, 2019). To counteract social bots, it is first necessary to iden-
tify the respective bot accounts. For this purpose, scholars of social bot detection have devel-
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oped various approaches (Ferrara, 2016). Social bots may be determined through human en-
gagement or through algorithmic analysis of features and social networks, both complemented 
by hybrid approaches (Table 3). Both improvements of the human-like behaviour and of detec-
tion systems can lead to an arms race similar to that observed for spam. 
Crowdsourcing Crowdsourcing relies on identification of social bots by human actors, fol-
lowing the underlying assumption of human beings as most able to recog-
nize linguistic nuances like sarcasm, humour, or commitment (Wang et al., 
2012).  
Social Graph 
Analysis 
Graph-based approaches model social networks visually as finite graphs, 
with nodes illustrating participants of the respective network and edges 
representing relationships (Yan, 2013).  
Feature  
Analysis 
Feature-based approaches execute identification by determining unique 
characteristics and behaviours of social bots. They are further differenti-
ated between machine learning or entropy approaches (Ramalingam & 
Chinnaiah, 2018).  
Hybrid  
Approach 
Hybrid approaches combine different methods, such as adding features to 
a graph-based approach, to increase the accuracy of social bot detection 
(Gao et al., 2015). 
Table 4. Approaches for social bot detection 
 CONTRIBUTION 
This paper examined three phenomena of social media misuse that inflict cultural violence and 
identified countermeasures which potentially improve cultural peace and security in social me-
dia. Based on the results, a differentiation of actors (human, machine) and intentions (mali-
cious, positive) is provided in Table 4. Further research is encouraged to examine additional 
phenomena in social media, such as cultural diversity, and apply a more systematic review of 
existing misuse potentials and countermeasures to draw a more comprehensive picture. 
 Actor 
Human Machine 
Inten-
tion 
Malicious  Fabricated Content, Misinter-
preted Content, Manipulated 
Content, Propaganda, Recruit-
ment 
Account Hijacking, Astroturf-
ing, Fake Accounts, Fake 
Posts, Spam 
Positive Gatekeeping, Media Literacy, 
Laws, Clarification, Parody/Sat-
ire, Hacking, Counter-Narratives 
Crowdsourcing, (Feature, So-
cial Graph, Survey based or 
Hybrid) Detection Algorithms 
Table 5. Actors and intentions for cultural violence and peace. 
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ABSTRACT 
Finding a responsible way to address fake news on social media has become an urgent matter 
both in political and social contexts. Existing studies focus mainly on how to detect and label 
fake news. However, approaches to assist users in making their own assessments are largely 
missing. In this article we present a study on how an indicator-based white-box approach can 
support Twitter-users in assessing tweets. In a first step, we identified indicators for fake news 
that have shown to be promising in previous studies and that are suitable for our idea of a 
white-box approach. Building on that basis of indicators we then designed and implemented 
the browser-plugin TrustyTweet, which aims to assist users on Twitter in assessing tweets by 
showing politically neutral and intuitive warnings without creating reactance. Finally, we present 
the findings of our evaluations carried out with a total of 27 participants, which result in further 
design implications for approaches to assist users in dealing with fake news. 
 INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK  
One of the big current questions in society and politics is how to deal with fake news. Studies 
have shown that it is essential to provide tools to support users on social media. Previous 
research has focused particularly on machine learning algorithms to detect and label fake 
news. For instance, Gupta et al. have designed a browser-plugin to automatically assess the 
credibility of contents on Twitter (Gupta, Kumaraguru, Castillo, & Meier, 2014). Further ap-
proaches (e.g. Fake News AI, http://www.fakenewsai.com) use machine learning techniques 
as well. On the other hand, some approaches are based on whitelists or blacklists (e.g. B.S. 
Detector, http://bsdetector.tech). When using black-box approaches, it is not possible to reason 
why a specific decision was made. Therefore, it runs the risk of creating reactance. We agree 
with other studies that it is necessary to improve media literacy to help users dealing with fake 
news sustainably (Müller & Denner, 2017; Stanoevska-Slabeva, 2017). Hence, white-box ap-
proaches are a crucial strategy. However, all presented applications and approaches are based 
on black-box methods. Even though the smartphone application Fake News Check 
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(https://www.neue-wege-des-lernens.de/projekte/fake-news-check) provides the user with 
transparent reasons why contents might be fake, it does not automatically check for indicators 
and it comes with a big effort.  
 OUR APPROACH 
In our work, as described by Hartwig and Reuter (2019), we intend to contribute to the scientific 
discussion by theoretically exploring the potential of an indicator-based white-box approach to 
assist users on Twitter and more practically to design, implement and evaluate a consistent 
browser-plugin as an artefact regarding to the design science approach. The plugin includes a 
warning concerning six easily comprehensible and politically neutral indicators for fake news, 
detailed information about each indicator and a configuration-feature for personalization.  
 
Figure 1. Exemplary output of TrustyTweet for three tweets. 
 CONTRIBUTION 
We aimed to answer the following first research question: How can we provide a transparent, 
politically neutral and objective assisting tool for users of social media? Taking into account the 
empirical findings, we suggest that our indicator-based white-box approach can be considered 
suitable when applying the following five design implications: personalization to enhance au-
tonomy, transparent and objective information, unambiguousness of warnings, personalized 
noticeability and minimization of false alarms. Moreover, we intended to answer the second 
research question: Does a white-box approach counteract reactance and encourage a learning 
effect? Our findings reveal that our white-box approach is promising to assist users on social 
media without creating reactance but encouraging a learning effect. Therefore, it can be con-
sidered a suitable alternative or supplement to black-box approaches.  
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ABSTRACT 
Smart cities want to provide a better life to their citizens, e.g. regarding health care, infrastruc-
ture, better safety and security. This can be achieved by using more and new technology and 
by interconnecting and analysing new and existent devices. Thus, public spaces and buildings 
will be equipped with more interconnected input and output modalities. This ongoing technolo-
gization of public spaces creates opportunities for making everyone’s life more secure, while 
at the same time everyone’s personal privacy is endangered. So how is this balancing act 
tackled and dealt with right now? What fears do citizens have regarding their security as well 
as their privacy? This paper provides first insights into the topic privacy in smart cities regarding 
that smart cities need data which can be provided by and of people. The paper raises the 
question if collecting people’s data, and thus enabling smart cities, is ethical and if not, how it 
can be assured to be ethical.  
 WHAT IS A SMART CITY? 
There exist different definitions of smart cities. While for some a smart city is a technical and 
infrastructural advanced and sustainable city (Baig et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2018), others see 
more implications, such as sustainability not only towards resources but also towards citizens 
as well as the citizen’s wellbeing in form of healthcare, education and more (Clever et al., 2018; 
K. Zhang et al., 2017). Smart cities need technologies and more important an interlinking be-
tween these technologies, using e.g. the data of cars (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014), drones 
(Khan, 2018; Vattapparamban et al., 2016) or public space camera systems (H. Zhang et al., 
2019). But in order to be smart and not only technologized, the socio-economic implications, 
which result from this technologization need to be examined (Allam, 2019) for cities to be truly 
smart and sustainable. Eckhoff and Wagner (2018) see smart cities as cities which “integrate 
information technology into every aspect of city life”. They consider the wellbeing of their citi-
zens just as one of the goals of smart cities while seeing economic growth as the other goal 
RESPONSIBLE DATA USAGE IN SMART CITIES – PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE VS. REACTING TO 
EMERGENCIES   
71 
and thus highlight economical aspects which may be hidden behind the citizen’s wellbeing in 
other definitions. 
 PRIVACY AND SMART CITIES 
Since data needs to be collected in a smart city in order to be “smart”, e.g. triggering emergency 
reactions, the data’s and thus people’s privacy needs to be taken into consideration. Elma-
ghraby et al. (2014, 1) phrase it as following: “Privacy protecting systems that gather data and 
trigger emergency response when needed are technological challenges that go hand-in-hand 
with the continuous security challenges.” They also see three general areas to be secured: “(1) 
The ‘‘privacy’’ and confidentiality of the information (2) The integrity and authenticity of the 
information and (3) The availability of the information for its use and services”. When thinking 
about data usage in smart cities in emergency situations these three qualities need to be met, 
thus saying that privacy and IT security go hand in hand (Bartoli et al., 2011; K. Zhang, 2017). 
People’s willingness to make their data available to smart cities and their privacy concerns 
depend on what they think their data is used for and who has access to it (van Zoonen, 2016). 
Hence, the citizens trust into their government is needed in order to implement an e-govern-
ment which is able to help its citizens (Manda & Backhouse, 2016) and thus the “need for 
transparency and inclusivity in urban processes and systems” (Allam, 2019) needs to be taken 
into account. 
It is evident that the data collected in a smart city can reveal habits or acts of people which they 
do not want to be known by anyone but themselves (Eckhoff, 2018; Elmaghraby, 2014) and 
the issue about smart cities is that their citizens are not able to opt out of being recorded or 
none of their data being used which makes smart cities a great danger for its citizens (Eckhoff, 
2018). Existing Patterns and Guidelines which enforce the implementation of privacy such as 
privacy by design (Eckhoff, 2018) or privacy requirements engineering (Eckhoff, 2018) should 
be used when implementing and developing smart city applications such as existing privacy 
enhancing technologies. Martínez-Ballesté et al. (2013) examine how yet existing privacy en-
hancing technologies can be used in order to preserve people’s privacy in smart cities ( “sta-
tistical disclosure control (SDC) , private information retrieval (PIR), privacy-preserving data 
mining (PPDM), location privacy, anonymity and pseudonyms, privacy in radio frequency iden-
tification (RFID), and privacy in video surveillance”). One option to protect people’s privacy 
would be to prevent “data over collection”, meaning, that only the data needed by an application 
is collected by an application and/or available to this application (Li et al., 2016). This approach 
results in less analysable personal data, since less data is collected. But even if privacy is such 
an important and drastic topic which needs to be discussed when talking about smart cities, 
privacy seems to be no factor for measuring the “smartness” of a city (Eckhoff, 2018). 
 USING SMART CITY DATA IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION 
Smart cities could provide different services and facilitation to people. Opposed to this benefits 
risks and challenges – e.g. regarding people’s privacy – need to be taken into account. One 
smart city scenario could be to monitor public areas to make them safer. This could e.g. happen 
through the use of video surveillance or the use of thermographic cameras. Depending on 
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which monitoring technique is used and how gained data is used, the safety and security of 
these places may be increased but also eventually the privacy of people being there is reduced. 
Also, data produced by people’s devices, such as smartphones, could be used and analyzed 
without further surveillance devices. Using this data provided by people being in a smart city 
could yield towards a smart safe city, with safe city being a city “safe from both external and 
internal threats to their well-being” (Allam, 2019). This protection of people in a city would fulfil 
the need for a city to be smart regarding the improvement of citizen’s health and life conditions. 
It could also enable efficient use of resources in everyday life but also in crisis, emergency or 
safety critical situations and thus could enable an easier recovery from disastrous events. In 
short, ideally smart safe cities could prevent, reduce and help but also rebuild after disastrous 
or crisis events. 
While data minimizationindeed serves people’s privacy, additional data could also be used in 
people’s favour for some cases, such as emergency situations. Nonetheless, not every type of 
data can or shall be used for an emergency situation. Therefore, we conclude it would be best 
to know beforehand which data can be used in emergency situations and collect just this data. 
The question arises how this data should be collected best, when every app should only read 
and collect the data it really needs. Is it still possible to implement emergency and security 
applications as ubiquitous city enhancements under these circumstances which use data 
gained by third parties? Or must specific devices be implemented for this case which need this 
data and hence are allowed to collect this specific data? Can systems which don’t need to be 
approved, activated or acquired by every affected person (e.g. video surveillance-based sys-
tems) operate and at the same time respect people’s privacy? Is it even okay to want to “pro-
tect” every person in a city or is this skipping of the people’s real consent to this – neither an 
assumed consent, nor an enforced consent – even ethical? Are there frameworks for such 
ethical 1 development and thus usage of surveillance technologies in smart cities? 
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INTRODUCTION  
Today, the nuclear arms control architecture is threatened: The INF Treaty collapsed, and a 
qualitative arms race is underway. The future of the New START treaty is unclear. The North 
Korean nuclear program poses a threat to international security. At the same time, missile de-
fence plans and the modernization of nuclear arsenals impede arms control efforts. The with-
drawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has the potential to 
curb non-proliferation efforts. While a large number of non-nuclear weapon states concluded 
negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, there is little progress with 
regard to a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Long-term pathways towards Global Zero remain 
unclear. As all of these issues have inherent technical components, scientific contributions are 
required to understand and solve them. Among those are for instance assessments of technical 
capabilities and the development of transparency and verification approaches as they are re-
quired to enable substantive arms control and disarmament measures. 
To discuss nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, SCIENCE · PEACE · SECURITY invited 
contributions from the fields of physics and engineering, as well as policy relating to technical 
issues.  
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ABSTRACT 
Uncertainties about global weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles are large. Also, states 
themselves observe differences between inventories known today and expected inventories 
based on their production records. This motivates the growing research field of nuclear archae-
ology, which is dedicated to reconstructing fissile material histories. It can comprise measure-
ments in shut-down facilities and of radioactive wastes, analysing documentation of fuel cycle 
operations and carrying out related simulations. Even though not called nuclear archaeology, 
there have been past activities in several states where some of the mentioned methods were 
required to verify non-proliferation and disarmament. They imply that similar tasks will be im-
portant in the future. Therefore, future policy objectives and verification challenges are studied 
where conducting nuclear archaeology would be required or at least beneficial. 
 INTRODUCTION 
While there is extensive experience in verifying both the correctness and completeness of nu-
clear material declarations issued by non-weapon states that are members of the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty (NPT), there is a lack of methods to verify the completeness of nuclear material 
baseline (or initial) declarations, i.e. the first verified declaration a state makes upon entering 
an agreement.  
Also, nuclear weapon states face challenges in assessing the completeness of their invento-
ries. The fissile material production uncertainty is very large, and even states themselves have 
had difficulty reconciling production records with physical inventories.  
As was attempted after South Africa had joined the NPT in 1991 (see Baeckmann, 1990), the 
most promising approach to verify the completeness and correctness of baseline declarations 
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is the reconstruction of the state's fissile material production history (Glaser & Göttsche, 2017). 
This is called nuclear archaeology, a concept introduced in 1990 (Hippel, 1990). 
 NUCLEAR ARCHAEOLOGY 
In order to reconstruct past fissile material production, a first approach is performing modern 
fuel cycle simulations. Codes that are more accurate than those used decades ago could be 
utilized. Re-calculating production based on records has indeed been a major aspect of the 
verification in South Africa. A complementary approach, which nuclear archaeology research 
has focused on, is measuring nuclear waste and samples from shut-down production facilities. 
 SCENARIOS FOR NONPROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT AND TRANSPARENCY 
Nuclear security: Undertaking a process of fully characterizing and accounting for all weap-
ons-usable materials by applying nuclear archaeology methods would create immediate secu-
rity benefits. Conducting nuclear archaeology to improve states’ own inventory assessments 
would act as a confidence-building measures that they take their nuclear security commitments 
seriously. Furthermore, such states – no matter whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state, 
would have a stronger case when demanding other states to better assess and secure their 
fissile materials.  
Fissile material transparency: As existing arms control measures are under attack, the pro-
spect for new initiatives remains grim, and the divide between non-nuclear and nuclear weap-
ons states in the NPT context deepens, new confidence-building initiatives are required, and 
have been demanded: It was agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference that, “as a confi-
dence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as 
possible on a standard reporting form […]” (NPT, 2010) including fissile material inventories. 
To-date, only the U.S. and U.K. have issued fissile material declarations. Confidence in these 
declarations could be built by holding an international exercise, where the methodology of re-
constructing fissile material inventories is discussed, or where even an inspection could be 
carried to assess a part of an existing declaration. 
Verified declarations for disarmament: Even if verification of warhead dismantlement will be 
taking place, existing fissile material stocks could be used to build new warheads. States must 
at some point declare the complete stocks of weapons-usable fissile materials they possess 
and allow for verification, in order to create confidence in and enable stability of arms reduction 
processes (Fuller et al., 2014). A verification process must build confidence that no large 
amounts of weapons-usable materials stocks are deliberately hidden. Undeclared storage fa-
cilities, however, do not need to have any remotely detectable signatures, for example using 
satellite imagery or wide-area environmental sampling. Their detection probability is low. 
Therefore, nuclear archaeology is the most promising method.  
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 INTRODUCTION  
The present stocks of nuclear material are estimated to be enough to build nearly 10 times the 
surmised number of existing warheads. Plutonium produced in reactors plays a central role in 
modern nuclear weapons and makes up the main part of the stocks - it exists in sufficient 
quantities for the production of more than 7 times the current arsenals. A comprehensive dis-
armament verification regime, therefore, requires the consideration of both nuclear warheads 
and these material stocks. Baseline declarations about the available amounts of fissile materi-
als will have to be made by each country. However, they may lack credibility: either because 
of missing or highly uncertain data or even due to the suspicion of intentional deceit. Verification 
of these declarations requires a scientific method for crosschecking provided documentation 
with taken and analyzed measurements. To this end, we propose to extend the field of “reactor 
archaeology” that has traditionally been used to reconstruct neutron fluence (flux integrated 
over time), which is related to the produced amount of plutonium and allows for an estimation. 
The fundamental principle of our proposed method relies on the “Graphite Isotope Ratio 
Method” (GIRM), a procedure developed to derive neutron fluence of a graphite reactor over 
its whole lifetime from ratios of stable trace-isotopes (Fetter, 1993). Further studies have ex-
tended the methods principles for usage on different types of reactors (Gasner & Glaser, 2011) 
or to differentiate between Plutonium and Tritium production modes (de Troullioud de Lanver-
sin, Göttsche & Glaser, 2018).  
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 METHOD 
GIRM measurements are performed after shut-down and focus on trace isotopes that have 
been created in structural reactor components from the irradiation during the reactors opera-
tional period. They are then combined into isotope ratios which indicate neutron fluence, which 
is in turn linked to Plutonium production. We propose to extend GIRM to be able to assess 
other parameters in addition to fluence, e.g. times at which the reactor was operated or reactor 
power, which we collectively call “reactor parameters”. To achieve this, in contrast to the exist-
ing method which only looks at stable or long-lived isotopes, one must specifically include 
shorter lived isotopes to gather information about parameters linked to the time dimension, for 
example shutdown time. In the context of a verification measurement performed years after a 
decades-spanning operation time “shorter” still refers to several years at the least. 
Our investigation will make use of numerical methods as part of an algorithm to reconstruct 
reactor parameters, performing repeated sampling and simulation of input parameters until the 
isotopic ratios the simulation calculates are sufficiently close to the actual measurement. It will 
use the OpenBU code framework currently being developed by Julien de Troullioud de Lanver-
sin at Princeton University, an open source burnup code running in conjunction with OpenMC 
neutron simulations. The available information from the state declarations as well as other 
sources can be used to construct an initial set of reactor parameters to run a full simulation on. 
To avoid the large computation resource requirements linked to Monte-Carlo simulations the 
ensuing sampling can be performed in a standalone computation mode decoupled from Monte-
Carlo simulations, making use of the low expected variations in the actual neutron spectrum. 
In the process of developing the algorithm we will consider the isotopes present in the material 
after irradiation and examine their suitability, or more precisely that of their ratios, to provide 
information on the reactor parameters. This will result in a selection of feasible ratios, most 
likely varying over different ranges of input parameters, to reconstruct parameters at good pre-
cision. Important selection criteria here are the presence and measurability of the respective 
isotopes as well as their dependence on input parameters, in particular differences to the de-
pendencies of other included ratios. 
We will also determine a set of reactor parameters that can be reconstructed from this. An 
initial set of preferred parameters could be obtained based on their respective importance for 
plutonium production; other important criteria to be evaluated are the precision that can be 
gained from the available isotope ratios as well as the consistency of the neutron spectrum 
approximation in the uncoupled simulations in respect to variations of the reactor parameter. 
The final goal is a complete algorithm that could be used to verify a production declaration 
using measurement data obtained from the structural components within reasonable limits to 
time and computation power. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
The availability of approved, reliable and robust verification procedures and technologies is an 
essential requisite for the existing nuclear arms control treaties, i.e. the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Their verification regimes include 
numerous documentation and reporting requirements, but center on adequate on-site and re-
mote measurement technologies to verify the compliance of signature states with their treaty 
obligations. Not surprisingly, past experience has shown that these verification technologies 
need to be enhanced or complemented by others for closing gaps, which were not anticipated 
when establishing the verification scheme. Their development is an important element of phys-
ics-based science peace research. 
No treaty exists between the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament nor is it expected 
to be negotiated within the near future. However, with the International Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) an international coordinated initiative has been established 
for developing verification regimes in support of future negotiations (Niemeyer et al., 2019).  
In the following, examples are given of recent physical verification research results in the au-
thor’s institute and future prospects. 
 EXAMPLE 1: VERIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST 
BAN TREATY  
For verifying this treaty, a global International Monitoring System has been established, which 
monitors and evaluates radionuclide, seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic signals. For sus-
pect seismic events, confirmation of its nuclear origin is provided for by detection of the four 
longer-lived radioactive xenon isotopes in air. However, the operation of the monitoring network 
has shown that this approach is restricted due to unexpectedly high emissions of radioactive 
xenon radionuclides by civil nuclear facilities (Saey, 2009). Therefore, it may be attractive to 
complement the xenon analyses by measuring concentrations of Ar-37, as this radionuclide is 
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produced by activation of rock calcium during an underground nuclear explosion. Information 
on anthropogenic emissions of this radioisotope by nuclear reactors were missing and have 
been generated by a research project at our institute. 
Argon-37 is not produced by nuclear fission, but by neutron capture in Ar-36, which is a minor 
isotope of natural argon present in air, and in calcium by a (n,α)-reaction in Ca-40. Production 
pathways in light water reactors include (i) within the reactor core the activation of argon in air 
dissolved in the water moderator and of calcium present as impurity in fuel, and (ii) outside of 
the pressure vessel the activation of argon in air and of the calcium present in the concrete of 
the biological shield. 
Our calculations, which have been validated by measurements, show that Ar-37 by these var-
ious pathways is small and after dilution in the atmosphere rapidly become lower than its nat-
ural background. Thus, Ar-37 is attractive for verifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Next steps will include the development of sensitive and fast detectors and their test at some 
of the existing radionuclide monitoring laboratories.  
 EXAMPLE 2: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION  
The major challenge for any verification regime for nuclear disarmament verification is given 
by the nuclear weapons states’ interest in keeping almost all construction details of nuclear 
warheads confidential. Within the International Partnership of Nuclear Disarmament Verifica-
tion, a concept has been developed, which combines qualitative measurements of the pres-
ence of fissile material and of high explosives with high sensitivity measurements of their ab-
sence (e.g. in scrap containers). Focusing on the dismantlement process of a warhead, which 
is highly attractive for potential diversion of fissile material, this concept will be tested by a one-
week practical exercise which is jointly prepared by FZ Jülich and our institute (Niemeyer, 
2019). Its results are expected to provide confidence that the concept can be applied for veri-
fying a future nuclear disarmament treaty, but also to give input for future refinement of the 
generic concept. 
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ABSTRACT 
On October 18, 2018, the German Bundestag discussed and voted on a motion calling upon 
the government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The motion 
was not approved, but has been supported by Die Linke and the Green Party. The TPNW 
prohibits the development, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. This presen-
tation will discuss the technical and legal challenges Germany would face if it were to join the 
treaty, and the steps that would need to be taken prior to ratification and after the treaty enters 
into force. 
First, I will assess the obligation for states party to the treaty never to "[a]llow any stationing, 
installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its 
territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control." At the height of the cold war, more than 
4000 nuclear weapons were stored in over 200 different sites on German soil. This number 
has since decreased drastically, and it is currently estimated that Germany hosts twenty tactical 
nuclear weapons owned by the United States in one location. The removal of these weapons 
would be a necessary step on the path to German accession to the TPNW. Verification options 
that could accompany the removal process will also be discussed. 
Second, I will analyze the legal changes that Germany would need to undertake to transform 
the treaty obligations into German law. Several regulations are already in place, such as the 
ban on the production of nuclear weapons codified in article 17 of the Kriegswaffenkontrollge-
setz. Furthermore, as a member of NATO, Germany is part of a "nuclear alliance". It is the 
current understanding that NATO members might aid other member states with nuclear weap-
ons. I will summarize the current debate on the relationship between TPNW obligations and 
NATO membership. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
On October 18, 2018, the German Bundestag discussed and voted on a motion calling upon 
the government to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Bundestag, 2018). 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the latest framework to join the 
existing body of international law on the subject of nuclear weapons. During the 2016 United 
Nations General Assembly, a resolution that required states to negotiate "a legally binding in-
strument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination" received 113 
votes in favor (UNGA A/RES/71/258). 124 countries met in two sessions in 2017 to negotiate 
and adopt a treaty text. Currently, 70 countries have signed the TPNW, 23 countries have 
ratified the treaty (UNODA, 2019). The treaty will enter into force as soon as 50 states deposit 
their instruments of ratification (Article 15). 
Germany, along with every other NATO member state except the Netherlands, did not take 
part in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the TPNW. As of today, Germany has not 
signed the treaty, although it is the general policy of the German government to work towards 
a world without nuclear weapons (Böhmer, 2017). Two German parties, Die Linke and Bündnis 
90/ Die Grünen supported the 2018 motion in the German Bundestag, while the other parties 
voted against it or abstained.  
The TPNW prohibits the development, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
It also includes a special obligation for states party to the treaty never to "[a]llow any stationing, 
installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its 
territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control." (Article 1.1.g). At the height of the cold 
war, more than 4000 nuclear weapons were stored in over 200 different sites on German soil 
(Rabe, 1984). The number has decreased drastically since then, and it is currently estimated 
that Germany hosts 20 tactical nuclear weapons owned by the United States at the Büchel 
airbase (Kristensen & Korda, 2019). During the Cold War, a larger number of other countries 
hosted U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons on their soil. Today, the only other countries hosting 
weapons are Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey. 
Ninety days after Germany ratifies the treaty, it enters into force for Germany, assuming that 
the treaty, in general, has already entered into force. No later than 30 days after entry into 
force, Germany has to declare that it hosts nuclear weapons of a different country on its soil 
(Article 2.1.c). Those weapons have to be removed as soon as possible, within a deadline that 
will be set by the first Meeting of States Parties. After the weapons have been removed, Ger-
many would declare the fulfilment of its obligation to the UN Secretary General (Article 4.4). No 
verification of the removal is required, but voluntary measures could include opening storage 
sites to international inspectors, who could then verify that no nuclear weapons are remaining 
in these facilities. Inspectors could also verify the conversion of the German dual-capable Tor-
nado airplanes. Potentially, one could prove that the storage site held weapons immediately 
after removal based on neutron activated concrete in the bunkers. 
Article 3 of the treaty requires Germany to adopt agreements on safeguards with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Germany has ratified the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/153), as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The 
TPNW Article 3.2 requires such an agreement as a minimum standard. Germany has also 
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ratified the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which grants the International Atomic Energy 
Agency extended rights during inspections. This agreement is voluntary both under the NPT 
and the TPNW, but TPNW Article 3.1 requires Germany to "maintain its International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty."  
In the German legal system, international agreements have to be approved with a special treaty 
law ("Vertragsgesetz"). According to Article 5 ("National Implementation"), Germany will be 
required to adopt legal measures to prevent activities prohibited under the treaty. Currently, the 
legal system already in place in Germany includes numerous measures prohibiting develop-
ment, production, acquisition, import, export and transport of nuclear weapons in various legal 
codes (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz, Strafgesetzbuch, Verordnung zur Durchführung des Au-
ßenwirtschaftsgesetzes, Gesetz über das Zollkriminalamt und die Zollfahndungsämter). These 
codes specifically define a nuclear weapon as a device that contains (or is made to contain) 
nuclear fuels or radioactive isotopes for the purpose of mass destruction, mass damage or 
mass poisoning. Parts of such devices are also considered nuclear weapons. The legal obli-
gations also refer to the definition in the Brussels Treaty of 1954, which prohibits Germany from 
acquiring atomic weapons (Brussels Treaty, 1954). 
None of the existing legal codes listed above regulates the threat of use of nuclear weapons. 
New legal provisions could be required here, as the TPNW does go so far as to specifically 
prohibit such threats (Article 1.1.d). Additional legal measures could further prohibit the station-
ing of nuclear weapons on German soil. Currently, German law includes a special exception to 
allow weapon-related activities as part of NATO activities (Article 16, Kriegswaffenkontrollge-
setz). This article likely would have to be revoked to comply with the TPNW. 
According to NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, "as long as there are nuclear weapons in the 
world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance" (NATO, 2010). However, NATO’s founding treaty, 
in fact, does not make any reference to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Germany is a member 
of the Nuclear Planning Group, which allows it to participate in NATO nuclear policy making. It 
also supports the 2010 Strategic Concept, which was adopted by consensus. The provisions 
in the concept casts Germany as a "nuclear umbrella" state, because it receives security guar-
antees that stipulate the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defend Germany. The TPNW 
prohibits member states to "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;" (Article 1.1.e). Nuclear umbrella agree-
ments could be considered "encouragement," and as such would have to be renounced to 
comply with the TPNW (NPA, 2018; IHRC, 2018). A U.S. "Non-Paper" on possible implications 
of a Nuclear Ban Treaty supports the fact the umbrella agreements would need to be re-
nounced (NATO, 2016). 
Upon joining the TPNW, Germany would have to leave the Nuclear Planning Group, and make 
clear that the nuclear-weapons-related provisions in the 2010 Strategic Concept would not ap-
ply to Germany anymore. Although such a move would not be viewed favourably by other 
NATO countries, there are examples of individual national policy choices within NATO. Den-
mark, Norway and Spain do not allow deployment of nuclear weapons in peacetime, while 
Iceland and Lithuania refuse to host nuclear weapons under any circumstances (Eide, 2014). 
Germany remaining in NATO while joining the TPNW would also be in line with NATO's com-
mitment to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. 
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ABSTRACT 
Minimization of the civil use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the cornerstones of 
international nonproliferation efforts. The aim is to prevent the access of states, subnational 
actors or terrorists to fissile material suitable to build nuclear weapons. This short paper pre-
sents some of the current issues regarding HEU use, production technologies and HEU mini-
mization efforts. 
 FISSILE MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION  
Highly Enriched Uranium - HEU is a special fissile material that can be used in nuclear weap-
ons. In the civilian nuclear sector HEU is used to fuel research and power reactors, for naval 
propulsion and to produce isotopes for medical purposes. 
More than seven decades after the construction of the first nuclear weapons the main barrier 
to build nuclear weapons today still is access to sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons-rele-
vant materials and less the construction of a functioning nuclear explosive device. The pro-
curement of fissile material is, so to speak, the decisive bottleneck through which state and 
sub-state actors must pass before they can build a nuclear explosive device. 
Highly enriched uranium is particularly attractive for military or terrorist use because, unlike 
plutonium, weapons, they can be built with relatively simple designs. The Proliferation risks of 
highly enriched uranium are associated with HEU stocks and uranium enrichment technolo-
gies. For example, uranium enrichment plants, especially gas centrifuge plants, can easily be 
converted from LEU production to HEU production. Also, HEU has to be stored and trans-
ported. HEU can be diverted or stolen from the civilian sector and then used for military or 
terrorist purposes. In non-nuclear-weapon states, stocks and production technologies are sub-
ject to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The minimization of civilian use of highly enriched uranium has been one of the priority activities 
worldwide since the end of the 1970s to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism. Internationally, the norm was established that enrichments of the isotope uranium-
235 with more than 20% by weight in uranium are classified as highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
and those below as low enriched uranium (LEU).  
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 HEU 
The mass of uranium for a nuclear weapon (or the critical mass) is significantly reduced the 
higher the percentage of the uranium isotope U-235 in the uranium metal. The lower the critical 
mass, the higher the attractiveness of the highly enriched uranium for weapon use. For military 
applications, weapons-grade HEU with an enrichment above 90% is therefore preferred. To-
day, there is a broad international consensus that the 20% enrichment limit is a viable choice 
for differentiating between HEU and LEU. The definition originally dates back to the 1950s 
(Atoms for Peace). Today, the IAEA defines uranium with an enrichment greater than or equal 
to 20% as highly enriched uranium and classifies HEU as "direct use" material.  
The chemical form in which the uranium is present plays no role in this classification. However, 
the effort for a proliferator to acquire HEU for a weapon application depends on the respective 
processing steps necessary to generate metallic HEU that could be used in a weapon. The 
Department of Energy of the USA defines (Department of Energy, 2012) the need for nuclear 
material monitoring in a graded safeguards table for Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) located 
at a specific location. The sub-allocation serves to classify different categories of unirradiated, 
highly enriched uranium into different monitoring needs. However, HEU is always considered 
to be a "special nuclear material".  
 HEU PRODUCTION 
In strict legal terms, international treaties do not restrict a state from using highly enriched 
uranium for civilian purposes or producing it itself for civilian purposes. The signatory states of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty are only obliged to report such a procedure to the IAEA. 
Today HEU is produced with gas centrifuge technology, a technology which is in the reach of 
the technical capabilities of most countries worldwide. Problematic developments in nuclear 
proliferation in the last two decades involved the spread and covert acquisition of centrifuge 
enrichment capabilities by countries such as Iran and North Korea 
However, with the exception of North Korea and Pakistan, new production of HEU has been 
abandoned worldwide in the 1990s. After a long moratorium, Russia resumed HEU production 
in 2012. It is reported that the need for HEU fuel of the German research reactor FRM-II con-
tributed to this worrisome development (Glaser & Podvig, 2017). In nuclear weapons states 
such as Russia, HEU still plays a major role either as a commodity or for the domestic energy 
and research programs, e.g. the recent use of HEU to fuel the Russian fast reactor program. 
Not much is known about the North Korean enrichment program. However, it can be safely 
assumed that North Korea produces HEU in its gas centrifuge facilities. 
Not often talked about: other countries also enhance and expand their centrifuge capabilities 
such as Pakistan or Brazil. 
In Iran, the nuclear program is mostly frozen since the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). Recently 
tensions between Iran and the US are on the rise after the US left the JCPOA. Iran threatens 
to resume its enrichment program. The IAEA never found evidence that Iran produced enrich-
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ment levels beyond 20% with its gas centrifuge facilities. However, Iran’s latent nuclear capa-
bilities allow Iran to engage actively in the form of “weaponless” nuclear deterrence. Iran with 
its capability to enrich uranium follows the historic role model of other virtual nuclear weapon 
states such as Germany and will set another case for the future treatment of uranium enrich-
ment technologies in international security and international norms. 
 HEU ELIMINATION AND REACTOR CONVERSION 
Internationally there is a great interest to reduce the risks associated with civil HEU use. One 
major challenge is the use of HEU as research reactor fuel. Other challenges would be the use 
of HEU for medical isotope production or the conversion of naval propulsion reactors. 
 REACTOR CONVERSION 
A major focus of the efforts to minimise the civil use of HEU is to convert the fuel of research 
reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium to the use of low enriched uranium. Research 
reactors are the largest civilian users of highly enriched uranium. The reduction of enrichment 
has to be compensated by the amount of fissionable uranium-235 in the reactor core either by 
a larger quantity of fuel (volume increase) or by a higher density of the fuel. Following the 
qualification of uranium silicide fuels (U3Si2) with a higher density of up to 4.8 g/cm3 in the 
1980s, a number of research reactors worldwide were converted from HEU to LEU (below 20% 
enrichment in U-235) with the aid of the new fuel. 
On the one hand, the conversion of research reactors from the use of HEU to the use of low-
enriched uranium was quite successful. But the complexity to qualify suitable high-density Ura-
nium-Molybdenum (UMo) fuels to convert high flux reactors from HEU to LEU also caused 
difficulties in the conversion efforts. Still, the annual demand for HEU for research reactors is 
the highest compared to other civilian applications. 
 THE GERMAN RESEARCH REACTOR MUNICH II (FRM-II) 
Since all research reactors in Germany except FRM-II have been converted to LEU or decom-
missioned, today's conversion efforts concentrate on FRM-II. The reactor's HEU design dates 
back to the 1980s. It was not until 1994 that the nuclear licensing procedure was started, de-
spite the fact that since the 1980s, a norm existed not to commission any new research reactors 
with a design based on HEU fuel. A main exception to this norm until today is the FRM-II, which 
went critical in 2004. 
In Germany, efforts to convert research reactors in the 1980s were supported by the develop-
ment of denser uranium silicide fuels in the "Programme for the reduction of enrichment in 
research reactors" (AF Programme). The development programme - financed with 50 million 
Deutsche Mark - originally served to convert the West German research reactors in Jülich, 
Berlin, Munich (FRM-I) and Geesthacht. 
However, the uranium silicide fuels originally developed for the LEU conversion in the fuel de-
velopment program were reused with high enrichment for the FRM-II in order to design a reac-
tor core that was as compact as possible with an optimized power to volume ratio. This misap-
propriation of the uranium silicide fuel, developed for conversion purposes, together with the 
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very compact fuel element and the restrictions on dimensional changes, is now the difficulty of 
why a conversion of the FRM-II to LEU is so technically challenging. 
Due to years of criticism and the change of federal government, the Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research (BMBF) convened a commission of experts in 1998 to discuss various con-
version options. The compromise in 2001 finally provided for commissioning with HEU uranium 
silicide fuel and subsequent conversion to less than 50% enrichment by the end of 2010, de-
pending on the status of the development of high-density fuels. The reactor finally went into 
operation in 2004. The FRM was initially supplied with HEU from European "remaining stocks" 
and then from Russian production. 
The date of conversion of FRM-II to LEU use depends on the availability of suitable high-den-
sity fuels with an even higher density than the 1980s uranium silicide fuels developed for reac-
tor conversion back then. After it became clear in 2008 that the development of new high-
density fuels would not be completed by 2010, the original FRM-II conversion agreement was 
amended in 2010. The 2010 amendment to the original agreement between Bavaria and the 
Federal Government stipulates that an agreement will be reached between the parties con-
cerned and the operator by the end of 2016 as to whether the reactor can be converted by the 
end of 2018.  
The more recent fuel developments towards even higher densities are based on uranium-mo-
lybdenum (UMo) alloys either as dispersion fuel or monolithic fuel. Both fuel types encountered 
unexpected development difficulties. The dispersion fuels showed an unstable swelling behav-
ior under irradiation, which could only be partially eliminated so far. In the case of monolithic 
fuels, after initial problems with irradiation have been largely solved, fuel manufacturing is the 
main problem. At present, a conversion of the FRM-II with these new high-density UMo fuels 
cannot be expected within the next ten years. 
There are essentially two options currently available (2019): 
 Wait: postpone FRM-II conversion until new high-density uranium-molybdenum fuels are 
qualified and available. Until then, further operation will be carried out with the current 
uranium silicide HEU fuel. This option results effectively in no conversion during the first 
quarter century of reactor operation. 
 Two-Step Conversion: As a first step - short term conversion with currently available or 
short term licensable uranium silicide fuels with a density of 4.8 g/cm3 or more to an en-
richment much less than 93%, ideally less than 50%. The aim should be to achieve the 
lowest possible enrichment by exploiting geometric changes in the fuel element. The US 
National Academy of Sciences 2016 (NAS 2016) recommended such an intermediate step 
on the way to a longer-term conversion with the new high-density fuels. As a second step 
– conversion to less than 20% enrichment as soon as the high-density fuels become avail-
able. 
The conversion of FRM-II is complex, a whole range of possibilities, but also different interests 
must be weighed against each other. The goal of less than 20% enrichment should, however, 
be pursued intensively by all actors. 
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 HEU REPATRIATION 
Another success is the fuel repatriation programs. Historically, the supplier countries for the 
HEU were the USA and Russia. As early as 1992, the USA adopted the so-called "Schumer 
Amendment", which excludes the export of HEU from enrichment above 20%.  
Many fresh and spent fuel assemblies containing HEU have already been returned to the sup-
plier countries (USA, Russia) as part of the take-back programmes. The original "Off-Site Fuels 
Policy" of the USA (1964-1988) to take back delivered HEU was extended in 1996 to support 
the conversion of research reactors to LEU. As part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 
the programme was continued from 2004-2015 (Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Acceptance Programme) and has been continued by the Office of Material Management and 
Minimization (M3) since 2015. In addition, there is a US-funded program for the return of HEU 
in spent fuel, formerly from the Soviet Union (Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) 
Program). In both programmes, HEU was also returned from Germany to the countries of 
origin. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Nuclear archaeology is a field dedicated to the reconstruction and quantification of the past 
production of weapons-usable fissile materials. In the context of nuclear disarmament, the ver-
ification of both nuclear warheads and fissile material stocks is crucial (Podvig, 2016). With 
regard to aggregate plutonium production estimates in a reactor’s lifetime, the Graphite Isotope 
Ratio Method (GIRM) (Fetter, 1993; Gesh, 2004), proposed in 1993, has been developed and 
tested the most. This method consists of the study of trace isotopes – initially present as impu-
rities in graphite to deduce the lifetime cumulative neutron flux inside the reactor. Similar meth-
ods are currently under development which apply an equivalent analysis to heavy water mod-
erated nuclear reactors (Gasner & Glaser, 2011).  
Although effective, these techniques cannot be applied once the reactor site has been decom-
missioned. In addition, they do not address the issue of verifying historical operation records 
and their consistency with measurements. In this case, we examine the possibilities and limi-
tations of exploiting measurements of reprocessing waste isotopic composition to reduce un-
certainty in fissile material declarations and production records, especially those dating back 
to early production operations. This is done through the inference of parameters related to the 
operational history of reactors such as burnup and cooling time, based on measurements of 
such waste. In the current work, we build upon initial studies on the method (Figueroa & 
Göttsche, 2019; Göttsche, De Troullioud De Lanversin, & Tietze-Jaensch, 2017).  
For the first stage of this project, we create a computer model of the savannah river plutonium 
production reactor K. Due to the complexity of this model, it is impossible to obtain a mathe-
matical formula to estimate the reactor input parameter values related to a given isotope meas-
urement, which is our goal. Instead, we run several forward simulations with the montecarlo 
code Serpent 2 (“Serpent - A Monte Carlo Reactor Physics Burnup Calculation Code,” n.d.) to 
identify outputs close enough to the measurements, a procedure similar to traditional optimiza-
tion approaches. To do that, we have developed a surrogate model that can be used as a 
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computationally less expensive way to obtain an approximation to the results from an actual 
simulation. This is done through the use of gaussian process regression which provides an 
interpolated prediction at a non-simulated point based on the set of forward simulations (Ras-
mussen & Williams, 2006). 
In the second stage, we use the surrogate model, in conjunction with the Bayesian inference 
framework, to solve the inverse problem of deducing the reactor batch operational history given 
a reprocessing waste measurement. This framework provides a solid probabilistic approach to 
inverse problems in which not only a solution can be inferred, but also the uncertainty in the 
measurement and model can be propagated into the estimated solution, producing a probability 
distribution for each parameter under study. A key point of this methodology is the possibility 
to include information such as state declarations, operational records, intelligence reports/anal-
yses and process expertise among others, that gives it an edge in comparison to other tech-
niques. This feature works by limiting the space of possible solutions, confirming existing infor-
mation or providing awareness in the case of inconsistent information sources that could indi-
cate at best incomplete information or at worst, cheating. 
For a proof of principle, we design and examine a group of scenarios involving a fissile material 
production declaration by a state, which has to be verified. For this, we consider the case of 
reconstructing burnup and cooling time for an operation consisting of: a single batch with only 
basic information on the general limits of the parameters, a single batch but now simulating the 
presence of operational records, a mixture of waste from two batches of the same reactor with 
different parameters, a mixture of waste from two batches with simulated operational records 
and finally, a waste mixture of two batches where the simulated records provide wrong infor-
mation. 
The Bayesian inference is conducted with the software PyMC3 (Salvatier, Wiecki, & 
Fonnesbeck, 2016). We observe that the reconstruction of such parameters is possible, as well 
as their correct combination and mixing proportion, provided additional information is included 
in the analysis. Additionally, irregularities in operational histories declarations can be detected 
due to the contradictory results they produce during the inference process. This is particularly 
important in the scenario of a mixture of 2 waste batches, where a declaring party might try to 
hide a very low burnup campaign - associated with weapons grade plutonium – by mixing its 
waste with that of a higher burnup campaign. 
Much research is still to be done to explore the limitations of this methodology, namely the 
largest number of parameters that can be inferred from a waste measurement, and the use of 
isotope ratios, which should allow for uncertainty reduction in measurements from tanks with 
non-homogeneous waste. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
A large amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has been produced both in civilian as well as in 
military applications of nuclear energy in the past decades. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) evaluated the global cumulative amount of spent fuel at the end of 2014 at 
approximately 380,500 tonnes heavy metal, with about 10,000 tonnes of heavy metal of SNF 
discharged yearly (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015). Thus, presently, more than 
430,000 tonnes heavy metal of spent fuel are stored around the world. Moreover, due to the 
growing demand for (clean) energy, several countries like China, India, Russia and the United 
Arab Emirates are planning to augment their nuclear capacity which would, in turn, lead to an 
even faster increase in the quantity of spent fuel.  
The Institute for Science and International Security (Institute for Science and International Se-
curity, n.d.) estimated that, at the end of 2014, the global amount of irradiated (i.e. present in 
spent fuel) and unirradiated (directly usable for nuclear weapons) plutonium was approximately 
2,400 tonnes (D. Albright, S. Kelleher-Vergantini, D. Schnur, 2015). The presence of fissile 
material in the spent fuel constitutes an important verification challenge since it could be di-
verted for weapons production.  
Several techniques can be employed for safeguarding the spent fuel, e.g. seals, video moni-
toring, remote radiation detection, etc. However, as the amount of SNF in storage accumulates, 
the probability that one of these monitoring techniques may fail also increases with time. Should 
such a failure occur, especially in the case of cask seals, the contents of the affected casks 
can no longer be accounted for? Measuring the radiation that escapes from a cask with a 
damaged seal can demonstrate that its content is radioactive, however, it cannot provide 
enough information to determine if any amount of spent fuel is missing. Neutron or photon 
radiography techniques may also not be feasible in this case due to the heavy shielding of the 
cask.  
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In order to verify the content of the cask and restore the continuity of knowledge, a tomographic 
technique based on cosmic muons was proposed and is currently under consideration (J.M. 
Durham et al., 2018). A complementary approach, first proposed in (P. Huber et al., 2017), 
envisages measuring the anti-neutrino emissions coming directly from the spent fuel itself for 
long term monitoring and for ensuring continuity of knowledge.  
This approach relies on the fact that the main source of radioactivity in spent fuel comes from 
beta-decaying isotopes, i.e. the SNF is an abundant source of anti-neutrinos. While many iso-
topes have rather short half-lives (in the order of several hours or a few days), a few like 90Sr 
(T1/2 = 28.78a) and 137Cs (T1/2 = 30.17a) still contribute, even decades later. The low energy (< 
10 MeV) anti-neutrinos can constitute a valuable source of information about the amount and 
content of the spent fuel in storage. Furthermore, due to their weakly interacting nature, with 
cross-sections lower than 10-38 cm2, they inevitably escape even large amounts of shielding. 
This application of anti-neutrino measurements, carried out with liquid argon detectors, repre-
sents the focus of this paper. 
The idea of using liquid-argon time projection chambers (LArTPC) for neutrino detection was 
first proposed by Carlo Rubbia in 1977 (C. Rubbia, 1977). A LArTPC consists of a large volume 
of liquid argon, cooled at 87K (-186.15° C), encompassed by a high-voltage cathode on one 
side and an anode on the opposite surface. In addition, several read-out wire planes are also 
located on the anode side.  
When an (anti-)neutrino interacts via charged or neutral current exchange with an argon atom, 
i.e. either with the orbital electrons or the nucleus itself, the emergent charged particles ionise 
and excite further argon atoms along their trajectory. The emitted free electrons drift in the 
liquid argon, under the force of the electric field, until they reach the read-out wires, in which 
they generate small currents. In addition, the excited argon atoms also emit scintillation light in 
the ultraviolet range (λ=128nm) which can be measured with photosensors (PMTs). 
One of the main advantages of LArTPCs is that they are imaging detectors - providing a three-
dimensional reconstruction of the tracks left by the charged particles emerging from an anti-
neutrino interaction. This is crucial for ensuring a good background rejection, e.g. based on 
topological criteria like the track length. Furthermore, argon (40Ar) is, in fact, denser than both 
water and oil-based scintillator materials which are typically used in neutrino detectors. In con-
trast to these types of detectors, which rely on the inverse beta decay process for neutrino-
observation, the main neutrino interaction in liquid argon is elastic scattering which has no 
kinematic threshold. Lastly, since argon constitutes approximately 1% of Earth’s atmosphere, 
especially the 40Ar isotope with an abundance of 99.6%, it is usually cheap to produce (and to 
liquify) and it is commercially available.  
In our study, we compare the event rate expected in two container-sized, i.e. 80 tonnes, liquid 
argon and water-Cherenkov detectors, respectively. We show that, even though the expected 
event rates are rather low in both cases, the performance of the LArTPCs is comparable to that 
of the water-Cherenkov detectors, in particular, due to the kinematic threshold of the inverse 
beta decay reaction.  
PROSPECTS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SAFEGUARDING WITH ANTINEUTRINO DETECTORS 
 
 
98 
The LArTPC technology is presently developed and validated by the neutrino physics commu-
nity, thus aligning the nuclear verification efforts with the forefront of fundamental science. Fur-
thermore, as the technology matures, we demonstrate that utilising it for spent fuel safeguard-
ing is worth investigating.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
This research reassesses the effect of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies aimed at limiting 
access to the back-end of the fuel cycle technologies, such as spent fuel reprocessing, in the 
ROK. Since the start of the Republic of Korea’s nuclear program, the country’s scientists have 
been interested in developing the capability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. The 1968 “Long-
Term Nuclear Power Development Plan” first articulated the ROK desire to develop a repro-
cessing capability as part of a broader commercial nuclear power program. With limited indig-
enous uranium resources, ROK scientists were eager to make the most of the energy content 
in commercial fuel and to expand the ROK’s scientific and industrial capabilities.  
In the early 1970s, the director of the Korean Institute for Science and Technology and a former 
director of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) Choi Hyung Sup played an 
important role in the development of this plan and was perhaps the strongest ROK advocate 
of developing a reprocessing capability. Choi was also approached by President Park Chung-
Hee in 1971 and asked to lead the effort to acquire the technological capability to develop 
nuclear weapons. Park and then-KAERI director Yun Yong-gu knew that the already articulated 
desire for a reprocessing capability would serve the purpose of building up a ROK nuclear 
weapons capability as well. As such, they travelled to France to begin the negotiation for the 
sale of a reprocessing plant from SGNT.  
The nuclear weapons proliferation risk presented by even a small reprocessing plant was made 
plain by the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, in which Indian scientists used a reprocessing fa-
cility derived from U.S. technology to reprocess fuel from a Canadian research reactor to obtain 
the necessary plutonium for the explosive device. Concerned about a similar risk from the ROK 
nuclear program, U.S. officials denied ROK requests for direct reprocessing assistance and 
persuaded Park and Choi to cancel the order for the French reprocessing plant in exchange 
for a package of additional nuclear cooperative activities, including the promise to study the 
possibility of building a multinational reprocessing facility in Asia involving the ROK and others, 
help in developing a light-water nuclear fuel fabrication facility, training for ROK scientists, and 
a range of research and development collaboration. The ROK’s decision to cancel the plant 
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was also influenced by Canadian threats to put off an order for a commercial CANDU reactor—
which the ROK wanted in order to diversify its nuclear program and increase its energy secu-
rity—if it didn’t cancel the plant. 
In addition to winning the ROK additional U.S. nuclear cooperation, this episode had other 
effects: ROK scientists and officials became wary of relying on the United States as a supplier 
of nuclear technology and know-how. Indeed, when the ROK eventually negotiated the transfer 
of fuel fabrication technology, it did so with a German supplier for light-water reactor fuel and 
with Canadian nuclear authorities for heavy-water reactor fuel.  
The cancellation of the French reprocessing facility purchase was not the end of ROK efforts 
to develop a domestic reprocessing capability. Throughout the 1980s, ROK officials tried in 
vain to engage U.S. officials and others in the development of the back-end of the fuel cycle 
facilities in the ROK. First, ROK scientists approached U.S. officials about developing a so-
called Tandem process facility, but U.S. officials shut down this effort by not providing consent 
to the ROK to process U.S.-origin spent fuel in the facility and not agreeing to the location of 
or safeguard arrangements for the facility. 
Well aware of U.S. proliferation concerns, ROK scientists tried again to obtain U.S. assistance 
in spent fuel processing with the development of the DUPIC process, starting in 1991. This 
time around, ROK scientists emphasized the degree to which, in their eyes, DUPIC presented 
less of a proliferation risk compared to traditional spent fuel reprocessing, because it didn’t 
involve chemically separating plutonium from the rest of the spent fuel. Not only did the United 
States consent to the DUPIC program and assist in developing safeguards technologies that 
could be deployed at DUPIC facilities, but it ultimately provided sensitive technological assis-
tance to the ROK to help it develop the remote-control technology necessary for hot-cell oper-
ations. The actual DUPIC fuel-fabrication process, however, was developed between ROK and 
Canadian scientists, a partnership that deliberately excluded American involvement so as to 
avoid U.S. nonproliferation obstruction.  
Still eager for a back-end of the fuel cycle capability, in the late 1990s, ROK scientists began 
to develop a system called pyro-processing, which similarly promised to limit the proliferation 
risk of processing spent nuclear fuel and to reduce the amount of high-level waste in need of 
long-term disposal. Encouraged by a U.S. presidential administration that was eager to develop 
a new role for the United States in the global nuclear energy system, ROK officials developed 
a facility that would prepare spent nuclear fuel for the process. Despite ROK’s enthusiasm and 
interest in this development route, the U.S. again withheld consent for the ROK to process 
U.S.–origin spent nuclear fuel—effectively stalling the entire process.  
While U.S. nonproliferation policies have been effective in limiting ROK access to and experi-
ence with the back-end of the fuel cycle technologies, what have been the unintended costs of 
this influence? This review suggests that U.S. nonproliferation policies have inadvertently in-
creased the spread of technological know-how about different types of back-end of the fuel 
cycle technologies, despite their stated goal of limiting proliferation. The ROK desire for back-
end of the fuel cycle technologies has not diminished over time, and ROK scientists have simply 
shifted their focus to other potential technological avenues when stymied by U.S. policies. 
Would some of these later technologies have developed even if the U.S. initially consented to 
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the ROK purchase of the French reprocessing facility? Maybe. But ROK scientists would have 
had far less reason to extend their technological understanding over time if they had a more 
willing partner in the United States. 
The U.S. denial of back-end of the fuel cycle technologies also increased the incentives of 
South Korean officials to diversify ROK nuclear supply chains. A certain amount of diversifica-
tion was always part of South Korean development plans, but the ROK moved more quickly in 
this direction than it would otherwise have because of uncertainty in U.S. supplies. The regular 
shifts in U.S. policy maker support for certain ROK capabilities, particularly in regards to pyro-
processing, also increased the resentments of ROK nuclear scientists at a time when the ROK 
was seemingly more committed to the nonproliferation regime than ever before. 
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[#19-ABSTRACT]  
ABSTRACT 
Given the erosion of existing arms control treaties (such as INF or the START-process) as well 
as the growing pace of new technological developments, global security and peace are con-
fronted with new challenges, technically and politically. New technical arms races are on the 
horizon in several domains such as cyber and outer space which are poorly regulated with 
regard to military applications. On offensive-defensive arms competition is evolving in the stra-
tegic field such as offensive delivery systems and missile defence. Manoeuvrable supersonic 
cruise missiles, hypervelocity gliders, anti-missile interceptors and cyberweapons can threaten 
the offensive oriented nuclear balance. Additionally, new capabilities in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence are complicating the strategic debate. Classical nuclear arms control is based on 
parity of key weapon systems, offensive ballistic missiles and the verification of delivery sys-
tems. Politically, the great power competition between the US, Russia and China is heating up 
the debate politically. New arms races on scientific-technological fields are in the making. New 
innovative concepts have to be elaborated and science has to be part of this endeavour. The 
talk will give some recommendations for further research questions and fields. 
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TRACK III: 
BIOLOGICAL/ 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
TRACK CHAIR: 
MIRKO HIMMEL 
CARL FRIEDRICH VON WEIZSÄCKER-CENTRE FOR SCIENCE AND 
PEACE RESEARCH (ZNF), UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG 
INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War, the use of biological or chemical weapons became more and 
more unlikely as means of warfare. Furthermore, the increasing global implementation of both, 
the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention (BWC, CWC) has been perceived as prom-
ising sign for a persistent international ban of these weapons. The frequent use of chemical 
weapons (CW) in the course of the civil war in Syria, as well as the alleged use of nerve agents 
for assassination attempts in Malaysia and Great Britain by state actors, now puts the chemical 
weapons ban under pressure. In a politically tense atmosphere, a severe loss of trust can be 
recognised among CWC States Parties. Important questions such as the investigation of the 
alleged use of chemical weapons cannot any longer be solved in a constructive manner.  
The political situation within the BWC regime is different, but not much better. There is still no 
agreed verification mechanism for this important arms control treaty. Compliance monitoring is 
relying in part on in-transparent methods. Science and technology are evolving fast, but a struc-
tured review of relevant developments is lacking. Within this context, political progress is slow 
and BWC States Parties experience difficulties to agree on necessary steps fostering the bio-
logical weapons ban. The adoption of new production concepts in the chemical industries, dual 
use aspects of new genetic engineering techniques as well as the convergence between biol-
ogy and chemistry are some of the future challenges for biological and chemical arms control. 
Here, science can contribute to a better understanding of technical aspects of CBW. Compli-
ance monitoring and the analysis of alleged CBW use can now be supported by open source 
information. Does the question remain how to make this information accessible? Fresh thinking 
is required to tackle all these problems. 
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To discuss challenges and possibilities for biological and chemical arms control, SCIENCE · 
PEACE · SECURITY invited contributions from the fields of biology, medicine, chemistry, from 
international arms control organisations as well as policy relating to technical issues. 
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[#20-ABSTRACT]  
ABSTRACT 
Chemical arms control relies predominately on agreed inspection and verification procedures. 
The international Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supports the 
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and provides technical and sci-
entific assistance to Member States. There is an increasing demand for integration of new 
scientific methods in the OPCW’s work as reflected by several reports of the organisation’s 
Scientific Advisory Board. New methods for chemical arms control include remote sensing 
technologies, chemical forensics, the use of open source information and computer-based al-
gorithms for the assessment of toxic chemicals. 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) lacks a verification mechanism. Con-
fidence Building Measures, which submission is not legally-binding, allow only in part to assess 
the compliance of Member States. Therefore, compliance monitoring relies on alternative meth-
ods and could include in the future the analysis of open source information. Other scientific 
methods for monitoring industry-scale process in selected production environments could be 
of use also for a more comprehensive monitoring approach. 
Altogether, science can contribute to a better understanding of technical aspects of CBW. Com-
pliance monitoring and the analysis of alleged CBW use can now be supported by open source 
information. But the question remains how to make this information accessible? An integrated 
analytical approach is required to address these challenges both in the BTWC and CWC con-
text. 
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ABSTRACT 
Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, has seen a renaissance in the last few years, 
particularly due to the huge popularity and growth of the range of affordable AM machines and 
the funding and strategic investment that has poured into the wider industry. AM applications 
related to the development, production and delivery of biological weapons have only more re-
cently been identified as a possible source of concern. AM poses a number of challenges for 
export control, including the decentralization of production, a shift in skill requirements and an 
increased reliance on intangible transfers of technology. Developments in the printing of labor-
atory equipment and drone components and in the bioprinting of tissue potentially pose biolog-
ical weapon proliferation risks. While relevant applications of AM currently still require consid-
erable talent recruitment and process development efforts, particularly the digitized and auto-
mated nature of AM will likely mean that these barriers will be successively removed. It is thus 
important to neither under- nor overestimate the immediate impact of these technological de-
velopments and engage with all stakeholders to carefully monitor the nuanced risk picture cur-
rently faced and prevent AM from becoming an enabler of biological weapon proliferation. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Additive manufacturing (AM), often referred to as “3D printing”, describes a range of manufac-
turing processes in which an object of almost any shape is built by adding and fusing together 
layers of material. While AM has a long history as a rapid prototyping technology, it has more 
recently seen a renaissance, particularly due to the huge popularity and growth of the range of 
affordable AM machines using plastic polymers and the funding and strategic investment that 
has poured into the wider industry. The technique used by many of the simple desktop AM 
machines is similar to the functioning of a common desktop printer, thus often referred to as 
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“3D printers”. However, AM includes a variety of manufacturing techniques. These include 
techniques to build objects made of metal or alloys with characteristics such as corrosion re-
sistance, making them relevant for the production and development of weapons (Bundestag 
Committee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment, 2017). Products that have 
been additively manufactured to date range from basic forms of small arms to key components 
of rocket engines.  
While aerospace and missile applications of AM have received significant attention in the last 
few years, AM applications related to the development, production and delivery of biological 
weapons (BW) have only more recently been identified as a possible source of concern. Both 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the principal non-proliferation treaty 
banning the development, possession, stockpiling and transfer of BW, and the Australia Group, 
the multilateral export control regime concerned with BW and chemical weapons (CW), have 
recently started considering threats resulting from or facilitated by AM (Australia Group, 2019). 
Advances in and the greater availability of AM machines and technology have raised particular 
concerns as a profound challenge to the effective implementation of export controls (Brock-
mann & Bauer, 2018). Export controls have traditionally focused on controlling the physical 
movement of goods across national borders, while the implementation of controls on transfers 
of technology has proven much more difficult. Controls on tangible goods, such as AM ma-
chines, key components and feedstock materials, remain a cornerstone of the application of 
export controls to AM. However, AM enables an intangible transfer of technology, such as an 
email or another digital file transfer, to deliver a significant amount of the information required 
for the automatic production of an object and could thus enable proliferation, including to BW 
programmes. Most AM applications in the BW field are still developing, thus resulting in a nu-
anced risk picture. Nevertheless, these risks and the impact on BW proliferation are expected 
to grow as the technology matures and the specific skills required for effectively leveraging AM 
become more common. 
There is only a limited literature that has investigated the technological capabilities of AM to 
contribute to a BW programme and BW proliferation and arms control challenges that result. 
The bi-annual assessments by a group of experts convened by the Swiss Spiez Laboratory, 
published in the “Spiez Convergence” reports (Spiez Laboratory, 2016; Spiez Laboratory, 
2018), provide concise technical assessments of the capabilities of AM for BW and CW appli-
cations. A recent series of papers on “Emergence & Convergence” by the US National Defense 
University is another notable exception, particularly stressing the impact of the digitisation of 
emerging technologies, including AM (Bajema, 2018). Building on the work published in 
SIPRI’s report “Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Tech-
nologies” (Brockmann et al., 2019), this paper first discusses AM technologies and in particular 
bioprinting, as well as the challenges AM poses to export control. It then discusses three spe-
cific areas of application of AM for the development, production and delivery of biological weap-
ons. It concludes with a summary of the resulting risk picture and select policy recommenda-
tions. 
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 EXPORT CONTROL CHALLENGES AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON 
PROLIFERATION RISKS POSED BY ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 
 ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING AND BIOPRINTING TECHNOLOGY 
AM is often treated as if it were one unitary technology, however, it is better described as a 
category of automated manufacturing techniques. The main commonality of these techniques 
is the deposition and fusing of layers of materials. These techniques can be used to build an 
object of virtually any shape or form, reducing the loss of material and enabling more complex 
objects and new performance characteristics (Fey, 2017). An increasing variety of materials 
can be used as feedstocks to produce objects using these techniques, including polymers, 
resins, metal powders and so-called bioinks.  
One technique that is currently receiving particular attention is bioprinting (Noor et al., 2019; 
Derakhshanfar et al., 2018). In contrast to the inanimate materials used as feedstock by other 
AM techniques, bioprinting constructs objects made from biological materials such as living 
cells. Using bioinks involves the added complexity of their high sensitivity to environmental 
conditions, growth and differentiation factors, and the particularities of the construction of tis-
sue. In bioprinting, the bioinks are deposited using, for example, small nozzles for extrusion or 
an inkjet to achieve precisely layered arrangements of cells and support structures (Ji & 
Guvendiren, 2017). These materials then grow into functional tissue based on the cells’ biolog-
ical processes. 
 EXPORT CONTROL CHALLENGES POSED BY ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING 
AM promises to bring production to the end-user. It could decentralize production and thus 
reduce the need for the physical transportation of goods across borders (Palmer, 2015). AM is 
also said to be “deskilling” certain aspects of manufacturing, making it easier for producers with 
less knowledge and experience to produce more complex products. This characterisation 
should however be used with caution and it is better to view AM as causing a shift in knowledge 
and skill requirements rather than their reduction. However, AM does threaten to provide a 
substitute for other, controlled production techniques and the associated equipment, thus po-
tentially enabling the circumvention of the barriers imposed by export controls. Perhaps more 
crucial than the new performance characteristics it enables is the increased digitization and 
automation of this production technology. As such, it further increases the importance of intan-
gible transfers of technology—particularly the digital build files which encode both the charac-
teristics of the object to be produced and the commands for the AM machine—which can easily 
be transferred for example via e-mail (Stewart, 2016; Brockmann, 2018). Compared to physical 
goods, digital transfers of technical data are harder to track and control (Bromley and Maletta, 
2018). Moreover, the specialized audit capabilities to verify compliance with technology export 
controls are still very rare. States must, therefore, rely on intelligence and law enforcement 
information to detect illicit transfers and internal compliance mechanisms in companies are 
ever more important. 
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 POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING IN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY 
AM has a range of potential applications in the development, production and delivery of biolog-
ical weapons. All of these are still evolving—as with almost all AM technologies—and thus 
provide a moving target for regulatory measures (Spiez Laboratory, 2016). Among the many 
potentially relevant applications of AM, three are worth particular consideration:  
Printing of production or laboratory equipment 
AM can be used to print components of production and laboratory equipment and other items 
required for the production of biological weapons. In this way, AM could limit the footprint—
acquisition of particular equipment, materials and specialized knowledge—of a clandestine bi-
ological weapon development or production effort. There are however also several technical 
barriers that currently remain: Especially when using polymers, chemical compatibility and re-
sistance still limit the range of materials that can be used (Spiez Laboratory, 2018; Heikkinen 
et al., 2018). Moreover, there has so far only been limited testing of relevant properties of 
products and how printed items interact with chemicals and biomaterials. While AM may offer 
an alternative production pathway for some parts and equipment, it currently only results in a 
modest substitution effect as much of the equipment that is of concern can already be acquired 
through commercial providers for laboratories and the pharmaceutical industry. Using new AM 
techniques for this purpose likely still involves more significant technical expertise, knowledge 
and process development requirements (Fairchild et al., 2017). This means that only under 
very specific circumstances an actor may choose to pursue this pathway to manufacture pro-
duction or laboratory equipment.  
Bioprinting of tissue samples 
Among the many positive applications of bioprinting in medicine (Ventola, 2014), the printing 
of tissue for pharmacological testing is potentially also relevant in the context of the develop-
ment of biological weapons (Spiez Laboratory, 2016). Such synthetic tissue is already being 
used to test pharmaceutical compounds for toxicity and other characteristics. As this technol-
ogy matures, bioprinted samples may be used for biomedical research and testing that is in-
volved in the development of biological weapons (Zilinskas & Mauger, 2015). For example, 
bioprinted tissue could be used to assess specific interactions between biological agents and 
certain tissue types under conditions that are otherwise difficult to simulate. However, these 
techniques are not uniquely enabling (Fairchild et al., 2017). Established methods, such as 
animal testing, are currently still more accessible and require a more common set of knowledge 
and skills. While bioinks and suitable printers are commercially available, the knowledge re-
quired to take advantage of this technology is less accessible to an actor with malicious intent. 
Printing of delivery systems or their components 
Potential risk scenarios like terrorists using adapted commercial drones to disperse a biological 
weapon have long been known to experts (Bajema, 2018). The use of AM to produce compo-
nents for delivery systems such as drones contributes to making their designs more adaptable, 
increase their capabilities and could thus make them more suitable for use as a delivery system 
for biological weapons. Plans and build files for printable parts of commercially available drones 
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are openly shared in the do-it-yourself (DIY) community. Simultaneously, the capabilities and 
customizability of off-the-shelf drones have also increased (Dura, 2018). Certain spray tanks 
and types of nozzles that are already subject to export controls can be produced using AM. 
However, the relatively low level of sophistication of these parts means that they do not neces-
sarily present a major obstacle to their acquisition by a state or a non-state actor.  
 NUANCED RISK PICTURE AND SELECT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The applications of AM relevant to the development, production and delivery of biological weap-
ons are still relatively unknown. However, developments in bioprinting, as well as in the printing 
of drone components and laboratory equipment, continue at a rapid pace due to commercial 
and scientific interests—and an active DIY community. While relevant applications of AM cur-
rently still require considerable talent recruitment and process development efforts, particularly 
the digitized and automated nature of AM will likely mean that these barriers will be succes-
sively removed. Although the convergence of biotechnology and AM currently only produces 
moderate biological weapon proliferation risks, these are expected to increase (Brockmann et 
al., 2019). It is thus important to neither under- nor overestimate the immediate impact.  
Discussions in the AG on if and how to exert controls over the transfer of relevant goods and 
technologies area are therefore confronted by a difficult array of challenges. These include 
tracking advances in a rapidly evolving set of technologies and defining the associated risks. 
At the same time, export controls should not stifle developments for civilian applications of 
these technologies. Many of the challenges posed by AM extend beyond the biological and 
chemical weapons context and are relevant to missiles and the nuclear and conventional arms 
fields (Brockmann, 2018; Brockmann & Kelley, 2018). Thus, they are of interest to all the export 
control regimes. Members of the regimes should therefore consider it as a topic for possible 
dialogue between the regimes, in particular regarding potential technical parameters for con-
trols on AM machines and controlling intangible transfers of technical data that are used in AM. 
At the same time, while export controls are currently a focus of regulatory discussions in the 
context of AM, meeting the challenges it creates in connection with biological weapons requires 
a more comprehensive approach. As such, discussions in both the BWC and the AG also need 
to pay attention to the role of research ethics and risk mitigation procedures in relevant research 
fields. This would include a stronger emphasis on raising awareness about possible weapons 
applications at relevant universities, research institutes and in DIY communities, as well as the 
development of stronger industry compliance and due diligence standards (Bauer et al., 2017). 
States thus need to engage with all stakeholders and carefully monitor the nuanced risk picture 
currently faced to prevent AM from becoming an enabler of biological weapon proliferation. 
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ABSTRACT 
Synthetic gene drives are a novel technology which is heavily researched on. This genetic 
technology can be used to, over a number of generations, either drive selected traits into the 
majority of the population or suppress unwanted population. This promises to shape whole wild 
populations or even species according to our will. GDs may be applied in the fields of public 
health, for agricultural, and in ecology conservation. Currently, however, the technology is far 
from controllable in its spatiotemporal spread. It has to be feared that a suppression of invasive 
rodents in New Zealand would spread to the continents, likely tipping over established ecolog-
ical networks for many generations. Proponents of the technology eagerly stride forward in 
their ambition to release the first gene drives into the wild, preferably sooner than later, while 
gene drives still pose an enormous challenge to regulators and policy makers. It is obvious that 
this topic harbors a high conflict potential even without mentioning potential military or adverse 
applications. Exploratory scenario settings for different proposed or imaginable applications 
shall provide an insight into potential benefits, issues, problems, failures and conflicts that might 
arise from this rather premature technology that has already been called a silver bullet. 
 INTRODUCTION  
In a gene drive (GD), genetically manipulated organisms with customized traits are released 
into wild populations. These gene drive organisms (GDOs) are designed to pass their trans-
genic trait on to their offspring in a higher ratio than would usually be possible due to the Men-
delian laws of inheritance. Depending on the customized trait — over generations — this Su-
per-Mendelian inheritance allows the GDOs to either drive their genes into the vast majority of 
a population to change its properties or cause a population suppression of an unwanted spe-
cies. However, the confineability of a GD is still questionable, posing the risk of uncontrolled 
spread, harboring unpredictable ecological consequences up to the global conversion or sup-
pression of a whole species and effects cascading from that. Although limitation strategies are 
researched upon (Min et al. 2017a, 2017b; Noble et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2016), none has yet 
reached a stage beyond initial laboratory experiments.  
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GDOs will be released into wild habitats instead of artificial, agricultural ecosystems and cor-
responding genetic alterations will irreversibly remain for multiple generations instead of just 
one crop season. Conventional GMOs are meant not to proliferate, while GDOs are designed 
to do exactly that and even more successfully than their wild conspecifics. Thus, the technology 
collides with the regulations for the release of conventional genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) (Simon et al. 2018). Moreover, a GD once released will not adhere to national bound-
aries. Since some species that should be suppressed or altered may be protected in some and 
regarded as pests in other countries, a unified regulation is direly needed. Even more so, the 
advent of GD-research shows an imminent threat of the technology to become a business plan 
for the agro-industry where more and more ideas are spun to manipulate agricultural pest in-
sects. On the other hand, the US military research agency (DARPA) is currently the biggest 
funding agency for GD-research (~$ 100 million) (ETC Group and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2018), 
looking for a way to detect GDs in the wild that have been released by error or malintent 
(“DARPA: Safe Genes,”). Implying a certain fear that GD technology may be weaponized and 
secretly deployed against crop plants or even humans. Taken together, the character of the 
technology and possible impacts of side effects and misuse show that certain applications of 
GDs bear a high conflict and possibly even dual-use potential.  
 METHOD AND RESULTS  
Three prospective, exploratory scenarios will be developed in order to provide insights into the 
political, legal, as well as ethical challenges and blind-sides for the potential application of gene-
drives. By using an inductive methodology, the scenarios will be built up step-wise according 
to the existing knowledge of technical as well as institutional and regulatory contexts for poten-
tial GD applications.  
The scenarios are based on gene drive applications in agriculture, public health and conserva-
tion. Each scenario will be scrutinized according to their intended, beneficious consequences, 
their potential unintended side effects and possible accidental consequences. Furthermore, the 
responsibility of governance and regulation will be assessed as well as the liability in the case 
of negative consequences. 
These scenarios are planned to give useful insights into the potentially upcoming socio-political 
issues and conflict potentials linked to gene drive technology. Thereby they contribute to (pre-
emptive) policy and regulatory development but also fundamentally seek to raise awareness 
among a diverse set of stakeholders for the complex social, political, and ethical challenges 
associated with the application of gene drives and their release into the ecosystem.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was opened for signature in January, 1993, and 
entered into force four years later, April 29, 1997. Today it includes 193 States Parties, with 
only four countries – Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan – remaining outside the 
treaty regime. Of these four, Israel has signed but not ratified the treaty. There is also another 
important country, Taiwan, which is not a member due to the opposition of China against any 
inclusion of Taiwan in any multilateral regime. Taiwan, however, contains one of the world’s 
largest chemical industries and therefore remains important to the CWC. 
The CWC is, therefore, the most universal of all arms control and disarmament treaties with 
the most States Parties of any multilateral regime today except the United Nations. It is there-
fore useful to look at the CWC as a model weapons abolition treaty, and to draw conclusions 
regarding successful weapons abolition regimes. 
The CWC’s implementing agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), is located in The Hague, The Netherlands, with about 475 international employees 
and an annual budget of 70 million Euros. The treaty is very comprehensive in banning all 
chemical weapons, including development, production, testing, stockpiling, and use. It does 
not ban limited research in chemical agents for defensive purposes, and also does not ban the 
use of riot control agents (RCAs) such as tear gas for non-military purposes. 
The CWC mandates the declaration and verified elimination of all chemical weapons programs 
and stockpiles and has therefore overseen the safe and permanent destruction of declared 
chemical weapons stockpiles in eight countries to date – Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, Russia, 
South Korea, Syria, and the United States. These eight CW possessor countries have declared 
a total of 72,304 metric tons of chemical agents, of which 70,199 metric tons, about 97%, have 
already been safely eliminated as of June 30, 1999. 
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The United States was the first country to begin destruction of its large stockpile in 1990, seven 
years before the CWC entered into force but partly as a result of the prior bilateral agreements 
between Russia and the US in the late 1980s to unilaterally and reciprocally eliminate their CW 
stockpiles. The US had nine large CW stockpiles holding 28,577 metric tons (31,501 US tons) 
in 1990, but was able to destroy 1,436 metric tons by the CWC’s entry into force (EIF) in 1997. 
So the US total was 27,141 metric tons (29,918 US tons) at EIF. Of these totals, 26,671 metric 
tons have now been destroyed, about 93%, leaving two stockpiles currently operating at Blue 
Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado. These are both scheduled to finish destruction by the 
end of 2023. Total costs for this program will exceed $40 billion, more than twenty times initial 
program estimates from the 1980s. 
The Russian Federation declared the largest stockpile total, 40,000 metric tons of chemical 
agents at seven large stockpiles and began operating its first destruction facility in 2002, twelve 
years after the US began destruction. Russia completed its first-stage destruction process after 
fifteen years in 2017, although several hundred thousand tons of liquid toxic waste from its 
neutralization process still remain to be treated in second-stage processes. The total cost of 
Russia’s program is estimated at $10 billion, with about a quarter of this provided by the Global 
Partnership (US, UK, Germany, Canada, and several other national contributors). 
The other CWC States Parties which declared and destroyed their CW stockpiles are Albania 
(16 metric tons destroyed by 2007); South Korea (605 metric tons [estimated] destroyed by 
2008); India (1,055 metric tons [estimated] destroyed by 2009); Libya (26 metric tons destroyed 
by 2014); Iraq which encased two large concrete bunkers with unknown amounts of chemical 
weapons and agents by 2014; and Syria (1,308 metric tons destroyed by 2014). Each of these 
former possessor countries has its own unique story to tell. 
There have been many challenges to these stockpile destruction efforts, perhaps the largest 
being the enormous and unpredictable costs involved. At least five countries – Albania, India, 
Iraq, Libya, Russia, and Syria – have relied on foreign financial and technical support, while 
three countries – India, South Korea, and the United States – have funded their own programs. 
A second major challenge has been the development of safe and reliable technologies for 
destruction of these dangerous agents and related materials including explosives and rocket 
propellant; major disputes have broken out between high-temperature processes, especially 
incineration, and wet-chemistry processes, especially neutralization. Environmental and public 
health regulators have generally chosen neutralization as more manageable and measurable, 
while militaries have preferred incineration as faster and more mature.  
A third major challenge has been the ongoing inspection and verification of destruction, espe-
cially since the most recent use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict since 2012. Although 
Syria declared its chemical weapons stockpile – 1,308 metric tons – in 2013 when it joined the 
CWC, and allowed its destruction by the US, Germany, Finland, and the UK, it has been shown 
that chemical weapons attacks have continued in Syria through 2018. The Fact-Finding Mis-
sion (FFM) of the OPCW has shown that chlorine, mustard, and sarin nerve agent have been 
used numerous times, and the Joint Investigative Mechanism found that the Syrian military and 
the Islamic State were both the perpetrators of these attacks. 
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Another example of the use of deadly chemical agents has been the assassination of Kim Jong-
nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on Feb-
ruary 13, 2017, with VX nerve agent. This murder was undertaken by North Korean agents but 
North Korea does not belong to the CWC. It clearly illustrated that North Korea has the ability 
to produce the most advanced nerve agents, and the country is thought to deploy over 5,000 
metric tons of agents in chemical artillery shells. 
Another important assassination attempt took place in March, 2018 when the former Russian 
spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Julia, were attacked with a military-grade nerve agent in 
Salisbury, UK. Fortunately, they both survived the attack, reportedly by two Russian agents, 
but two other UK citizens were subsequently injured four months later after finding the nerve 
agent disguised as a perfume bottle; one victim, Dawn Sturgess, died as a result of this. This 
crime has been raised in the OPCW meetings since then, but Russia denies any responsibility 
for the attack. 
Two additional challenges to note include the need for all CWC States Parties to declare their 
past chemical weapons-related activities and to annually report all activities, including imports 
and exports of scheduled chemicals, to the OPCW. All States Parties must also fully implement 
the treaty domestically by establishing a National Authority and legislative initiatives. Only 
about 50-60% of States Parties today have met these obligations. And lastly, the OPCW and 
CWC require much more public support and awareness of this international effort to ban a 
whole class of weapons of mass destruction; while the OPCW has made progress with the 
establishment of an Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), and non-governmen-
tal organizations have established a network of NGOs and civil society stakeholders – the 
“CWC Coalition,” much more needs to be done. 
In conclusion, eight broad lessons for weapons abolition can be noted: (1) Treaty implementa-
tion requires broad national and public support, both financially and politically. (2) An experi-
enced and effective inspectorate and verification group are needed to build confidence in the 
regime. (3) On-site and challenge inspection options are required. (4) Annual reporting require-
ments for States Parties must be enforced. (5) A Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) is critical to 
track technology development and relevance. (6) Public outreach, training, awareness-raising, 
and capacity-building are critical to strengthen the treaty regime. (7) Investigative mechanisms 
are necessary for examining allegations of use of banned agents and weapons and for identi-
fying perpetrators, both state and non-state. And (8) capable and licensed laboratories for sam-
ple testing and forensic analysis are critical to treaty implementation. 
The Chemical Weapons Convention is an excellent model for other international arms control, 
disarmament, and abolition treaties and is clearly helping to build a more safe and secure 
world.1 
                                                     
 
1 Further information can be found at www.opcw.org  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
The Chemical Weapons Convention is a treaty underpinned by science and technology, with 
implementation requiring broad scientific and engineering skills and knowledge. This is clearly 
seen at an operational level where toxic chemicals must be destroyed, chemical analysis and 
inspection of chemical production facilities are required, assistance and training for response 
to chemical incidents must be provided and all the Nation States party to the treaty are encour-
aged to use science itself as a tool for international cooperation for economic and technological 
development. Furthermore, decision makers serving in policymaking organs of international 
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments often consider and review infor-
mation with significant scientific dimensions, requiring they have adequate levels of scientific 
literacy and access to scientific advisors. Yet, a ban on chemical weapons is often viewed from 
a perspective of mistrust to science of chemistry – the scientific discipline most closely associ-
ated with this class of weapons of mass destruction. 
Twenty-first century scientific and technological development is a trans-disciplinary, dynamic 
and rapidly evolving endeavour that is enabled by the emergence of new and innovative tech-
nologies, and the repurposing of existing technologies for unanticipated new applications. New 
advances across the chemical sciences come forward through ideas and tools originating from 
sectors outside this discipline (and chemistry itself influences other scientific disciplines in a 
similar manner), and relevant developments may not be easily recognized by a scientific review 
limited to chemical-specific fora. For those viewing science with distrust and concern over its 
potential misuse, the ecosystem of scientific and technological change brings uncertainty on 
what impact it may have on disarmament and non-proliferation. Those assessing impact of 
technological change on the Chemical Weapons Convention are confronted with many poten-
tial challenges for treaty implementation not the least of which is the challenge of recognizing 
where to look, and how to identify relevant advances. A significant challenge of scientific ad-
vancement viewed through a prism of distrust, is the risk of losing access to critical knowledge 
about known chemistry and chemicals of relevance to the treaty. Advances, however, can also 
be enabling for treaty implementation, providing opportunities for recognising when something 
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is “unusual” or out of place – focusing on warning signs in place of simply a new scientific 
development or innovation. 
The presentation discussed areas of concern often associated with posing a risk to the Con-
vention Weapons Convention, along with how science is advancing and what is driving it for-
ward. Approaches to addressing the inevitable scientific and technological evolution, that in 
future, will influence the operating environment of chemical weapons (and other) non-prolifer-
ation and disarmament regimes were also explored. A lack of scientific literacy puts implemen-
tation of a chemical disarmament and non-proliferation at risk of being ineffective, demanding 
that science be viewed not from a perspective of fear, but from with practical views on the 
capabilities necessary for success.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Dual use research of concern or DURC for short became a widely discussed topic within the 
life sciences. One commonly used definition for DURC is: “[Research that] Based on current 
understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies 
that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants, 
animals, the environment, or materiel.”(National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 2006, 
4). The misuse of biological agents for hostile purposes might be older than the study of said 
agents themselves. Germs have been used as weapons in various instances throughout his-
tory. Since World War I preparations for biological warfare took place in some states, reaching 
a peak during the Cold War where biological warfare agents where produced on industrial scale 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain (for history of bio-weapons production and use see various 
authors in: Lentzos, 2016). The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin 
Weapons (BWC) categorically banned any possession of pathogens and toxins in quantities 
large enough for non-peaceful purposes by member states (UNOG, 1972).  
However, 2001 saw a renewed concern in the possibility of bioweapons usage, this time pri-
marily by non-state actors. The case of “Ameritrax” as well as a general fear that terrorists 
might conduct attacks with weapons of mass destruction brought biological weapons back on 
the international security agenda (Vogel, 2016). Recent breakthroughs in the life sciences, 
namely in synthetic biology and genome editing, led to the fear that malicious actors might 
(mis-)use this research for their own purposes. In this respect, the international debate sur-
rounding gain-of-function experiments with genetically engineered influenza virus strains is of 
importance. Two laboratories, one in the USA and one in Europe submitted manuscripts in-
cluding details of the work which gave raise to concern due to the perceived misuse potential. 
The European research group headed by Ron Fouchier genetic analyzed the spread of avian 
influenza between mammals and conducted experiments that led to the successful infection of 
ferrets with a modified H5N1 virus through the air. While Fouchiers experiment itself can be 
designated as a success as it produced the desired results, many in the biosecurity community 
feared that the knowledge gained through his research could be used for hostile purposes. This 
brings us to a fundamental difference between the current DURC discussion and the discussion 
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about non-proliferation of biological weapons during the Cold War: While Cold War non-prolif-
eration measures were mainly focused on the control over the flow of materials necessary to 
build WMD the regulation of DURC will be mainly concerned with control of the knowledge that 
might be used to create or use pathogens for non-peaceful purposes.  
Currently, there is a demand for the implementation of DURC regulations at different levels. 
However, even the very broad DURC definition mentioned above is not uncontested and there 
is no agreement on what kind of DURC regulation would be adequate, who should be the 
regulating body or what would fall under such a regulation. Over the last years, a number of 
proposals on how to handle the security implications of DURC have been put forwards by in-
ternational organizations, national governments, non-governmental organizations, including 
scholarly academies and individual researchers participating in the current debate. Germany 
started some time ago to makes efforts in regulating DURC. The National Ethics Council 
(Ethikrat, 2015) as well the Leopoldina scholarly society (e.g.: Hacker, Fritsch, and Deutsche 
Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina, 2015) put forward proposals on dealing with DURC 
and research with security implications in a broader sense. At the same time, government 
agencies are active on the EU level to achieve a harmonized regulation (e.g.: European Com-
mission, DG Research and Directorate E: Biotechnology, Agriculture and Food Research, 
2004)  
Regulations and their concrete content are one type of what is called a policy in the social 
sciences. Policies are concerned with the concrete output of political process. Negotiating what 
kind of regulation is needed for DURC (even if such negotiations are informal) is precisely that 
- a political process (Fuhse, 2005 with reference to Easton, 1965, 349 f.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Public Policy Studies describes Policy as “[…] the business end of political science” […](Ox-
ford Handbooks, 2009). Policies, as the outcome of political processes, are usually concerned 
with the question of “who gets what and when” (Lasswell, 1936). or maybe more fitting in the 
current case of the DURC debate: who is allowed to do what and when, because here we look 
at a restricting policy rather than one that deals explicitly with the distribution of goods and 
services. Policy making is often seen as a “rational” undertaking in which experts and decision 
makers identify a clear-cut problem, consider alternative approaches to address the problem, 
find the “best” solution to it and implement this solution effectively (Fischer, 2007, 98 f.). How-
ever, when taking a social constructivist stance, policies are no longer the impartial solutions 
to clearly defined problems they are often presented as. 
Social Constructivists argue that there is no such thing as objective truth or knowledge. Instead, 
what we perceive as reality is produced (or constructed) and reproduced through discursive 
means and while we as a society share certain basic concepts (this is what we call culture, a 
system that lets us understand each other and accept certain knowledge as universally “true” 
(Hall, 1997, 4 ff.), specific knowledge, e.g. the specific properties of a technology, is often con-
tested (for policies see: Fischer, 2007, 100 ff.; Yanow, 2000, 5 ff. for technology see: Grint & 
Woolgar, 1992) 
The same holds true for policy making. Analysing policies can reveal which kind of knowledge 
is perceived as “true” by its makers. Policy has certain experiences, values and interests, that 
let seem see problems in a specific light. Those values are reflected within the polices they 
create and are reproduced through the enactment of those policies. Thus, policies create 
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meaning in their respective issue area (Yanow, 1996, 2000, 5ff.). Such an approach takes a 
closer look at the policies regulating DURC and treats policy documents itself as data. Using 
interpretive methods, in particular content analysis, can reveal the meanings, knowledge and 
values contained in the policy documents, make them comparable and allow insights in the 
“local” knowledge of different policy actors e.g. how they organise ideas and concepts (Yanow, 
2000, 20 ff.; Wright, Shore & Pero, 2011, 3). Since policies are not only a reflection of their 
maker’s values but an entity that constructs meaning itself, they are a window into the larger 
process of DURC regulation (Wright & Reinhold, 2011, 108; Yanow, 1996). What is proposed 
here is taking into consideration German and EU policy documents in order to show how actors 
approach DURC regulation in Germany and how they understand DURC. Important questions 
are for example how actors define DURC research and what is included in this definition and 
what not. Another interesting question is what kind of measures should be taken and who 
should be responsible for implementing them. While the first approach asks for the conception 
of DURC by the actors, the second set of questions are more concerned with how actors order 
their environment. This is very relevant to practitioners in the field since they have to deal with 
regulations once they are adopted. Here, deconstructing what is presented as ‘objective’ 
knowledge in the discussion can open a space for actors and knowledge that is usually over-
looked and introduce it into the policy making process. This would allow researchers and their 
knowledge to contribute more to the policy making process. 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT  
Systems biology aims to understand how vital, complex physiological systems function, and 
how these systems interact with one another to function as a whole. In a systems biology ap-
proach in the life sciences, experimental data concerning the gene, protein, and informational 
responses of biological processes gained through wet lab studies are integrated into computer-
assisted mathematical models designed to describe the structure of the system and its re-
sponse to perturbations (Kumar, Pathak, Gupta, Gaur, & Pandey, D., 2015). The aim is to learn 
about relations among components of a system that cannot be identified by using traditional 
reductionist methods that study only individual units in a complex biological process. This pro-
cedure can provide a better understanding of the system’s dynamics, which is the key to de-
termining biological mechanisms and understanding disease (Hood et al., 2012). The field of 
systems biology is not new, but rather has its origin in mathematical theories of systems control 
dating back to the beginning of the 20th century. What is new is the convergence of high-
throughput methodology for obtaining biological data and computational processing power that 
have led to a re-definition and expansion of the field (McDermott, Samudrala, Bumgarner, 
Montgomery & Ireton, 2009; Naylor & Chen, 2010). 
This research is yielding an enormous amount of information about specific targets of vital 
physiological processes and how these might respond to a perturbation. An example would be 
perturbation by a pharmacological therapeutic, thus paving the way for the innovative design 
of better drug candidates, which could be greatly beneficial in the diagnosis and treatment of 
complex diseases. At the same time, these studies have implications for biochemical security. 
In particular, work in this area has extended the spectrum of biological threat agents beyond 
the classical categories of microorganisms and toxins to include biochemical bioregulators, 
which to a great extent regulate the proper function of vital processes within the nervous, en-
docrine and immune systems. The bioregulators of relevance here are neurotransmitters/neu-
ropeptides, hormones and cytokines. Accordingly, systems biology methods have been used 
to study host-microbe interactions and in particular host-parasite relations (Adarem et al., 2011) 
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to aid in understanding infectious diseases. Systems biology has also been used to study im-
mune functions (Wu & Chen, 2016) as well as intricate processes in the nervous system (Diaz-
Beltran, Cano, Wall & Esteban, 2013; De Luca, Colangelo, Alberghina & Papa, 2018). In addi-
tion, this type of holistic approach has been actively applied to the investigation of complex 
diseases such as cancer (Filipp, 2017). Naturally, all these studies are directed at gaining in-
formation that can be decisive in steering vital physiological processes in a positive direction 
towards better health and well-being. 
Normally, bioregulators are produced in optimal amounts to ensure the regulatory balance and 
proper function of physiological processes including respiration, heartbeat, body temperature, 
cognition, mood and immune responses. However, if they are produced in amounts greater or 
less than optimal, this causes an imbalance of physiological responses that can lead to dys-
function, damage and even death. A case in point is the much-publicized mousepox experiment 
published in 2001 (Jackson et al., 2001). In an attempt to control a plague of rodents in Aus-
tralia, researchers developed a vaccine using a genetically engineered mousepox virus as vec-
tor, against which the mice were immune. They added a gene to the virus that encoded a 
protein on the surface of mouse oocytes designed to trigger an antibody response to the protein 
that would prevent fertilization. In order to boost the antibody response, the researchers added 
another gene encoding an immune system cytokine, interleukin-4 (IL-4), known to enhance 
antibody responses in general. However, as an unexpected result, the inoculated mice died. 
Apparently, overproduction of IL-4 suppressed the function of killer T cells necessary to contain 
the viral infection. The outcome of this study was the creation of a virus with enhanced lethality 
instead of a contraceptive (Ylönen, 2001). This example illustrates how overproduction of a 
bioregulator that is normally beneficial can be deadly as a result of imbalance of processes in 
a system as a whole, and underscores the need for a holistic approach in the study of interac-
tions of components in vital systems. 
When bioregulators as novel biochemical threat agents are combined with improved means of 
delivering these agents to their targets, you have the potential for the creation of novel bio-
chemical weapons. Improved methods of delivery are most evident in connection with the ad-
ministration of biochemical therapeutics in experimental and clinical studies. While methods of 
targeted delivery of therapeutics to treat disease do not exactly mimic those that would be most 
practical for delivery of biochemical agents as weapons, it is still possible to come to certain 
conclusions in these studies about the feasibility of the use of such methods for delivering 
biochemical agents for terroristic or biological warfare purposes. 
The two fields of work that appear to be most relevant for both therapeutic purposes and bio-
chemical warfare are viral and non-viral vector-directed delivery technologies, which are being 
actively applied in both clinical and experimental studies as part of cancer treatment, gene and 
immunotherapy. Non-viral vectors, sometimes referred to as nanorobots, are being developed 
to overcome some negative aspects of using viruses such as safety, immunity against viruses 
that diminish their effectiveness or limited transport capacity. Nanotechnology has played a 
fundamental role in many developments through the construction of defined nanoparticles for 
facilitated uptake through the tissues. Improvements in specific targeting and gene transfer 
efficacy of viral and non-viral vectors have made them much more feasible delivery systems. 
In particular, the delivery of viral and non-viral vectors over the aerosol route is increasingly 
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being explored so that this is rapidly becoming a definitive option in therapeutic settings (Nix-
dorff, 2018). Aerosol delivery is also the preferred means of dissemination of biological warfare 
agents. 
Biochemical security concerns in systems biology are embedded in the larger domain of cyber-
biosecurity, which addresses the security vulnerabilities at the interface of the life sciences and 
digital worlds. There are many areas of interface, but one that has received much attention 
lately are robotic platforms known as cloud laboratories, operated by computers that receive a 
work order (software programming of the needed procedure and sequence of steps) carried 
out by an assemblage of machines (Cyberbiosecurity, 2019).  
Biochemical bioregulators are relevant agents of concern for both the Biological Weapons Con-
vention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. While the potential for misuse is certainly 
given, it is most difficult to assess just how actual the risk of misuse is in effect. In the end, the 
feasibility of delivering biochemical agents as weapons for terrorist or warfare purposes can 
only be determined by direct testing of the specific agents in a designated scenario. Neverthe-
less, there remains a need to be proactive in approaches to deal with the misuse potential of 
this research area. In particular, the expansion of the threat spectrum into new categories of 
agents has not received proper consideration either in the deliberations on how to come to 
grips with the dual-use issues involved or in actual formulation of oversight policies at national 
and international levels. The misuse potential of bioregulators as well as the feasibility of using 
such agents as weapons first received prominent attention when the Committee on Advances 
in Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation Bioterrorism and Bi-
ological Warfare Threats (the Lemon-Relman Committee) of the United States National Acad-
emies examined more closely the work of earlier investigators (Kagan, 2001; Dando, 2001; 
Wheelis, 2002) and issued its report in 2006 (National Research Council, 2006). Since that 
time, however, there has been little effort in formulating security policies so as to extend the 
categories of dual-use research of concern described in the Fink Committee Report (National 
Research Council, 2004) to include experiments with biochemical bioregulators in the context 
of systems biology research. 
In Germany, the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the National Academy of Sciences, 
Leopoldina, have formulated recommendations (DFG & Leopoldina, 2014) for dealing with se-
curity-relevant research in all disciplines. Their recommendations, which revolve around dual 
use research of concern, include all the basic elements of an oversight programme, to be es-
tablished on a voluntary basis. A Joint Committee of DFG and Leopoldina is assisting with the 
establishment of these recommendations at universities and other research institutions in Ger-
many. Progress can be followed in regular reports along with other information available on the 
Joint Committee website (https://www.leopoldina.org/ueber-uns/kooperationen/gemeinsamer-
ausschuss-dual-use). 
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Around the same time that genetic engineering became a real option in the biological sciences 
in 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was concluded in Geneva. It entered into 
force in 1975, the same year the “Asilomar Conference” produced the first guidelines for the 
biosafety and governance of genetic engineering. These political and technological develop-
ments did not simply coincide; rather, biological disarmament and scientific and technological 
(S&T) developments have been intertwined from the outset. The BWC prohibits all biological 
agents and toxins “whatever their origin or method of production” (Article I (1)), anticipating that 
further technological advances might fall into that scope. It also stipulates that a review after 
five years shall “take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant 
to the Convention” (Article XII). This task was replicated at all subsequent review conferences, 
most recently in 2016. All Final Declarations reaffirmed the comprehensive scope of Article I, 
but there was no systematic review or monitoring of S&T developments. The institutional op-
tions to address such developments in the BWC framework remain limited to date. At the same 
time, the rapid developments in the life sciences create an ever-increasing number of (potential 
or actual) challenges for biological weapons disarmament. These include for example a 
broader geographical spread of institutions and researchers, a wider and faster dissemination 
of knowledge, development of enabling and other technologies that make relevant research 
easier, cheaper and hence more accessible, and last but not least a deepening knowledge of 
(micro)biological functions. All of these developments have benign, useful and important roles, 
and listing them as challenges might seem counterintuitive. However, from a security perspec-
tive they all include a potential for misuse and malign application that needs to be monitored 
and contained in order to mitigate concerns about possible biological weapons proliferation, 
without unduly limiting scientific freedom. In recognition of these challenges, BWC states par-
ties in 2011 agreed to include S&T review in the new intersessional work programme as one 
of the standing agenda items. The topic was hence addressed at the annual BWC meetings of 
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experts and states parties between 2012 and 2015. In the current intersessional process, S&T 
is again covered by one of the meetings of experts (MX 2) annually between 2018 and 2020. 
While this increased awareness of this issue among many stakeholders, it did not (yet) produce 
any more tangible results. States parties and non-governmental experts have developed nu-
merous proposals on how to deal with S&T developments more effectively in the BWC context, 
including through establishing a science advisory body. Taking into account examples from 
other treaty regimes such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty or the Convention on Biological Diversity, the presentation will discuss these proposals 
and offer some reflections on the available options.  
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[#28-ABSTRACT]  
ABSTRACT 
Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction are banned by two international arms 
control treaties: the Biological and the Chemical Weapons Convention (BWC, CWC). Recent 
events, namely the frequent use of chemical weapons in Syria since 2012 and an assassination 
attempt in Great Britain in 2018 give rise to concerns that under certain conditions the re-emer-
gence of chemical weapons cannot be prevented. In a politically tense atmosphere, a severe 
loss of trust can be recognised among CWC States Parties. Important questions such as the 
investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons cannot any longer be solved in a con-
structive manner. The political situation within in the BWC regime is different, but not much 
better. There is still no agreed verification mechanism for this important arms control treaty. 
Compliance monitoring is relying in part on in-transparent methods. Science and technology 
are evolving fast, but a structured review of relevant developments is lacking. Within this con-
text, political progress is slow and BWC States Parties experience difficulties to agree on nec-
essary steps fostering the biological weapons ban. The adoption of new production concepts 
in the chemical industries, dual use aspects of new genetic engineering techniques as well as 
the convergence between biology and chemistry are some of the future challenges for biologi-
cal and chemical arms control. 
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[#29-ABSTRACT]  
ABSTRACT 
Three types of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agreements have evolved. 
These regimes to regulate military relevant capabilities, technologies and capacities are faced 
with different trends. There have been major setbacks on classical arms control as a stability-
oriented approach aims to reduce the risks of war, and prevent arms races. Non-proliferation 
regimes want to minimize the risks that sensitive technologies are misused for hostile purposes. 
These agreements still hold but there are serious problems, including non-compliance. Human-
itarian arms control and disarmament wants to reduce the level of suffering caused by weapons 
during and after conflicts and focuses on how weapons are used. There has been some pro-
gress on humanitarian arms control. 
There are three core conditions for the success of arms control, non-proliferation and disarma-
ment agreements. These accords have to be able reduce the security dilemma, must be sup-
ported by and implemented faithfully by a vast majority of governments (particularly great pow-
ers) and they must be able to adequately absorb technological developments. These conditions 
can no longer be taken for granted.  
One problem is that great powers and particularly Russia and the United States have turned 
against arms control. At the same time, no new arms control champions have emerged and 
the emergence of new technologies raises doubts about the effectiveness of arms control re-
gimes. 
To tackle these challenges, middle powers like Germany, should attempt to seize four oppor-
tunities. First, they should try to secure the acquis and build on arms control successes. Sec-
ond, they should use the normative power of agreements to pave the way towards binding and 
verifiable treaties. Third, they should take advantage of new types of governance, in particular 
to strengthen controls of proliferation-sensitive technologies. Finally, they should work in 
groups of like-minded states to strengthen arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament 
agreements.  
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ABSTRACT 
The evaluation of chemical hazards is object of numerous national and international regula-
tions. The misuse of highly toxic substances for hostile purposes is prohibited by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. Known chemical warfare 
agents (CWA) and precursor chemicals for their production are listed in the schedules of chem-
icals in the annexes to the CWC. Additionally, group definitions for chemicals are used in order 
to cover numerous derivatives of CWA. Lists of individual substances are often recorded as 
static lists in databases, while structure definitions must be interpreted “on the fly” by experts 
and translated manually into derivatives of a given parent structure. This process is tedious 
and prone to mistakes. For chemical arms control, it would be desirable to translate chemical 
information submerged in the structure definitions into a computer-interpretable form. The da-
tabase tool SciDex has been developed in the working group of Volkmar Vill. This tool is capa-
ble of performing an assessment of chemical hazardous substances. Translating legal texts 
into computer-based assessment algorithms allows mapping of relevant regulations which ap-
ply to a given chemical compound, even to new ones. Furthermore, specific structural analo-
gies can be used to predict approximations of individual physicochemical properties of com-
pounds not listed in a database through comparison of close structural derivatives with known 
properties. The computer algorithm is capable of identifying chemical substances which have, 
due to their structure, properties quite similar to those mentioned in the CWC schedules. 
SciDex is a dynamic database tool which can be used efficiently for preventive chemical arms 
control and trade monitoring purposes. 
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ABSTRACT 
Biological Weapons are identified as weapons of mass destruction within the arms control dis-
course, as there were of course (state-organized) attempts to produce biological weapons that 
possess the ability of mass causalities and there is the possibility that there will be similar 
attempts in the future. Despite that, the few cases of an intentional release of biological agents 
in the past show that one can rarely observe actual mass casualties. Within the discourse 
concerning the Biological Weapons Convention, one can however identify the concern, that 
biological weapons, even with lower destructive potential, can still have a lasting effect in the 
form of so-called “mass disruptions”. 
Often the term disruption seems to focus a disruption of critical infrastructures. However, there 
seem to exist additionally layers to the concept, which can be seen in mentions of the special 
appeal of biological weapons for terroristic purposes and effects, which are talked about in 
terms of “social disruptions”. This aspect of a disruption phenomenon addresses effects on a 
level of interactions and (socio-) psychological impacts, which go beyond the impact on critical 
infrastructures. 
We want to outline ideas on the question of how to divide and organize types of disruption and 
which affected areas are presumed. We want to open the discussion on how “mass disruption” 
may not be assessable as a quantitative threshold for defining an effect as such, but a qualita-
tive describable phenomenon which contains imaginations and concerns about vulnerabilities 
and the importance of areas of societies. 
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TRACK IV: NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 
AND ARMS CONTROL 
TRACK CHAIR: 
JÜRGEN ALTMANN 
EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS III, TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Since research and development of new military technology were done systematically they 
have brought about new weapons systems that often have endangered global peace and mil-
itary stability. Arms control has limited some of the most urgent problems, in particular with 
nuclear weapons, but could not change the general course of the qualitative arms race. Today 
arms-control treaties – not only for nuclear weapons – are in danger. Space weapons, limitation 
of which has been on the table for more than 30 years, are re-appearing. Hypervelocity missiles 
threaten to undermine limits on ballistic and cruise missiles. Armed drones, attacking under 
remote control, are being deployed by dozens of countries. Autonomous weapons, where the 
computer would select and attack targets without human intervention, are on the horizon. Cyber 
forces prepare not only defence, but also offence, with effects in the physical world, and co-
ordinated with military action therein. Markedly shortened decision times threaten to increase 
crisis instability, raising the spectre of accidental war. Ever smaller weapons and production in 
small, inconspicuous installations render verification of bans and limits increasingly difficult. 
To discuss dangers from new military technologies and possibilities of preventive arms control 
in various areas, as well as overarching policy issues, SCIENCE · PEACE · SECURITY invited 
contributions from the respective fields of natural as well as social science. 
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New Military Technologies and 
International Security/ Peace 
JÜRGEN ALTMANN 
EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS III, TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY 
[#32-EXT.-ABSTRACT]  
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Advances in science and technology, translated into new kinds of weapons, have always influ-
enced the issue of war and peace, but have gotten immensely higher importance after 1945. 
Many new technologies, used for military purposes, have increased threats, accelerated the 
pace of warfare and in consequence reduced decision times, endangering international secu-
rity and peace. One example from the Cold War is the addition, in the 1960s, of ballistic missiles 
to bombers as strategic nuclear-weapon carriers which reduced the flight times from many 
hours to 10-35 minutes, with correspondingly shortened early-warning and reaction times. An-
other is the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on mis-
siles in the 1970s which raised the specter of a disarming first strike. Even though concerned 
scientists had warned against such developments, these qualitative advances could not be 
prevented, but at least quantitative arms control could be agreed upon (Goldblat, 2002). Suc-
cess in qualitative arms control was possible in the field of ballistic-missile defence: after con-
siderable efforts by scientists (in the Pugwash Conferences) to convince political leaders 
(Evangelista, 1999), anti-ballistic missile systems were severely limited by the ABM Treaty 
(1972), removing motives for compensating offensive build-ups. Depending on political devel-
opments nationally as well as globally, military uses of specific technologies could be stopped 
and weapons destroyed, as with the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (1993). In order to be comprehensive and preclude undermining by tech-
nological advance, several arms-control treaties contain preventive elements, prohibiting not 
only use and deployment of certain kinds of weapons, but also the earlier stages of testing and 
development – additional cases are the nuclear test bans of 1963 and 1996. 
However, in most cases military-technological advances went unimpeded. This holds less for 
qualitatively new kinds of weapons, more for improvements of existing weapons and all sorts 
of components and systems for their higher effectiveness, including reconnaissance, tactics, 
strategies and logistics. In the 1980s microelectronics and information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) allowed markedly higher targeting precision. In the 1990s the notion of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs and net-centric warfare came to the forefront. The remote-control 
armed uninhabited vehicles that have been on the rise since the 2000s can be counted as a 
new kind of weapon. 
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Fundamental change in weapon systems can be expected from several present trends, with 
technologies that can be called revolutionary and that act synergistically. A general theme is 
nanotechnology that comprises many different fields (Altmann, 2006, 2017). Concrete issues 
include: Autonomous weapon systems where selection and attack of targets would be done by 
computer without human control, enabled by advances in sensors, ICTs and artificial intelli-
gence; manipulation in cyberspace; additive manufacturing (“3-D printing”); new possibilities of 
manipulating life processes, in particular genome editing (this may enable targeted application 
of biological agents and reduce military reservations against them); body manipulation that 
could produce brain-machine interfaces and enhanced soldiers. Several of the new technolo-
gies will be more generally available, including to non-state actors. In case of software-con-
trolled, general-purpose production technologies, preparing nefarious uses could need no more 
than a change of the process-description file. 
Arms races in such technologies are by and large not yet real, still limited to the planning, 
research and development stages, but they could expand to deployed military hardware soon, 
with proliferation to many countries. The military situation would destabilise, endangering inter-
national security and peace. Also, there are dangers to arms control and international human-
itarian law. Civil society could be affected by new kinds of weapons used by terrorists. Needed 
is military-technology assessment and then preventive arms control (Altmann, 2006: ch. 5, 
2008). Preventive arms control limits or prohibits potential new military uses of technologies 
before they would be deployed, working at the stages of use, acquisition, testing and/or devel-
opment. Preventive elements are contained in more treaties than the ones mentioned above; 
the ban of laser blinding weapons is an interesting special case (Protocol, 1995). 
Preventive limits of revolutionary technologies encounter difficulties. Many technological devel-
opments are driven by the civilian sphere (e.g. “autonomous” cars), several technologies will 
come with dual-use potential. With civilian interests in the civilian application of such technolo-
gies, limiting them will meet resistance. However, in many cases the military requirements go 
beyond what is being developed for civilian markets, so that specific military development is 
still needed, military systems will differ from civilian ones and could be limited without marked 
consequences for civilian products. More problematic is the desire for improved combat 
strength that moves modern armed forces toward fast introduction of new technologies. In par-
ticular, the quest for maintaining or achieving military-technological superiority acts as a driver. 
Necessary is the insight that national security can only be ensured sustainably by organising 
international security. With this insight and ensuing political will preventive limitations of the 
most dangerous military uses should be possible for the near- and mid-term future. In most 
areas verification of compliance seems possible using established co-operative methods such 
as data exchange, on-site inspections, sensor systems and overflights, or improved forms 
thereof. 
But the smaller, cheaper, more numerous and more widely available technologies or danger-
ous systems will become, the more intrusive the verification of compliance with limitations will 
need to get. In the long run anytime, anywhere inspections in military as well as civilian places 
could become necessary in theory which would be hard to accept in practice not only by armed 
forces, but also by private industry and ordinary citizens. Will arms control encounter its limits 
in such a case? Will prevention of arms races and extreme destabilisation require organising 
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international security in a different manner, by an international system where states for their 
security no longer rely on the threat of their armed forces, but on an international legal system 
with a (limited) monopoly of legitimate violence against lawbreakers? 
Before such questions will become relevant, one has to look at the present international situa-
tion that is characterised by uncertainty and increasing dangers. US-Russian arms control is 
deteriorating – the ABM Treaty was abrogated in 2001/2002, Russia has stopped participating 
in the CFE Treaty in 2015, the INF Treaty has ended in 2019, and whether the New START 
will be prolonged in 2021 is unclear. China’s military spending is rising; it is still considerably 
below the US budget, but China – not participating in nuclear arms control – is increasingly 
seen as a competent potential adversary by the USA. Intermingled with this triangle of military 
threats and counter-threats is another triangle consisting of China, India and Pakistan where 
no agreed arms limitations exist. 
It seems that bilateral limitations are no longer a feasible solution. In principle, the global situ-
ation could be defused by comprehensive arms control among the USA, Russia and China. 
However, the outlook for this is dim at present. Each of the three countries puts much emphasis 
on new military technologies. Their introduction would increase mutual threats and destabilise 
the situation. As in the Cold War, it is the task of concerned scientists and engineers to inform 
decision makers and the public about such dangers and to help to reverse the present trend. 
REFERENCES 
Altmann, Jürgen. (2006). Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive 
Arms Control. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. 
Altmann, Jürgen. (2008). Präventive Rüstungskontrolle, Die Friedens-Warte, 83, 2-3, 105-
126. 
Altmann, Jürgen. (2017). Preventing Hostile and Malevolent Use of Nanotechnology – Mili-
tary Nanotechnology After 15 Years of the US National Nanotechnology Initiative. In M. 
Martellini, A. Malizia (eds.). Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explo-
sives Challenges: Threats and Counter Efforts. Cham: Springer International. 
Altmann, Jürgen & Sauer, Frank. (2017). Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stabil-
ity. Survival 59 (5), 117-142. 
Evangelista, Matthew. (1999). Unarmed Forces – The Transnational Movement to End the 
Cold War. Ithac NY/London: Cornell University Press. Ch. 6. 
Goldblat, Jozef. (2002). Arms Control – The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. 
London etc.: PRIO/SIPRI/Sage. 
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention). (13 October 
1995). Retrieved from https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documen-
tId= 
70D9427BB965B7CEC12563FB0061CFB2&action=openDocument&SessionID=C097633
C1DD50D4150B74453E6BD62A210202C6D. 
 
 
COOPERATIVE TRANSPARENCY – MODERNIZATION OF OPEN SKIES SENSORS IN TENSE TIMES  
 
141 
Cooperative Transparency – 
Modernization of Open Skies 
Sensors in Tense Times 
HARTWIG SPITZER 
INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF 
HAMBURG 
[#33-LONG-PAPER]  
ABSTRACT 
Imagine you fly over the territory of a potentially unfriendly neighboring state, you take photo-
graphs of it, and no one shoots you down. In fact, the state actually provides you with the 
infrastructure to carry out your flight. This is regular practice during Open Skies flights. The 34 
state parties of the Treaty on Open Skies have opened their full territory from ‘Vancouver to 
Vladivostok’ to cooperative observation flights. The Treaty supports mutual transparency of 
major military assets which are visible in the open. Both the observing and the observed party 
get copies of the images taken, a basis of avoiding misperceptions. The images have a high 
degree of undisputed authenticity. The Open Skies Treaty continues to function fairly well in 
spite of tense East West relations. 
Originally film cameras at 30 cm resolution were used. The transition to digital cameras has 
triggered an ongoing modernization process. Russia and Germany have acquired new dedi-
cated Open Skies aircraft. The United States has established a budget for the acquisition of 
two new long-range aircraft. This paper will focus on treaty implementation, new aircraft and 
different configurations of digital aerial cameras acquired by the Russian Federation, the US, 
Germany and Romania.  
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 INTRODUCTION1 
The Treaty on Open Skies has been, from its beginning, a multi-facetted, although little noticed, 
microcosm and mirror of changing East-West security relations and regional status conflicts in 
Europe. In particular, after entry into force in January 2002 the tensions between the Russian 
Federation on the one hand and Western states on the other were accentuated by a step-by-
step deterioration of the East-West arms control architecture: Withdrawal of the United States 
of America (US) from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, failure of NATO states to ratify 
the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of 1999 (ACFE), suspension of imple-
mentation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) by the Russian Federation in 
December 2007, the failure of attempts to modernize the Vienna Documents on confidence 
and security building measures after 2011, and the withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty 
and the Russian confirmation of the end of the treaty in 2019. In parallel, various military and 
political interventions have fuelled mistrust and alienation between the Russian Federation and 
Western States: The interventions led by the US and France, respectively, in Iraq (2003) and 
Libya (2011), the recognition of Kosovo by several western states in 2008 and the annexation 
of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 as well as the subsequent war in Eastern 
Ukraine between Ukrainian and separatist forces, the latter ones supported by the Russian 
Federation. The eastward expansion of NATO since 1999 and the ongoing cooperation of 
NATO with Georgia and Ukraine have raised concerns in Moscow.  
In parallel, an ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey about an accession application by 
Cyprus to the treaty paralyzed the Open Skies Consultative Commission – the body which 
takes decisions on treaty implementation – from January 2011 to July 2012 (Spitzer, 2011). 
Most recently, a veto from Georgia to accept Russian overflights prevented the flight activity of 
all states in 2018 (Spitzer, 2018). Nevertheless, flights have resumed as normal this year.  
Surprisingly, Open Skies implementation survived such challenges and setbacks so far for 
several reasons: 
 The major players, the Russian Federation and the US, as well as other parties continue 
to see the treaty as being in their national security interest. They value the degree of 
transparency it creates. 
 The built-in structure of cooperative implementation and reciprocity in data access makes 
it attractive to all parties. 
 The treaty architecture contains several elements of flexibility: Parties can choose flight 
paths according to changing security concerns. The treaty provides a procedural frame-
work for certified modernisation of aircraft and sensors.  
                                                     
 
1 The author has followed the development of Open Skies from the very beginning. He initiated and led a 
research project on contributions of multispectral imaging in support of arms control monitoring. Based 
on this work he was invited to support the German Foreign Ministry in preparing the first Open Skies 
Review Conference in 2005. Subsequently he has participated as an observer in the work of the Informal 
Group on Sensors (IWGS) of the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). 
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This paper will report on recent steps in modernizing aircraft and imaging sensors. It will eval-
uate the contribution of Open Skies cooperative aerial observation to arms control verification 
and transparency. To begin with, the treaty substance, impediments to full treaty implementa-
tion and compliance conflicts are discussed. 
Open Skies works mostly in the quiet. It is rarely noticed by the media with the recent exception 
of some Russian news services and US defence and security journals, and very occasional 
features in mainstream newspapers. As far as known to the author only a few scientific papers 
have been published on Open Skies sensors after entry in to force, see e.g. (Dunay et al., 
2004), (Petrie, 2007), (Spitzer, 2009), (Orych, 2015). A comprehensive overview of publications 
on Open Skies from 1989 to 2004 can be found in (Dunay et al., 2004) 
 DEVELOPMENT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE TREATY 
 THE FIRST THREE YEARS UNTIL SIGNATURE 
The first three years from the initial proposal of the treaty in May 1989 to its signature in March 
1992 saw dramatic changes in the political orientation of states in Europe, which had belonged 
to the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization. Likewise, there were major shifts in the Euro-
Atlantic security relations.  
US President H. Bush had initially proposed an Open Skies agreement to the Soviet leadership 
in order to test General Secretary Gorbachev on his policy claim of Glasnost (openness) and 
in order to regain initiative in the arms control arena. In contrast to the bilateral Open Skies 
proposal of President Eisenhower of 1955, the anticipated agreement was intended to include 
allied states of both sides2. The proposal was quickly picked up by member states of NATO, 
but also by Hungary3. A NATO communiqué of December 1989 contained essential elements 
of the architecture of the treaty that would emerge from its negotiations (NATO, 1989): 
 Full territorial access for cooperative observation flights with fixed wing unarmed aircraft,  
 Annual flight quota which are to be derived from the size of participating countries,  
 Establishment of a multi-lateral treaty among the parties. 
It took two major conferences in Ottawa (February 1990) and Budapest (May 1990) as well as 
an intense negotiation period from September 1991 to March 1992 in Vienna until parties could 
agree on the treaty. Key elements are:  
                                                     
 
2 For details of Eisenhower´s proposal see e.g. Dunay et al., 2004, pp.17-20 and references quoted 
therein. 
3 Hungary and Canada performed a first Open Skies demonstration flight as early as in January 1990. 
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 Limits of the ground resolution of certified imaging sensors (30 cm for film cameras and 
video sensors, 50 cm for thermal infrared cameras and 300 cm for synthetic aperture ra-
dar),  
 Availability of image copies to both the observing and the observed states4,  
 Entitlement of active quota for flights in other countries, combined with the obligation to 
accept the same number of flights over one´s own territory (passive quota). 
 Treaty issues are discussed and decided in the Open Skies Consultative Commission 
(OSCC) which meets monthly in Vienna and in Review Conferences every five years. 
The Russian Federation with Belarus and the US have annual active and passive quota of 42 
flights, each5. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Turkey have 
quota of 12 flights each, other countries have less6. A detailed account of the negotiation phase 
and its outcome can be found in (Dunay et al., 2004), (Hartmann, Heydrich, 2000) and (Jones, 
2014). 
The Treaty was signed by 26 states in March 1992. In the meantime, the German Democratic 
Republic had acceded the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union had been dis-
solved. Four successor states of the Soviet Union joined the treaty: Belarus, Georgia, the Rus-
sian Federation and Ukraine7. 
In the arms control arena the successful conclusion and implementation of the CFE Treaty of 
November 1990 eliminated the force dispositions for massive conventional surprise attacks in 
Europe. The treaty was originally meant to include an aerial verification system. This was 
dropped because of lack of negotiation time. In a way the role of aerial monitoring was taken 
over by Open Skies. 
However, Open Skies has a much wider territorial scope. Whereas on-site inspections under 
CFE are restricted to Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, Open Skies flights can also cover 
the vast territories of North America (US and Canada) as well as the Russian Federation east 
of the Urals8. Thus, the treaty has a transcontinental dimension and a role in the US-Russian 
nuclear relationship. Both the US and Russia can use flights to monitor nuclear weapon and 
missile defence sites in complementation of their satellite reconnaissance assets. 
 TRIAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE 
Entry into force was much delayed by lack of consensus on the treaty in the Russian Federa-
tion. The obstacles came from several quarters. Strong opposition to ratification existed in the 
                                                     
 
4 Other parties can acquire copies at nominal cost. 
5 The Russian Federation and Belarus have formed a group of parties with joint quota. 
6 See Dunay et al. 2004, page 45 for a table of flight quota. 
7 Kyrgyzstan signed the treaty in 1998 but never ratified it. 
8 On-site inspections under the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures cover 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals including the three Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia) plus the territories of the five Central Asian Republics. The latter ones are not parties of the Open 
Skies Treaty. 
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Russian military which feared espionage. More importantly, there was an institutional dead lock 
between the Russian parliament and President Boris Yeltsin. The treaty was eventually ratified 
in April 2001, well after Yeltsin had resigned. The treaty was now seen as advantageous to 
Russia in obtaining information with minimal expenditures (see Dunay et al., 2004, 62). 
The ten-year phase before entry into force was well used. Parties were eager to train their 
personnel and to test inspection procedures. Over 400 bilateral trial flights were performed 
upon mutual agreement. Some of the test flights yielded relevant information about Russian 
military equipment which had been relocated east of the Urals. Germany hosted two trial certi-
fications of five foreign aircraft each in 2000 and 2001. This created the basis of practical ex-
perience for the successful certification of aircraft and sensors of ten countries after entry into 
force of the treaty (1 January 2002)9. In addition, C130 aircraft with a joint sensor pod of a 
group of ten further countries (the so-called Pod Group) were successfully certified. For an 
account of the trial implementation phase and the mission practice after entry into force, see 
(Dunay et al., 2004). 
 ACCESSION OF OTHER PARTIES AND FLIGHT ACTIVITY 
Eight countries acceded the treaty after entry into force. These included the three Baltic States, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Finland, Slovenia and Sweden. Today the treaty comprises 34 
states including all NATO member states apart from Albania and Montenegro and a few non-
aligned states (namely Bosnia-Hercegovina, Finland, Georgia, Sweden and Ukraine)10. 
Although each country is entitled to fly over any other country within the limits of the quota 
system, the actual flight activity has developed in a less balanced way. NATO member states 
have agreed not to overfly each other. NATO states are concentrating their flights on the Rus-
sian Federation and Belarus, exploiting most of the passive quota of those countries (42). In 
return, Russia performs 42 flights annually over NATO states including seven flights over the 
United States (in 2017). A smaller number of flights were performed in 2017 by non-aligned 
states: Ukraine (12), Sweden (6), Finland (2). Over the years the total number of active flight 
missions has been about one hundred annually. Several flights are performed as shared mis-
sions of two or three parties in order to reduce the cost per country11.  
Overall the flight activity reflects the politico-military tensions and security concerns between 
NATO states and the Russian Federation. It addresses such concerns by creating transpar-
ency within limits. 
                                                     
 
9 The certified camera configurations are designed for operation at different flight altitudes. Some coun-
tries operate camera configurations which allow observation below relatively low lying clouds: Canada 
and France (1210 m), Germany (1550 m, in preparation), Russian Federation (1130 m), Sweden (1830 
m), Turkey (1790 m), USA (2150 m). 
10 The Czech Republic and Slovakia became parties after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 
1993 as successor states. 
11 A full account of flight activity in 2008 can be found in (Spitzer, 2009). 
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 DISPUTES HAMPERING FULL TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 
The treaty opens the full territory of parties to observation flights with the exception of a 10 km 
zone along the border of non-parties. Since entry into force several impediments to full territo-
rial accessibility have come up, two of them as a consequence of unsolved status conflicts. 
The impediments occurred in the following time sequence12. 
 2002-2016: NO ACCESS TO SOME US ISLANDS 
The Treaty covers both the continental United States as well as US island territories. Access 
to the Hawaiian Islands was opened in 2007. The Russian Federation has repeatedly asked 
for flight access also to several smaller islands in the Pacific and the Atlantic13. Only in 2016, 
the US submitted the necessary declarations for the remaining islands including Guam in the 
Pacific, which hosts a major military base. The first Russian flight over Puerto Rico and the US 
Virgin Islands was performed from 28 May to 3 June 2019 (OSCC, 2019). The impediment can 
be considered as resolved. 
 SINCE 2010: NO FLIGHTS IN THE RUSSIAN 10 KM BORDER ZONE OF ABKHAZIA AND 
SOUTH OSSETIA 
In consequence of the August 2008 war between Georgian, Russian and separatist forces, the 
Russian Federation had recognized the entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent 
states14. Georgia and all other Open Skies parties apart from Russia consider Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia still as part of Georgia’s national territory – in spite of the de facto separation. 
Since May 2010 the Russian Federation has rejected flight plans of other parties which would 
have entered the 10 km zone along the border of Abkhazia. This rejection has been heavily 
criticized in the Open Skies Consultative Commission and by national capitals15. It is a classical 
dilemma of an unsolved status conflict. The practical effect on overhead image acquisition ca-
pability is small, because panorama cameras when flown high enough can view distances well 
over 10 km16. 
                                                     
 
12 In addition there have been disputes over flight altitude restrictions which mandated high flight levels, 
e.g. over the Moscow area, over Chechnya, in Norway and Canada. Some of the cases are caused by 
different national standards and procedures for air traffic control. 
13 See e.g. OSCC (2015) for details. 
14 The entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had broken away from Georgia in two bloody secession 
wars (1991-94). The conflict had a complicated history concerning ethnic composition of the population 
and political affiliation. Both entities had an autonomous status in the USSR. For details see e.g. (Richter, 
2019, pp.16-17) and sources quoted in (Spitzer, 2018). Today Abkhazia and South Ossetia are recog-
nized by five UN member states only: Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, the Russian Federation and Syria.  
15 E.g. the United States have determined in the 2018 Arms Control Report that Russia was in violation 
of the treaty by ”refusing access of observation in a ten kilometer corridor along its border with the Geor-
gian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. (State, 2018) 
16 It should be also noted that parties refrained from extending their flights over Georgia to the break-
away territories. The government of Georgia would not have been in a position to guarantee the safety of 
such flights. 
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 SINCE APRIL 2012: GEORGIA REFUSES TO ACCEPT OVERFLIGHTS BY RUSSIA 
On 4 April 2012, the head of the delegation of Georgia to the OSCC submitted a letter declaring 
that Georgia will no longer allow any observation flight that includes participation of the Russian 
Federation over the territory of Georgia (OSCC, 2012). The letter referred to the rejection of an 
US-Romanian flight plan of May 2010 which would have entered the 10 km zone along the 
Russian border of Abkhazia. Georgia sees this rejection as a violation of the Open Skies Treaty 
and of international law. 
 SINCE MARCH 2014: NO FLIGHTS OVER CRIMEA 
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 is seen by other parties 
as a violation of international law. In May 2014, the Russian Federation invited other parties to 
overfly Crimea as part of missions over Russia. Other parties have refrained from doing so 
because it would imply recognition of the annexation. Thus, the major Russian naval base in 
Sevastopol is no longer observed by Open Skies flights. Again, a regional status conflict is 
preventing full treaty implementation. 
 SINCE JUNE 2014: FLIGHT LENGTH RESTRICTIONS OVER THE OBLAST OF 
KALININGRAD 
On 10 June 2014, the Russian Federation notified all parties on a flight length restriction of 500 
km over the oblast of Kaliningrad. (Open Skies, 2014) The oblast comprises an area of 15.125 
square kilometres with a maximum East-West extension of about 170 km and a maximum 
North-South extension of about 100 km17. In detail, Russia designated the airport of Krabrovo 
in the Kaliningrad oblast as an airfield that can be used for Open Skies flights with a maximum 
distance of 500 km. In addition, flights out of the Open Skies point of entry in Kubinka near 
Moscow have to observe a component part of maximum 500 km when flying over the oblast. 
Previously flights out of Kubinka had included longer observation distances over the oblast. 
Several parties protested in the Open Skies Consultative Commission18. They emphasized that 
the agreed maximum flight distance for flights out of Kubinka is 5500 km. According to the 
treaty each state party shall ensure effective observation of its entire territory. Maximum flight 
distances from Open Skies airfields have to be set and notified correspondingly. 
The matter was disputed heavily since 2014 without reaching consensus. Observing parties 
have respected the limit in flight missions over Russia under protest. Russia has claimed, last 
time in the OSCC session of 20 May 2019, “…that the maximum flight distance of 500 km 
                                                     
 
17 The oblast is a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea surrounded by Poland and Lithuania. The formerly 
German territory was integrated in April 1946 into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(SFSR), the predecessor of the present Russian Federation. 
18 The United States have determined in the 2018 Arms Control Report that Russia was in violation of the 
treaty by “imposing and enforcing a sublimit of 500 kilometers over the Kaliningrad Oblast for all flights 
originating out of Kubinka Open Skies Airfield”. (State, 2018) 
 
 
COOPERATIVE TRANSPARENCY – MODERNIZATION OF OPEN SKIES SENSORS IN TENSE TIMES 
 
 
148 
enables an effective observation of the entire territory of the Kaliningrad region, obtaining im-
ages of up to 98 per cent of its territory from a single observation flight with the possibility of 
observing any of its points”19. 
In June 2017 the US administration formally accused Russia of violating the treaty by limiting 
the flight length over the oblast. In retaliation the US imposed limits on Russian flights over the 
Hawaiian Islands and closed some airfields for Russian overnight stops, still leaving the full US 
territory accessible to Russian observation. Russia responded by closing three Open Skies 
airfields for US flights20. 
The oblast is at the center of security concerns both of Russia and of NATO states, in particular 
the Baltic States and Poland. It hosts important military bases, a port of the Russian Baltic fleet 
as well as early warning radar stations and short range nuclear capable missiles. Of particular 
concern are the Iskander manoeuvrable missiles21. The system has been modified for launch-
ing also cruise missiles. According to (FAZ, 2019) Russia has expanded and modernized the 
storage capacities for nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region. Both the manoeuvrable 
rocket and the cruise missile version of the Iskander have a significant military capability due 
to their targeting accuracy and their manoeuvrability which makes detection and hits by missile 
defence harder. 
 MODERNIZATION OF AIRCRAFT AND SENSORS 
 NEW OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT 
The above described impediments to full treaty implementation are real, but they are only part 
of the story. The core of the story is the fact that the major players, the US administration and 
the Russian leadership, as well as the governments of other parties are holding on to the Treaty 
for the time being in spite of compliance disputes. Major investments in modernization of Open 
Skies hardware have been made. 
Russia was first, already in 2006, to provide a budget for two new long-range Open Skies 
aircraft of type Tu 214. The first of those aircraft was displayed in August 2011 at an air show 
                                                     
 
19 In the view of the author a full observation of the area in one 500 km flight is only possible under rare 
conditions: Operating a panorama camera from 10 km altitude under a nearly cloud free sky. However, it 
should be possible to photograph most military sites of known location in one flight of 500 km under 
favourable cloud conditions. 
20 The restrictions were communicated by the US administration as an incentive for the Russian Federa-
tion to return to full treaty compliance. For details of the US measures see (State, 2018). 
21 In reaction to the deployment of US missile defence units in Poland, Russia deployed Iskander missiles 
in the oblast. The Iskander missile family is reported as comprising road-mobile manoeuvrable missiles 
with accurate strike potential down to a circular error probable of 5-7 meters. The Iskander can be tipped 
with several conventional warheads including a cluster munition warhead, a fuel-air explosive enhanced 
blast warhead, an earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electro-magnetic pulse device as well as 
with nuclear warheads (from Wikipedia.com, which quotes numerous sources, access 8 August 2019). 
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in Moscow (see figure 1). Open Skies has the attention of the top Russian leadership; President 
Putin took a tour of the aircraft. Both aircraft and the digital image sensors on board of type 
OSDCAM 4060 were certified for use in Open Skies (through the agreed inspection processes 
for equipment to be used under the treaty) in Kubinka in September 201822. The cost of the 
modernization program was reported as 220 million USD at the 2010 Review Conference of 
the Treaty (Open Skies Review Conference, 2010). 
 
Figure 1: A Russian Open Skies aircraft of type Tu 214 ON on display at the Moscow Air 
Show, August 2011 (courtesy: US Air Force) 
Germany had modified a Russian made Tu 154 jet liner for Open Skies use in the years 1993-
1995. The aircraft performed successful trial missions, but was lost in a mid-air collision over 
the Southern Atlantic in September 1997. It took eighteen years and a lot of lobbying before 
the German Parliament approved a budget for a new Open Skies aircraft in November 201523.  
It was decided to acquire a little-flown corporate airliner of type Airbus A319 CJ. The aircraft 
model A319 CJ has four extra fuel tanks in the freight compartment to allow for long distance 
direct transit flights of over 6000 km. Thus, Germany will be in a position to perform observation 
flights far beyond the Urals. The aircraft was adapted for its future role by Lufthansa Technik 
                                                     
 
22 The certification procedure was performed 2-11 September 2018. All attending parties apart from the 
US signed the certification document on 11 September. The US signature was submitted on 26 Septem-
ber in a session of the OSCC without giving reasons for the delay. 
23 The decisive initiative came from several parliamentarians who questioned the government on provid-
ing a German Open Skies capability in 2012. One of the parliamentarians, a retired colonel of the Bun-
deswehr, succeeded in placing the objective in the coalition agreement of the Christian Democratic and 
Social Democratic Parties in November 2013. The deterioration of conventional arms control and the 
events of 2014 in Ukraine helped to enhance awareness and acceptance. For more details see (Müller, 
2016). 
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in Hamburg and by several subcontractors. It was handed over to the Bundeswehr on 21 June 
2019. Figure 2 shows the aircraft at the Lufthansa base in Hamburg. 
The aircraft will be available for up to 12 active German missions annually as well as for leasing 
by partner nations24. The target date for certification is fall 2020. Before this happens, extensive 
test flights have to be performed, in order to establish the flight altitude corridors in which the 
digital sensors yield the treaty mandated resolution. The cost of acquisition and retrofitting of 
the aircraft was around 120 million Euro, including cost for training flight crews. 
 
Figure 2: The new German Open Skies aircraft of type A 319 CJ (source: Lufthansa Technik) 
The two existing Open Skies aircraft of the United States (modified Boeing 707 models) were 
built in the 1960’s. Several recent missions had to be terminated early due to technical failures. 
The former Secretary of Defense, Mattis, decided to aim for parity of US Open Skies assets 
with Russia. In consequence a budget of 222 million USD was requested from US Congress 
and approved in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019. The 
bidding process for two long-range aircraft is under way. 
Several parties use existing aircraft: Canada, France, Hungary, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and 
Ukraine as well as Russia (five medium range An-30 and one Tu 154). The aircraft of the Czech 
Republic and the UK have been put out of service. The Pod group was dissolved end of 2013. 
The sensor pod with film cameras is only flown on C130 aircraft of Canada and France. Bul-
garia stopped flying their An-30 aircraft for Open Skies missions in 2019. Most other countries 
                                                     
 
24 The aircraft has four working stations for sensor operators, 16 seats for inspectors of the observed 
party and for mission personnel of partner nations, as well as 25 extra seats. 
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exploit their active flight quota by renting Open Skies aircraft from Hungary, Romania, Sweden 
and Ukraine or are sharing missions. 
 OPEN SKIES SENSORS: TRANSITION TO THE DIGITAL AGE 
Under the rules of the treaty, Open Skies sensors have to be commercially available to all 
parties. When the treaty was negotiated between 1990 and 1992 the commercial market of 
aerial cameras was dominated by film cameras, mostly with panchromatic (black and white) 
film. The treaty allows for framing cameras and (wide angle) panchromatic cameras with reso-
lution no better than 30 cm25. 
The transition to commercial digital aerial cameras was initiated by the presentation of a large 
format mapping camera by the company Z/I Imaging (Oberkochen, Germany) in 2000. Today 
three digital camera formats are being used commercially: small format or consumer cameras 
with about 1-30 Megapixel (MP), medium format cameras weighing a few kgs with about 40-
150 MP and large format cameras with up to 450 MP.  
The Open Skies Treaty authorizes the OSCC to decide on technological updates of existing 
sensor categories without having to go through a formal amendment (re-ratification process). 
How to store and transmit information digitally has been addressed in Open Skies already in 
1994, primarily in connection with the readout of video sensors, which are a treaty sensor cat-
egory (with resolution no better than 30 cm). Intensive work to introduce digital aerial cameras 
started in 2006 in the Informal Group of Sensors of the OSCC. 
It took many tests and demonstrations of certification procedures until the OSCC could decide 
on the introduction of digital cameras in the treaty category of video sensors. Availability on the 
commercial market was checked in 2008. Cameras with four spectral channels for blue (B), 
green (G), red (R) and near-infrared light (NIR, with wavelength between 0,69 and 1,1 micro-
metres) can be used, also a panchromatic channel. Today, certification of sensors is based on 
a sequence of five steps: (i) lengthy flight tests of the certifying party in order to establish the 
flight altitudes at treaty resolution for the various camera configurations; (ii) submission of ex-
tensive documentation on sensors and processing software, as well as on the outcome of test 
flights, (iii) demonstration of certification procedures to state parties (the precertification event), 
(iv) intermediate meeting in order to resolve remaining questions, (v) the actual certification 
event which demonstrates and confirms the flight altitudes for treaty mandated resolution. 
Further work was needed in order to agree on a verified data processing chain. This comprises 
(a) processing of raw image data to composite images in an agreed Open Skies image data 
format, (b) duplication of image data, (c) duplication verification, (e) erasure of raw data after 
processing, and (f) erasure verification. 
                                                     
 
25 The resolution is determined on bar targets of black and white bars. The resolution definition which was 
adopted by the OSCC implies that 30 cm resolution of a film camera under Open Skies corresponds 
roughly to the ground resolution which is usually quoted for digital cameras: i.e. the size of a ground area 
which is imaged by a picture element (pixel) of a digital camera. For details see (Dunay et al., 2004, 43 
and 74). 
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How is cheating prevented? Inspectors of the observed state are on-board during data taking. 
They check that the certified flight altitude for 30 cm resolution is observed. At the end of a 
mission the digital storage devices are sealed for transport into the media processing station. 
Image processing, duplication and erasure of raw data is performed in a controlled way in 
presence of inspectors and experts of both sides. Checks of data and erasure fidelity are being 
made. The software has to be documented for all parties. 
As a result, the image duplicates which are handed over to the observing and the observed 
party have a very high degree of authenticity26. For details see (Orych, 2015). Thus, Open 
Skies images can be used in bilateral disputes as a source. 
 A SYSTEM WITH FORTY LENSES: THE RUSSIAN OSDCAM 4060 
 
Figure 3: The Russian Open Skies camera system OSDCAM 4060 (source: 
www.poksi.ru/OSDCAM_44060-Eng.pdf, access 12. August 2019) 
Russia was the first party to present a digital camera system for certification in 2013. The sys-
tem had been developed by a small Russian company KSI in Moscow using sensor chips and 
lenses available on the commercial market of consumer cameras. The system consists of forty 
small cameras which are configured in four subsets which have the same focal length each: 
Six cameras for data taking at low altitudes (1050-1130 m), 18 for medium altitudes (3230-
                                                     
 
26 Providers of commercial satellite imagery have confirmed that the degree of authenticity of Open Skies 
imagery is unmatched in the satellite world. Transmission and processing of commercial satellite image 
data is done only by one party without outside checks and without disclosing their internal proprietary 
methodologies. (VERTIC, 2017) 
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3500 m) and ten for high altitudes (6490-6790 m). All cameras operate as RGB cameras27. 
The ground swath covered ranges from 2740-2940 m at low altitudes to (7750-8077 m) at 
medium altitudes and 11.680-12.430 m at high altitudes28. There is also a camera subset which 
operates in the NIR at altitudes of 1390-1440 m.  
Each subset produces a strip image which widens at larger observation angles. The strip im-
ages can be composed of a composite image. Figure 3 shows the lens configuration of the 
system. 
The camera system was first flown in an Open Skies mission in July 2014 after an eight-month 
delay by the US administration in signing the certification document29. 
 THE DIGITAL SENSORS SYSTEM DVIS OF THE UNITED STATES 
The US had been a vocal proponent of going digital in the IWGS and at Open Skies Review 
Conferences since 2005. The slogan of the US chairman of the IWGS was “faster, cheaper, 
better”. Creating a budget for acquisition of digital sensors turned out to be tedious due to 
bureaucratic drag and competing priorities for defense acquisitions. A decisive step was taken 
in March 2012 by the Presidential Policy Directive 15. The directive tasked the Department of 
Defense to establish a budget for acquisition of digital sensors for the two existing US Open 
Skies aircraft. 
The budget was approved by Congress in steps (2013 and in subsequent years). The request 
for proposals was released in September 2015. It contained quite challenging ground coverage 
specifications which were derived from the ground coverage of the existing film cameras (one 
vertical and two oblique framing cameras and one panoramic camera)30. The contract was 
awarded in February 2016 to the veteran-owned company KIHOMAC (KIHOMAC, 2016) with 
a volume of 37 million USD. 
The designers of KIHOMAC took an approach which has some similarity to the Russian ap-
proach: Using arrays of multiple cameras to obtain ground coverage of about 99 degrees from 
three different altitude levels. They decided to combine medium format cameras of type CM-
                                                     
 
27 Aerial RGB cameras have – similar to consumer cameras – an array of filters which are transparent for 
red, green or blue light, over the matrix of light sensitive sensor elements. 
28 The camera system is certified for use on three aircraft types: An-30, Tu 154 and Tu 214. The ranges 
of flight altitudes for 30 cm resolution and the related ground coverage, which are quoted in the text, 
comprise the performance on all three aircraft types. The certified values for An-30 and Tu 154 aircraft 
are given in (OSCC, 2017). 
29 This delay was caused by interventions of agencies within the US administration which were suspicions 
of the information gathering potential of the new camera. In the end the forces won which successfully 
argued that 30 cm from a digital device is equivalent to 30 cm from an analogue device (film) in Open 
Skies. However, the RGB capability and the digital accessibility of the images provide an added value 
which all parties can exploit after going digital. 
30 The ground coverage of the US film cameras vary from ca. 3000 m from a vertical framing camera 
flown at an altitude of ca. 2000 m to 12.500-23.200 m for a panoramic camera flown at 10.800 m according 
to (OSCC, 2017). 
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MK produced in Canada by the US owned company Teledyne Optech with 84 MP (10720 x 
8064 pixels at 6 micrometers size each). The camera is employed in three spectral variants: 
(a) as RGB camera, (b) as pan-chromatic camera and (c) as camera operating in the NIR. The 
high-altitude configuration consists of five panchromatic and five RGB sensors covering a 
ground swath of 18,9 km from an altitude corridor of 7600-8500 m. The medium altitude con-
figuration uses five RGB cameras covering a ground swath of 14,3 km from altitudes 5800-
6400 m. The low altitude configuration has four individual sensors filtered to Red, Green, Blue 
and NIR and a ground swath of 3100 m from altitudes 1200-1500 m. Image processing will 
take several days – longer than the present film development31. 
Delays in tests of the system after delivery have been caused by the complexity of the design. 
Certification is expected in fall 2020 or spring 2021. 
 THE DIGITAL SENSORS ON THE GERMAN OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT 
Germany – similar to the US and Russia – acquired a system of electro-optical sensors which 
take images in three altitude corridors. In contrast to Russia and the US the German system 
will have both RGB and NIR cameras at all three altitudes32. In addition, Germany is the first 
party to operate a thermal infrared camera system33. 
The RGB and NIR cameras employ the model PhaseOne iXU-RS 1000 from the Danish com-
pany PhaseOne with lenses of different focal length from 23 to 90 mm. The camera has 100 
MP (11608 x 8708 pixels of size 4,6 micrometer). 
The low altitude configuration comprises one vertically mounted RGB and one NIR camera. It 
is expected to cover a ground swath of 3500 m across track from an altitude of 1550 m. The 
medium altitude configuration consists of two slightly tilted (by 5 degrees) RGB and NIR cam-
eras each, providing a resolution of 30-35 cm over a swath of 5660 m from an altitude of 3580 
m. The high-altitude configuration comprises three RGB and NIR cameras, each providing a 
                                                     
 
31 Development of photographic film from Open Skies flights can be usually done overnight. The data 
from the multiple cameras for medium and high altitudes of the US system have to be stitched together 
in order to yield three images each, one for vertical view and two for oblique view. This operation is time 
consuming. 
32 Near-infrared cameras support the monitoring of the health of vegetation and the discrimination of dif-
ferent types of vegetation (e.g. the discrimination of conifers from deciduous trees). This can be used, for 
example, to detect and analyse camouflage on vehicles, when such camouflage is made of cut vegetation 
which is dead or dying. Near infrared imaging has been also used for environmental reconnaissance, for 
example, by estimating the size of expected crops. 
33 Thermal infrared radiation is emitted by all object’s day and night due to their surface temperature. 
Thermal sensors were included in the treaty sensor set to support data taking at night and during winter 
in northern regions when illumination by sunlight is short and faint. The resolution limit of 50 cm was seen 
in 1992 as a compromise between the resolution of optical cameras and the performance of then available 
commercial infrared sensors at flight altitudes of about 1000 m (Hartmann, Heydrich, 2000, 62). An object 
can be recognized on a thermal IR image by shape if its temperature is different from the temperature of 
the surrounding area. 
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resolution of 30-35 cm over 90% of the full swath (10 090 m) from an altitude of 5870 m (IGI, 
2019). 
The thermal system consists of two tilted uncooled microbolometer cameras with 1024x768 
pixels each of size 17 micrometer34. The images of the dual camera will be processed into one 
continuous image with a resolution of 90-130 cm over a ground swath of 1900 m when operated 
at an altitude of 1550 m. 
The sensors are mounted on gyro-stabilized mounts, one for the sensors of each altitude and 
one for the thermal sensors. Two of the mounts are placed in a front freight department of the 
aircraft, two of them in the rear, each pointing at windows of 28 mm thickness which are trans-
parent for visible and NIR light, or thermal radiation, respectively. Thus, Germany will have the 
most comprehensive imaging capability concerning spectral performance, by providing images 
from RGB, NIR and thermal radiation35. The US system will be superior in ground coverage 
from medium and high altitudes. 
 ROMANIA: A FAST LATE COMER 
Romania is operating AN-30 medium range turboprop aircraft equipped with one mapping film 
camera Wild Aviophot RC-20. In 2018 it was decided to provide a modest budget for acquisition 
of digital sensors. Romania asked for offers of a compact system of cameras on one gyro-
stabilized mount, which can provide images at treaty resolution from three altitudes. Romania 
placed the order with the small German company GGS (GGS, 2019). 
GGS delivered and installed medium format cameras from PhaseOne in spring 2019. The low 
altitude configuration consists of one RGB and one NIR camera each of type iXM-RS100 
(11.608 x 8.708 pixels of 4,6 micrometer size), providing 30 cm resolution over a swath of 3480 
m from an altitude of 1500 m. The medium altitude configuration comprises one vertically 
mounted RGB camera and one NIR camera each of type iXM-RS-150 (14.204x10.652 pixels 
of size 3,76 micrometer), which provide 30 cm resolution over a ground swath of 4260 m, when 
flown at 3190 m altitude. Two obliquely oriented RGB cameras cover side strips up to ca. 6000 
m on each side at resolution between 30 and 82 cm. The high-altitude configuration comprises 
one PhaseOne RGB and NIR camera, each, of model iXM-RS150. The ground swath covered 
is 4620 m from an altitude of 5590 m. 
Thus, Romania is expected to operate a robust system, which works at three altitude levels 
both in RGB and NIR. 
                                                     
 
34 Microbolometers are thermoelectric sensors operating a wavelength in the region of 7,5-14 micrometer. 
Incoming thermal radiation heats a sensor element. The heat signal is subsequently transformed into an 
electric signal. 
35 The thermal camera system can only be certified once the OSCC has agreed on a revised certification 
procedure for cameras of present-day technology. A previous decision on certification procedures for line 
scanner technology is no longer in force. 
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 OUTCOME: CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRANSPARENCY AND ARMS CONTROL 
VERIFICATION 
 CREATING TRANSPARENCY 
The role and the outcome of Open Skies implementation are manifold, depending on the na-
tional interests and concerns of parties. Originally, as stated in the Preamble, it had a rather 
general scope of intentions and objectives: 
“…Welcoming the historic events in Europe which have transformed the security 
situation from Vancouver to Vladivostok, wishing to contribute to the further de-
velopment and strengthening of peace stability and co-operative security in that 
area by the creation of an Open Skies regime for aerial observation, recognizing 
the potential contribution which an aerial observation regime of this type could 
make to security and stability in other regions as well, noting the possibility of 
employing such a regime to improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the 
monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to 
strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management in the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in 
other relevant international institutions…” 
The treaty articles were more specific on the character of the aerial observation: Unlimited 
territorial access and cooperative execution of flights. The achievable transparency was pur-
posely restricted in a twofold way: 
 The verified resolution limit of 30 cm enables the detection of major military land vehicles 
and infrastructure, but excludes detailed reconnaissance, like recognizing the antenna of 
a tank. 
 The flights contain only a limited surprise element. The time period between disclosure of 
the flight plan of the observing party and the beginning of the actual observation flight is 
about 24 hours, leaving enough time to cover sensitive equipment. 
In addition, unfavourable weather conditions like very low-lying clouds can prevent observation. 
Still, everything in the open remains visible if cloud levels can be under flown. This includes 
land vehicles, aircraft, ships and submarines in ports, missile sites, as well as all kinds of static 
military and civilian infrastructure. 
How does Open Skies observation compare with satellite monitoring? (a) The resolution of 
Open Skies images for RGB or NIR light of 30 cm is comparable but not superior to the images 
of the most advanced commercial satellites Worldview 3 and 4 of Digital Globe, USA. Still, 
smaller countries prefer the access to Open Skies observation over commercial satellite im-
agery because of operational flexibility and cost. 30-50 military sites can be photographed in 
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one flight mission at a cost below the acquisition cost of 30-50 satellite images36. (b) The res-
olution of Open Skies thermal infrared images is far better than the resolution which can be 
obtained from commercial satellites cruising in 700 km orbits. For instance, the LANDSAT sat-
ellites offer a resolution of only 60 m in the thermal infrared region (wavelength 7,5-14 micron). 
(c) A decisive advantage of Open Skies images is, as argued above, their verified provenance 
and their high degree of authenticity. 
 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION 
Open Skies contributes to the verification of several arms control treaties: 
 Open Skies images have been used to prepare and to complement on-site inspections 
under the CFE treaty. After the Russian suspension of CFE implementation Open Skies 
flights can be used to monitor the sites of conventional forces in Russia. 
 Open Skies flights have been used to photograph chemical weapon storage and destruc-
tion sites. 
 Open Skies flights are being used to monitor nuclear weapon and missile sites. A protocol 
to the New START Treaty includes Open Skies assets as monitoring tools. 
 COOPERATION WITH THE OSCE 
All Open Skies State parties are participating in the OSCE. The relation of the treaty and its 
parties to the OSCE can be discussed on four levels: (i) Services provided by the OSCE sec-
retariat, (ii) Shared national and OSCE resources, (ii) Cooperation in conflict prevention as 
specified in the treaty, (iv) Options for further cooperation. 
 Services provided by the OSCE secretariat. Beginning with the main negotiation phase of 
September 1991 to March 1992 the secretariat of the OSCE (then CSCE, Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) has provided paid services to the Open Skies state 
parties. This includes meeting rooms in the Vienna Hofburg, administrative support and 
website management of an Open Skies delegate’s website. The Open Skies website is 
handled within the OSCE delweb-website which is accessible to delegates who are nom-
inated by Open Skies states, resp. by participating states of the OSCE.  
 Shared national and OSCE resources. Politically the Open Skies state parties and the 
bodies of OSCE operate independently. There exist shared information channels. The 
ambassadors and military advisors assigned to the OSCE in Vienna represent their coun-
try also in the OSCC. They provide consistency of national policies for all three OSCE 
dimensions and for non-OSCE arms control regimes and security building measures. 
Open Skies state parties make use of the OSCE Communications network, e.g. notably 
for Open Skies notifications. Delegates of all 57 OSCE participating states have access 
                                                     
 
36 Procuring high resolution satellite images in a short time frame can be particularly expensive. The cost 
per scene can be up to several thousand USD. Germany is renting the Swedish Open Skies aircraft at a 
cost of ca. 50 000 Euro per flight (without salaries of the German team). This sum is below the cost of 30-
50 high resolution satellite images. (German Verification Center, 2019) 
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via the delweb to the text of OSCC decisions and to statements made in the OSCC which 
are documented in written form in the Journal of the OSCC. Access to documentation of 
Open Skies implementation is limited to representatives of Open Skies state parties. 
 Cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management. The preamble of the treaty calls 
for strengthening the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management in the frame-
work of the CSCE (now OSCE). A procedural architecture for eventual implementation of 
this option has been specified in Annex L, Sec III, 1. of the treaty (OSCE, 1992, 95):  
 ‘The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall consider requests from the bodies of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe authorized to deal with respect to 
conflict prevention and crisis management and from other relevant international organiza-
tions to facilitate the organization and conduct of extraordinary observation flights over the 
territory of a State Party with its consent.’  
This procedure has never been negotiated and executed. But it is worth being ex-
plored.37 
 Recommendation: The author suggests exploring need and feasibility of such flights, both 
in the OSCC and jointly with the head of the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) of OSCE. 
Questions to be explored include: 
 What kind of non-treaty missions are states parties willing to support with Open Skies 
assets? 
 Are parties prepared to give the CPC a coordinating role in planning flights and data taking 
as well as in distribution and analysis of images taken? 
 Who bears the cost of such flights and data processing of images? A demonstration flight 
for testing proposed procedures would be helpful. It should be noted that Open Skies 
parties have considerable experience in shared missions and joint test flights. 
 Options for further cooperation. Could Open Skies images or insights from such images 
be made accessible to bodies of the OSCE, like the CPC? In general, not. Open Skies 
images are government-official (confidential) among the Open Skies state parties and not 
accessible beyond. However, parties can use their insights and concerns from analysis of 
Open Skies images in informal bilateral or multilateral contacts in Vienna. 
 CONCLUSION 
The Open Skies Treaty has withstood the test of time in spite of implementation deficits. The 
value assigned to the treaty in the literature depends a lot on the perspective. The US expert 
                                                     
 
37 A representative of Sweden has pointed out at the Open Skies Review Conference of 2010 that the 
option had been already proposed within the OSCE. The OSCE document “Stabilizing Measures for Lo-
calized Crisis Situations” proposes an aerial observation regime aimed at checking compliance with 
agreed stabilizing measures and building confidence and the possibility of using the procedures and 
measures of Open Skies. (Open Skies Review Conference, 2010 a). 
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Michael Krepon emphasized the symbolic relevance of opening the full territory to aerial obser-
vation:  
“The point of the treaty has always been about symbolism rather than technical data collection”. 
(Krepon, 2018).  
An expert brief from the US Council on Foreign Relations argues:  
“The Treaty does provide a valuable benefit: It serves as a tool to measure the 
health of US-Russian relations. Unlike arms treaties and agreements, Open Skies 
focuses on access and transparency, which are important ingredients for any 
good relationship between nations. The treaty provides preapproved implemen-
tation standards and guidelines for specific operational elements, such as flight 
routes, altitudes, and timing. These are quantifiable and measurable.” (Reynolds, 
2017) 
The treaty has survived on the one hand because the US and the Russian Federation are 
backing it, most visibly through their investment in new aircraft. On the other hand, being a 
multilateral treaty there exist a range of diverse motivations and interests of parties to adhere 
to the treaty. States in neighbourhood of the Russian Federation, which lack satellite capabili-
ties of their own, are clearly interested in the technical image data collection. These states 
include the Baltic States, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey and the Ukraine. 
Interestingly, whereas Ukraine did not undertake observation flights in Russia before 2014, it 
does so since 2015 as shared flights with other parties. The military forces in the oblast of 
Kaliningrad are of particular concern for the Baltic States and Poland. Canada is an arctic 
neighbour of the Russian Federation. 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK value Open Skies images as complement to their satellite 
reconnaissance capabilities but also for the confidence building effect. All parties acknowledge 
the value of cooperation of their mission personnel on-board and on the ground. 
The treaty has a sound architecture and includes options for modernization. The elements of 
cooperation inspire those who work with the treaty. The built-in checks prevent cheating and 
guarantee the production of trustworthy images with a high degree of authenticity. However, 
the military relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and many (though 
not all) of the other parties on the other is characterized by mistrust and antagonism. This is 
despite cooperation in other fields like civil use of space assets, basic research and commerce. 
In the military field both sides, the Russian Federation and the US as well as France and the 
UK, are hostages of the other’s nuclear potential. It is a metastable situation. Open Skies can 
contribute to stabilization in some way, but it is endangered should further escalation occur. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article describes military applications of additive manufacturing (AM): what is happening 
today, what is possible in the future, and what are the implications of these developments for 
international security. Additive manufacturing is still developing rapidly with what was formerly 
hype and promise now being turned into deployment and use. Current use cases, for the mili-
tary, include production of spare parts in the field and shorter development cycles for new 
systems. We do not yet understand military applications that will arise from the convergence 
of AM with other emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. The broader impact on 
international security is still unclear. The success of using additive manufacturing is highly de-
pendent on the complexity of the object to be produced, the material used, and the process 
used to produce it. Strategies to control use of this technology can mirror current export controls 
for advanced machine tools or focus more permissive controls for digital build files for each 
individual printer or on the control of the digital files themselves. 
 INTRODUCTION 
The implications of additive manufacturing (AM) for the military are not yet understood. The 
hype of a technology that has been described as capable of transforming where things are 
made, what they are made of, and by whom, (Economist, 2011) must be tempered by reality.  
In AM, parts are built using a computer-programmable machine tool from smaller pieces, sim-
ilar to a robot that is programmed to build a Lego model. Unlike Lego, which is restricted by the 
available plastic bricks and stuck together using friction, in AM a computer-controlled melting 
processes are used to construct a predesigned shape using wires and powder composed from 
an ever-widening base of materials.  
AM is desired for several benefits: it can be used to shorten system development cycles (Good-
win, 2015), introduce cost savings by consolidating components (Kellner, 2015), allow printing 
in the field (Asclipiadis, 2014), and reduce the mass for components used in aerospace and 
space (Froes, Boyer, & Dutta, 2019). It will enable faster repairs of damaged systems, enable 
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production of embedded electronics, such as conformal antennae (Esfahani et al., 2018), and 
conserve valuable material when manufacturing. The agility and flexibility to rapidly design new 
systems will allow those states with mastery of AM to be better placed to answer unexpected 
strategic challenges (Schrand, 2016). It can be used to produce individual parts, such as an 
individual fuel nozzle that fits onto an aircraft (Roschli et al., 2019; Underwood, 2015), or whole 
systems such as a conventional warhead or missile (Relativity, 2019). 
For military applications, relevant printing techniques can be divided into the extrusion methods 
that melt a material such as thermoplastic wire, directed energy techniques that fully melt a 
metal, ceramic or high-performance plastic powder or wire, and binder jetting techniques that 
adhere metal, ceramic or high-performance plastic powder that is then sintered. Materials avail-
able include nickel superalloys, titanium, maraging steel and high-performance plastics such 
as PEEK. 
Powder metal printing, the most precise and complex AM process, deposits layers that are 60 
micrometres thick, but final part will not maintain this resolution, which will be closer to a tenth 
of a millimetre. Powder metal printing occurs in an inert atmosphere, which limits the build 
volume to half a cubic metre. Large area printing is possible, for instance using Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory’s thermoplastic extrusion technique, known as Big Area Additive Manufac-
turing (BAAM) (Roschli et al., 2019) which can be used to print moulds for aircraft wings. Large 
area metal printing is also possible: Sciaky’s Electron Beam Additive Manufacturing (EBAM) 
has been used to print titanium propellant tanks for NASA (Kenyon, 2015). The variety of ma-
terials available to print is staggering. They range from ultra-hard steels such as maraging steel 
300 to specialised metals such as Inconel or Zircaloy.  
Yet, AM is a difficult and complex process. Serious discussion of AM must temper the hype 
with a realistic assessment of what the technology is capable of. AM is not ‘plug and play’. For 
instance, new metal powder printing machines require a six-month commissioning period and 
individual calibration before entering production (Volpe, Christopher, Kühn, Loehrke, & Shoaf, 
2018). Quality control of parts and the slowness of the printing process itself is a serious issue: 
ISO and ASTM have only just begun publishing industry standards as acknowledged by the 
United States Department of Defense in their 2016 roadmap for AM (DoD, 2016). In the current 
generation of metal powder printers, it takes several days to print a 20-centimetre part. Failures 
that occur in the first few hours will not be discovered until the end of the printing process. This 
high barrier to entry will limit AM’s adoption by state and non-state actors that fail to acquire 
the tacit knowledge required for this complex manufacturing process. 
The development of AM also poses risks by potentially enabling horizontal proliferation, for 
both state and non-state actors, via the availability of the technology and the increased risk of 
cyber espionage (Fey, 2017) and easy access to crude conventional weapons (Nelson, 2015). 
The shortening of supply chains and the ability to rapidly design new components will also 
impact military planning and as development continues has the potential to be game-changing 
for military logistics (Schrand, 2016). 
This paper will assess AM with regards to convergence with key technologies that enable rel-
evant capabilities with context for their impact on international security. This is followed by a 
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description of how adversaries may adopt and benefit from AM and finally, the outline of possible 
means to reduce these risks. 
 THE IMPACT OF AM 
The development of AM is occurring in parallel with significant technological advances in other 
sectors, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), increased computing speed and cloud computing. 
We, therefore, discuss developments and advances in AM in this context. 
 AM, HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING AND AI 
High-performance computing allows the use of more detailed computer models when prototyp-
ing. The driver of the fast development cycle in AM is not just the process itself but the combi-
nation of AM with computer modelling (Goodwin, 2015). Increased computing power permits 
the use of more accurate models of performance under operational conditions. Development 
cycles can be drastically shortened using an iterative process of modelling, producing proto-
types and feeding the test results from the prototype back into the design. The AM process, 
which builds a product from the ground up, may also allow the verification of a part as it is 
constructed further contributing to shortening development cycles (DoE, 2019).  
Machine learning, itself enabled by increases in computing power, can also be used to model 
failure modes of AM parts in real time (Jackson, 2018). Although it may take some achieve this 
capability, first steps are being taken, as demonstrated with the collaboration between the 
United States Navy’s Office of Naval Research and AM tech company Senvol to improve the 
printing process using machine learning ("Senvol Developing Machine Learning Software of 
US Navy for Additive Manufacturing," 2018). The expected improvement this will provide in 
reliability will encourage adoption of AM and encourage the risk-averse security sector to use 
AM to produce critical components.  
The implications are that new systems can be developed in such short periods that they can 
impact military operations in months, rather than years. They can be deployed during a single 
extended operation or campaign if a tactical vulnerability is identified that can be countered 
with a new system designed in-part using AM (Schrand, 2016).  
 AM AND THE IOT 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the set of devices that can communicate over the internet or a 
private secure network. Connecting AM machines to the IoT enables two significant capabilities 
for AM-produced parts. First, distributed ledger technologies, or blockchains, can be used to 
both grant permissions for permitted users and validate that the contents of digital build files 
for AM machines that are on a secure IoT node (Hoffman & Volpe, 2018). Assurances by the 
blockchain that digital build files are free from industrial sabotage will provides an additional 
layer of security beyond encryption. Such techniques can be adopted to limit the proliferation 
of any part produced using AM or any other computer-aided manufacturing technique. 
Second, sensors connected to the IoT can be used to monitor the performance of components 
in-situ (G. Christopher, 2018). When instrumented with sensors, a part’s operating conditions 
can be communicated to a secure data cloud to provide performance data. Machine learning 
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can then be used to model when a part is likely to fail, leading to predictive maintenance. This 
is, of course, all possible without AM. The innovation provided by AM is the possibility to pro-
duce parts with embedded sensors, thus increasing the reach of the IoT. Systems with embed-
ded sensors will be more reliable so will reduce costs over time, they will improve safety by 
decreasing the likelihood of catastrophic accidents and will increase the confidence in AM. 
Instrumented sensors will also have tactical military applications. If embedded in battlefield 
equipment and uniforms sensors can be used to monitor battlefield conditions to relay infor-
mation about the tactical environment.  
Integrated sensors could open up new possibilities for verification and monitoring of arms con-
trol agreements. AM cannot solve purely political problems about the introduction of sensors 
into a facility, but for organisations that conduct inspections and remote monitoring incorporat-
ing sensors into facility production equipment, as a plant is being designed, or by replacing 
older components, could be an attractive prospect. 
 AM AND 3D SCANNING 
When supply chains fail, or individual parts are available only via an expensive batch process, 
AM can be used to reverse engineer a component by 3D scanning the part to produce a digital 
model, such as the impeller printed by Siemens for the Krško nuclear power plant in Slovenia 
(Siemens, 2017). AM can also be used to produce machine tools and ‘widgets’ that previously 
only were available via more costly, slower production methods (NNSA, 2016). This is used to 
keep down costs and also extend the lifetimes of older systems (Johnston, Smith, & Irwin, 
2018). 
 AM AND SHORTENED SUPPLY CHAINS 
The ultimate shortened supply chain for the military is the ability to print in the field. The United 
States Army Rapid Equipment Force (REF) has been using 3D printing in the field since 2012 
(Asclipiadis, 2014). This can be used to perform maintenance and routine tasks as well as 
providing militaries with flexibility for problem solving in the field (Schrand, 2016). AM is also 
being included in plans for combat readiness by reducing the requirement to maintain a full 
inventory of replacement parts (JL, 2018). 
 HOW AM COULD DESTABILISE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
With AM, manufacturing becomes local and immediate. Moreover, AM will be able to iterate 
multiple generations of a system before a conventionally manufactured system is even de-
ployed. 
This points to several possible effects. First, in a future conflict, a state that is able to maintain 
an asymmetric advantage in design agility and flexibility will better placed to counter any unan-
ticipated strategic or tactical disadvantage (Schrand, 2016). By contrast, conflict between AM-
capable states could result in a dynamic where systems and counter-systems are rapidly de-
veloped.  
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Second, If AM can deploy full systems that are cheap and easily replaced, states that are 
overly-reliant on small numbers of expensive systems could be overwhelmed without a com-
mensurate rapid manufacturing capability. Modern militaries are composed of expensive, diffi-
cult to replace systems. All but the most well-resourced states in a prolonged conflict will lose 
systems to attrition that cannot be replaced. For instance, states that rely on ballistic missile 
defence, (BMD), rapid production of missiles could saturate and overwhelm the designed sys-
tems before they can be upgraded (Walsh, 2017). 
Third, limiting the spread of new technologies is nearly impossible. Any new proven new capa-
bility that AM provides will eventually spread to potential adversary states. As AM has devel-
oped, the introduction of electronic printing, which will allow the integration of sensors, is one 
such AM-enabled technique that will provide new capabilities that are not replicable via other 
manufacturing techniques. 
These risks, as described, may not be as great as they first appear. Bar some extreme cases, 
such as Relativity’s in-development entirely 3D printed rocket (Relativity, 2019), AM is being 
used on a component-by-component basis, where it provides some efficiency or new capability, 
rather than being used to print entire systems.  
In the OECD countries, there are clear applications and use cases of AM that are being devel-
oped for use by militaries (DoD, 2016). Potential adversaries have no doubt observed gains 
and promising areas of AM and will seek to emulate such successes in their own weapons 
programmes. 
AM could enable proliferation of advanced technologies to both state and non-state actors. In 
particular, in states that fear isolation due to sanctions, such as North Korea and Iran, AM could 
be pursued as a means to evade sanctions and achieve autarky (Johnston et al., 2018). AM 
hardware and raw materials are largely free from export controls so should be less difficult than 
conventional hardware for states to acquire. AM also wastes less material than subtractive 
techniques so it will be attractive for programmes with limited quantities of material. This could 
be used in any case where AM can substitute for conventional manufacturing, which at present 
ranges from production of liquid-fuel propulsion systems to turbines and small unmanned sys-
tems. 
States and non-state actors with cyber espionage capabilities will seek to acquire designs and 
intellectual property associated with advanced systems in either a targeted or opportunistic 
manner. Destroyed or damaged systems that are acquired, via encounters or by accident, will 
become easier to reverse engineer using 3D scanning and printing technologies (Johnston et 
al., 2018).  
 ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE 
Fey (Fey, 2017) describes five broad areas to address risks posed by AM: (1) strengthening 
cybersecurity, (2) safeguards in hardware, (3) export controls, (4) awareness and (5) industry 
self-regulation. 
Deterring cyber-theft of intellectual property by advanced state-backed cyber-espionage pro-
grammes is a broader problem that applies to all computer aided manufacturing. The most 
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valuable intellectual property for AM is not the geometry of the part but the instructions to the 
machine for how to build it. Yet, while AM remains difficult, stealing digital design files and 
associated hardware parameters will only provide very advanced users with the ability to suc-
cessfully manufacture the part. 
Export controls are a more difficult prospect. Additive manufacturing is being developed glob-
ally, including in non-OECD countries (G. E. Christopher, 2018). The leaders in developing AM 
include North America, Western Europe Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. In addition to 
traditional manufacturing hubs, International service providers are present all over the globe 
including in areas of weak export control enforcement. Attempts to control the spread of the 
technology will require the use of multilateral regimes and a willingness, that has not yet been 
expressed, for adequate controls to be put in place. States must balance their interests in de-
veloping new technology sectors with the associated risks with the spread of the technology. 
Reluctance to control the technology is rooted in a desire to maintain any commercial ad-
vantage which will also lessen the effectiveness of self-regulation by industry. As military ap-
plications emerge the appetite to control the technology may increase commensurately. 
Guiding the rise of AM to ensure maximum benefits are reaped – while addressing security 
risks – is a difficult challenge for policy makers. But AM has not yet reached its full potential so 
we do not know how it will most impact international security. Based on our current understand-
ing, AM will not be transformative on strategy and nor will it render export controls obsolete, 
but will likely have a significant impact in the specific areas of design, mobile repairs and inte-
grated sensors. 
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ABSTRACT 
As swarm technologies continue to garner attention among international security experts, mis-
diagnosis of the feasible rate and style of swarm proliferation has led to overly-assumptive, and 
subsequently inefficient, policy responses. The current body of literature on drone swarms 
identifies various aspects of international security that armed drone swarms could augment if 
implemented. In these analyses, impact magnitudes and policy action scopes hinge on the 
assumption of an unrealistically fast rate of proliferation. This distortion appears to be largely 
driven by the fact that swarms are derivatives of drones, and drones have proliferated rapidly 
on the global scale. However, swarm systems differ from individual drones because they re-
quire an increased level of autonomy in order to function. In conflating the two technologies 
when predicting proliferation potential, current analyses often ignore the impact that technical 
and social barriers unique to swarm development will have on the rate of swarm proliferation, 
and thus over-dramatize the predicted proliferation rate and overall applicability of swarms. 
This paper presents a more conservative estimate of swarm proliferation rate that takes into 
account technical and social barriers, and that allows for more concrete policy responses to 
target specific aspects of drone swarm proliferation through triaging the most imminent security 
risks. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Although the security world has yet to grapple with and become accustomed to the use of 
armed drones in defense activities, the recent application of drones as “drone swarms” further 
raises the stakes and intricacies of establishing an international order and rules system for 
armed drones, as well as developing national military postures toward the use of such technol-
ogies. With respect to their military application, armed drones have sparked concern among 
international security scholars and practitioners due to the insufficiency with which they are 
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covered in current arms and export control agreements (Altmann, 2013) and the lack of trans-
parency in their use for inter-military operations; many states, including the U.S., maintain a 
posture of ‘strategic ambiguity’ in drone operation (Ewers et. al., 2017). These issues have yet 
to be resolved at the international level and tension points have been exacerbated by the sheer 
rate at which drones have proliferated (Buchanan and Keohane, 2015). Because drone swarms 
are composed of drones, they elicit similar concerns that drones do, however, as they are 
augmented by increased autonomy, they also infuse new concerns that were typically periph-
eral and prospective in drone policymaking (Kallenborn and Bleek, 2019). In light of the fact 
that drone swarms promise to exacerbate tensions rising from a lack of comprehensive drone 
policy, as well as introduce new concerns arising from increased autonomy, there have been 
a number of commentaries arguing that drone swarms will profoundly change military combat 
(Hambling, 2015; Scharre, 2014; Scharre, 2018). However, analyses that claim swarms to be 
indicators of a new wave of military combat tend to assume or imply that swarms will proliferate 
as rapidly as drones have and may eventually become quotidian functions of military activities.  
Scholars and practitioners have already highlighted a number of concerning implications that 
could arise from implementation of armed drone swarms, including: ethical and operational 
issues arising from military technologies operating with an increased level of autonomy, dis-
ruption of current defense strategies due to the increased offensive capability allowed for by 
drone swarms, elevated risks for proliferation or use of chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) warfare systems in tandem with drone swarm development, and the general 
potential that swarms will have to disrupt strategic stability. Although autonomy has long been 
viewed as a forthcoming threat in the drone policy sphere (Sparrow, 2007; Sharkey, 2012; 
Asaro, 2012), the impetus to actually engage in meaningful debates and discussions that would 
conclusively determine some sort of international consensus on an acceptable level of auton-
omy has been undercut by the fact that drones can ostensibly maintain a meaningful level of 
human interaction, to some degree, for nearly every strategic action. However, since swarms 
are inherently reliant on automation in order to perform even basic functions, and unlike drones 
cannot perform at least some strategic actions under the direct control of a human operator, 
their introduction in the military technology sphere necessitates greater dialogue on autonomy. 
Beyond the legal and moral dimensions of autonomy, there is also concern over the sheer 
physical power that swarms composed of large numbers of drones will have. Scientists and 
engineers have indicated that the development of technological methods to protect against 
swarms will be difficult and expensive (Scharre, 2015, “Counter-Swarm”; Tucker, 2018). Schol-
ars have also examined swarms in the context of CBRN warfare technologies and have iden-
tified the various ways in which drone swarms could be used to complement or substitute for 
CBRN technologies, or to challenge CBRN technologies when used in opposition (Kallenborn 
and Bleek, 2019). Finally, both with respect to CBRN and conventional weapons, scholars have 
argued that swarms have the potential to decrease strategic stability in a number of domains 
and thus may increase the risk of conflict escalation (Kallenborn and Bleek, 2019; Altmann and 
Sauer, 2017). 
However, the current literature on drone swarms is lacking in depth of analysis on how swarm 
proliferation will occur. The scholars that have written more intensively about drone swarms 
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have only vaguely alluded to the proliferation process, and in cases where proliferation is ex-
plicitly discussed, most have simply argued for the high likelihood of largescale drone swarm 
proliferation based on the fact that drones themselves are widely available (Ewers et. al., 2017). 
Beyond these brief considerations, very little has been written about the social and technical 
barriers that those hoping to develop drone swarms will face. This omission has prevented 
consideration of the ways in which relevant barriers will shape the availability and application 
of swarm technology, and how such an analysis could be used to prepare more targeted arms 
control or international agreement opportunities to limit the use and detrimental impact of 
armed drone swarms. 
This paper will survey the validity of the concerns raised in current research based on a closer 
consideration of the technical and social foundation of drone swarm technology. The back-
ground and threat identification sections of this paper will discuss the technological differences 
between armed drones and drone swarms, and then survey the body of literature on the threats 
introduced by armed drone swarm implementation. However, because current analyses over-
look the realistic barriers that swarm technology development is likely to face, there is limited 
discussion on the realistic imminence of these threats and what form early use will take. Thus, 
this paper will expand upon the current body of literature by analyzing the technical and social 
barriers that will constrain the proliferation potential of drone swarms and posit potential result-
ing options for policymakers based on the re-framing of drone swarm threat immediacy. Under 
this analysis, this paper argues that social and technical factors should be used to temper the 
current predictions with regard to how rapidly drone swarms will be employed and what capa-
bilities early swarms will have. Finally, this paper demonstrates how a more nuanced prolifer-
ation consideration can ultimately allow for the ability to triage the risks introduced by drone 
swarms and to develop more concrete policies to address high-priority risks. 
 BACKGROUND 
 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SWARMS AND DRONES 
The individual physical components of swarms are derived nearly entirely from current drone 
technology, which has already been implemented for quite some time in the defense realm. 
Among defense and security scholars, drones are typically referred to as either unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVS), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), or unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs), depending on where they are operating. Drone technologies have triggered apprehen-
sion since their initial implementation. Concern over drone technology has been rooted both in 
its tactical application, such as drone killing, and surveillance application. Drones used for tac-
tical purposes and that carry weapons are typically referred to as armed drones. This paper 
will focus on armed drones and armed drone swarms (swarms composed of armed drones), 
though significant literature can be found on drone use for alternative purposes.  
Armed drone use has been criticized at the moral, legal, technical, and strategic levels. With 
regard to tactical use, scholars such as Frank Sauer and Niklas Schornig argue that drone 
killing is morally, legally, and politically problematic (Sauer and Schornig, 2012). At a more 
macro level, scholars have also argued that drone application has led to an increased likelihood 
of conflict by lowering the cost to the initiator and thus incentivizing first use (Sauer and 
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Schornig, 2012). Beyond the disruption caused by drones themselves, scholars have also iden-
tified ways in which drones could disrupt linked technical systems. This could be through direct 
technical interference, such as through the command, control, communication, and intelligence 
(C3I) network, or through heightening political tension and increasing disagreement among 
potential adversaries (Zhao, 2018).  
Swarm implementation not only carries the same concerns as drone implementation, but also 
introduces new concerns through the physical enhancement of increased drone numbers and 
(potentially but not necessarily) variability and through the digital enhancement of increased 
autonomy. Drone swarms are systems of multiple drones that work together, while not operat-
ing identically, to complete a shared, group objective (Scharre, 2015, “Unleash the Swarm”; 
Scharre, 2018). Paul Scharre defines swarms as, “large numbers of dispersed individuals or 
small groups coordinating together and fighting as a coherent whole,” (Scharre, 2014). While 
the physical technology basis for swarms is similar to drones, swarms must be augmented by 
digital technology innovation. Swarms operate by relying on some type of communication and 
processing network that allows for individual drones to perform basic operations independently, 
as well as communicate with other drones in the swarm and a command base, without neces-
sarily having to revert back to a central command for every individual action. The extent of 
regulation and oversight exerted by the central intelligent control of the swarm designates 
whether the swarm has a central command (high central control), or exhibits distributed, emer-
gent behavior (limited central control). Because of this immense communication coordination 
network, most subject matter experts agree that in order to allow for the unique operation of 
each individual drone, working coherently with the entire swarm in real time and responding to 
unplanned environment changes, drones in a swarm must be granted a requisite amount of 
autonomy (e.g. Chandhar, Danev, & Larsson, 2016). Thus, swarm application introduces two 
unique issues that extend beyond those already prevalent for single-drone military activities: 
the physical problem of having multiple drones operating simultaneously, and thus increasing 
the tactical threat and difficulty to defend against, and the legal and moral complications re-
garding increased autonomy, and thus less meaningful human control, in accomplishing mili-
tary objectives.  
 APPLICATION SURVEY 
Due to their physical and digital enhancements, a wide range of swarm applications have been 
identified across both the civilian and military domains. In “The Upside and Downside of 
Swarming Drones,” Irving Lachow specifies three main military use categories for swarms: at-
tack, defense, and support functions (including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). 
The benefits of using swarms in these applications largely derive from the swarm’s ability to 
disperse multiple agents over a large area, ensure an increased level of survivability, and in-
crease the difficulty of developing countermeasures (Lachow, 2017). Military scholars argue 
that because of these features, integration of swarms into warfare allows for greater efficacy, 
lethality, and survivability, as well as the opportunity for parallel warfare (Williams, 2018; Ar-
quilla and Ronfeldt, 2000; Scharre, 2014; Hurst, 2017). However, beyond the military domain, 
a wide range of civilian applications have also been identified, making swarms a dual-use tech-
nology. Interestingly, very crude swarms have already been used in the entertainment industry 
as alternatives to fireworks, with a 300-drone pre-programmed swarm having been employed 
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in Lady Gaga’s Super Bowl halftime show. Other potential applications that have been sug-
gested for future use include agricultural processes, such as water and pesticide dispersal, 
search and rescue operations, package distribution, and industrial management (Hambling, 
2017). 
As the breadth and utility of these applications continue to grow in prominence, so has funding 
and research progress towards actual swarm implementation. Beyond private industry re-
search and development for civilian purposes, many countries are developing military-based 
swarm programs. Most recently, the United Kingdom government issued a series of funding 
allocations for drone swarm projects, including projects on mini drones and the ‘Many Drones 
Make Light Work’ project (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2019). In the U.S., drone swarm prototype 
systems have been publicly tested since as early as 2016, with the testing of a Perdix drone 
swarm (U.S. Department of Defense, 2017). China has also been aggressively pursuing drone 
swarm technologies and is suspected of having more extensively tested drone swarms and 
developed advanced autonomy and artificial capabilities to specifically enhance swarm opera-
tion (Romaniuk and Burgers, 2018). Although not necessarily under the Chinese military, but 
in coordination with them, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) has 
tested drone swarms composed of 67, 119, and 200 UAVs (Kania, 2019). Other countries that 
are actively pursuing military swarms include South Korea, Russia, Turkey, and Israel (Kallen-
born & Bleek, 2019; Hambling, 2018).  
 THREAT IDENTIFICATION 
While swarms offer many benign, beneficial uses in both the civilian and military domains, their 
implementation also presents new challenges to the international community. Scholars have 
recently begun to think more critically of the impact that military use of drone swarms could 
have as the technology begins to grow more developed and implementation seems more im-
minent. Threats have been identified through consideration of the impact that swarms will have 
on other technology systems, the feasibility of wide-spread horizontal proliferation, the potential 
for escalation due to swarm malfunction or uncontrolled swarm interactions, and the ever-
pressing moral and legal dilemmas resulting from increased autonomy. 
 IMPACT ON EXISTING SYSTEMS 
One key area of swarm policy research that has evolved focuses on the impact that swarms 
will have on existing technology systems and the strategic stability that has been established 
for these legacy systems. As swarms have fallen under the more general security studies cat-
egory of “emerging technologies,” scholars in the security field have applied a methodological 
approach in thinking about swarm implication that is similar to what they have used in thinking 
about other emerging technologies (Bidwell and MacDonald, 2018). Within the focus area of 
emerging technologies, which has recently experienced a resurgence in interest and resource 
allocation (Ford, 2017), a general approach of identifying impact potential has developed. Pri-
marily, impact potential is measured by whether or not a technology incentivizes first-use where 
it was not previously incentivized, either of the technology itself or of the technical system it is 
disrupting, or whether the emerging technology alters the survivability of an established tech-
nology system (Bidwell and MacDonald, 2018). For example, under this analysis, the fact that 
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tactical swarm applications could lead a country to believe that it can circumvent a missile 
defense system more easily, and thus provides greater incentivization for first use would indi-
cate a high impact potential. At the same time, swarms could also disrupt the perceived surviv-
ability of nuclear weapons by inhibiting the usability of a missile defense system. With respect 
to armed drone swarms, scholars such as Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp Bleek have high-
lighted the potential applications that drones could have in the dispersal of chemical, biological, 
radionuclide, nuclear, or explosive weapons (Kallenborn and Bleek, 2019). However, impact 
potential in the military realm can also be determined based on a number of other factors, such 
as whether a technology makes an existing system obsolete or intensifies an arms race (Alt-
mann, 2005). The emphasis on impact potential in this line of research also often affords 
emerging technologies deemed capable of having a disruptive impact on the name of “disrup-
tive technologies.”  
It should be noted that up until now such research has neglected consideration of the technical 
feasibility of constructing a swarm system capable of successfully accomplishing such goals, 
and even less consideration has been given to the potential for swarms to match the develop-
ment of anti-swarm technologies. Anti-swarm technologies are currently assessed to be at a 
relatively nascent stage of research and development. But it has been argued that if a soft, 
non-kinetic) anti-swarm defense method is found it could deny use for a specific area fairly 
effectively, even if kinetic counter-swarm technologies, such as air-defense artillery, are less 
effective (Frantzman, 2019; Scharre, 2015, “Counter-Swarms”; Shmuel, 2018). Scharre has 
identified a number of options that could be considered in developing anti-swarm technologies, 
including: low cost-per-shot weapons, such as lasers or electromagnetic rail guns, or even 
machine guns; another swarm; high-powered microwaves; swarm communication jammers; 
strategic traps to get guide the swarm into a disadvantageous position; or even software infil-
tration capabilities to allow for hijacking the swarm. Despite this diverse assortment of potential 
defenses, Scharre does concede that research and development on anti-swarm efforts are still 
in early stages of consideration, as is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. military budget for 
counter-swarm measures is spread across such a wide variety of potential options (Scharre, 
2015, “Counter-Swarms”).  
 EASE OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION 
In addition to the threats posed by swarms augmenting highly-developed military capabilities, 
such as CBRN systems, scholars have also identified the threat of rudimentary, conventionally 
armed drone swarms, exacerbated by the ease of access to the core drone technologies. Alt-
hough there certainly are high-level drone technologies that require a large amount of capital 
and scientific expertise to acquire or develop, there are also types of drones that are able to be 
constructed or purchased with minimal knowledge and financial resources (Woodhams, 2018; 
Ewers et. al., 2017). Furthermore, countries that do have the adequate technical background 
and financial resources are able to buy nearly exact derivatives of other countries’ drone tech-
nologies, as was the case with the Netherlands and Belgium acquisition of a variation on a 
U.S.-made drone (Woodhams, 2018). Thus, because of the sheer ease in acquiring the basic 
drones required for swarms, many scholars have posited that drone swarms will proliferate 
rapidly (Madrigal, 2018; Homayounnejad, 2018). Additionally, analyses asserting wide horizon-
tal proliferation have led to fears of terrorist acquisition of drone swarms, especially as drones 
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have already been identified as a key technology for non-state actors (Tonnessen, 2017; 
Tucker, 2017; Hurst, 2019). In this respect, scholars argue that such horizontal proliferation 
could allow for non-state actors or other rogue actors with minimal resources to have an asym-
metric impact in security domains (Hurst, 2019). 
 UNINTENDED ESCALATION, FLASH WARS, OR FLASH ATTACKS 
Another threat pertains to the probability that a swarm would malfunction due to a technological 
accident, a hijacking, or in a response to an adversary’s system/swarm and lead to unintended 
escalation: such types of accidents are referred to as unintended escalation, “flash wars,” or 
“flash attacks” (Scharre, 2014; Scharre, 2018; Altmann and Sauer, 2017). Concern over this 
threat is also echoed by researchers studying emerging technologies, such as James Acton 
who claim that newer technologies have undergone less testing, and may malfunction in the 
real-world, resulting in inadvertent escalation (Acton, 2018). Early technical research exploring 
swarm applications identified the difficulty of fully verifying that swarm technologies will operate 
properly without malfunction (Vanderbilt et al. 2004). For example, a malfunction could include 
the swarm losing connectivity to its human controller, and thus having to operate on an entirely 
autonomous basis. Additionally, because swarm technology efficacy is difficult to verify, mal-
ware could be programmed in intentionally, and may go undetected. Scholars have also cau-
tioned that artificial intelligence (AI) integration into drone swarms could lead to swarms oper-
ating more autonomously than what was initially intended. Scharre writes, “Increased auton-
omy in the use of force raises the dangerous specter of “flash wars” initiated by autonomous 
systems interacting on the battlefield in ways that may be unpredictable,” (Scharre, 2014; 
Scharre, 2018). Finally, drone swarms could be hacked or experience a cyber-attack that 
makes them operate in a manner different from what the operating party intended; this could 
allow for an adversary or a third party to intervene in a strategic operation or military exercise 
(Wesson and Humphreys, 2013). In Military Robots and Drones, Robert Springer suggests that 
“autonomous combat systems offer the possibility to create a consummate double agent or 
sleeper, appearing to function normally until a critical moment, when a malfunction or loss of 
operator control can yield a devastating result,” (Springer, 2013). 
 INCREASED AUTONOMY 
The final threat that has received a significant amount of attention, and which has been previ-
ously alluded to multiple times in this article already, is the increased autonomy required for 
drone swarms. The concerns regarding autonomously functioning military technologies are 
multifold. With regard to defense oversight and organizational structure, there is concern over 
the level of accountability that can be ascertained with an autonomous system and the difficulty 
of tracing the decision-making process for an autonomous system in order to determine a prob-
lem or assign culpability (Scharre, 2014; Scharre, 2018). With respect to the technology itself, 
there are concerns over whether or not there would be bias in the coding, and how such biases 
and prejudices may impact the life or death decisions made by the autonomous system (Knight, 
2017). Finally, legal, moral, and ethical concerns also arise from autonomy; significant consid-
eration has been given at the international level to determine whether or not combat with au-
tonomous robots is unethical, violates basic human rights, or is illegal under the Laws of War 
(Sparrow, 2007; Sharkey, 2012; Asaro, 2012; Singer, 2009; Wilson, 2014). 
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 SOCIO-TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO CONSTRAIN PROLIFERATION 
PREDICTIONS 
As this analysis has shown, swarm implementation introduces a number of potential risks; 
however, despite the fact that efforts have been taken to mitigate identified risks, such efforts 
become misdirected and ineffective when the realistic proliferation drivers and mechanisms 
are not taken into account. Although the sheer assortment of beneficial uses of swarms, both 
for civilian and military purposes, may convince some scholars and policymakers that prolifer-
ation is inevitable, there are significant social and technical hurdles that nations looking to in-
corporate swarm tactics into their militaries will have to surmount before implementation. The 
key social hurdle identified here is the necessary use of autonomy, distinguishing armed swarm 
use from armed drone use. The key technical hurdle identified here is the requirement of ad-
vanced systems engineering and communication technologies necessary for the development 
of each specific type of swarm. The significance of these hurdles is heightened by the fact that 
swarm development will have to be task driven, and thus swarms developed in the civilian 
sphere will not be easily transferrable to the military sphere, minimizing the risks that swarms 
normalized in the civilian realm will pave the way towards military swarm use. Once these 
hurdles are considered in more depth, the future of swarm technology application appears 
much more limited, and thus ultimately allows for more clear and targeted policy approaches 
based on the proliferation pathways that are identified as most likely. This section will assess 
the relevance of social pressures and technical constraints in obstructing wide-scale prolifera-
tion and use of different types of armed drone swarms, allowing for more narrow and targeted 
policy recommendations to be given in the following section. 
 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
Whether or not the threats introduced by military application will alter the reception of drone 
swarms, and thus the number of missions that drone swarms are applied to in the international 
security field, varies depending on if the question is approached using either the social con-
struction of technology framework or the technological determinism framework. Under the so-
cial construction of technology framework, social acceptance and use of a technology impacts 
the development trajectory of the technology, and thus significant social apprehension will 
place a limiting pressure on the number and types of applications for the given technology. 
Based on the number of social concerns regarding autonomy, strategic stability implications, 
unintended escalation, and horizontal proliferation, the social construction of technology theo-
retical framework would argue that the development of drone swarms could be impeded as a 
result of the social concerns. The social construction of technology framework contrasts the 
easily, and often unconsciously, assumed technological determinism framework asserting that 
a technology will develop and proliferate as long as there are enough perceived benefits and 
uses of the technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Sovacool, 2006). However, it is worth noting 
that in the case of armed drone swarms, whether or not social pressure is influential is most 
likely dependent not only on the presence of a robust dialogue on concerns in the civilian 
sphere, but also on this dialogue of concerns being at least partly understood and acknowl-
edged by the military community. 
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As the prior threat analysis indicated, there would likely be significant social investment and 
concern during the initial implementation of armed drone swarms as autonomy presents a par-
adigmatic shift in multiple facets of the current security framework. A key driver of this social 
resistance is the increased autonomy, and decreased human accountability, which becomes 
especially startling in tactical/combat uses of drone swarms, as it could lead to autonomous 
machines making life or death decisions, more frequently referred to as lethal autonomous 
weapon systems (LAWS). For this reason, autonomous robots, be they swarms or single 
drones, are receiving a lot of criticism for the magnitude of change they would introduce into 
military activities. This has also led many scholars to investigate the different levels of interac-
tion that human controllers could have with the swarms in order to assure a certain level of 
meaningful human control and to identify where along that spectrum are thresholds to legal 
and ethical strategic operation (Kolling et. al., 2015; Hussein, 2018). Beyond the legal and 
ethical considerations, which have already gained traction in the civilian and academic spheres, 
the social impact of decreased human interaction and decision-making in the military sphere is 
especially apparent using Eliot Cohen’s parameters for whether a technology signifies a military 
revolution: “Will it change the appearance of combat?” and “Will it change the structure of ar-
mies?” (Cohen, 1996). If these two questions are taken as being indicators of technologies that 
produce military revolutions, then Scharre’s analysis of swarm impact on military organization 
positively indicates that swarms constitute a military revolution. Scharre writes, “scaling multi-
vehicle control up to large swarms will require even more fundamental shifts in the command-
and-control paradigm,” (Scharre, 2014). Thus, social barriers to swarm adoption, and the un-
derlying consent to largely autonomous systems, have significant foundations both in the mili-
tary and civilian dialogues.  
Furthermore, current literature focused on the evolution of drone swarms and how future sys-
tems should be designed for the most ideal prototypes suggests that the social construction of 
technology will be especially relevant to the development of drone swarms themselves. One 
scholar, Kathleen Giles, has argued at multiple forums (NATO and the Naval Postgraduate 
School) that drone swarms are most efficiently and effectively developed when their design 
and construction is centered around a mission objective (a top-down approach) (Giles, 2016). 
This contrasts earlier assumptions that currently available technologies and subcomponents of 
drone swarms, for example individual drone types, can be fused together by altering the man-
agement system (a bottom-up approach), and thus the belief that pre-existing swarm compo-
nents can be refabricated to fit a new purpose (Giles and Giammarco, 2017). Specifically, Giles 
argues that “to produce mission-effective systems, system architects must consider the doc-
trine, design, and planned assessment methodologies when developing a swarm UAS,” (Giles, 
2016). Giles’ argument is rooted in her assessment that systems engineering is one of the most 
prohibitive steps of drone swarm application. Even if a group of scientists are presented with 
all of the proper components for a type of swarm, it would take a high-level system engineering 
team with a mission in mind to actually develop an efficient and effective swarm system (Giles, 
2016). Thus, because a high-level plan based off of a desired end product is required for the 
development of each lower-level technology in a swarm, the technology determinism argument 
that technologies will be developed irrespective of social conditions deterring certain types of 
end products is even less likely to be relevant in the case of drone swarms. This could change 
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as stronger software capabilities evolve and are able to be adapted more seamlessly to varia-
ble hardware components, but a requisite amount of development and testing would still have 
to occur before the social construction of technology framework, as presented here, becomes 
irrelevant. 
These two points taken together make the argument that because drone swarms will not evolve 
easily and will need to be purposefully developed with specific functions in mind, and given that 
there are social reasons for both the civilian and military personnel to give pause before blindly 
pursuing such developments, adequate social pressure could shape the development trajec-
tory of drone swarms . However, this social pressure, and thus the limitation it would create in 
the furthering of drone swarm technology development, will only gain traction if it receives ad-
equate attention at the policymaker, military, and public levels. This is especially important 
given the fact that social concerns specific to the public may seem to be at odds with the per-
ceived needs of the military. However, even absent the acceptance of civilian concerns in mil-
itary developments, consideration of the strategic threats identified earlier in this article and 
Cohen’s military revolution argument indicate that there are significant military-based social 
hurdles as well.  
 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AS TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
Beyond affording greater weight to the social construction of technology framework for drone 
swarm development, the heavy systems engineering requirement for swarms also acts as a 
technical tacit knowledge barrier. Based on Giles’ assessment that the overarching plan for the 
swarm construction is the primary indicator of an efficient and effective swarm, a significant 
amount of systems engineering expertise will be required in order to incorporate the multiple 
types of drones and drone technologies into one cohesive swarm. Furthermore, the work ca-
pacity of each trained systems engineer, and the applicability of each technology produced, is 
limited based on Giles’ argument that swarm technologies are not easily transferrable, at least 
for tactical swarms (Giles, 2016). In other words, having enough systems engineering capability 
to produce one type of swarm does not guarantee a wide variety of transferrable uses; each 
swarm and application will require a significant amount of systems engineering (with the caveat 
that some swarms may have more intensive or more facile evolutionary steps depending on 
function, realm of use, and prior drone swarm technologies they are innovated from). This will 
force swarm developers under constrained resources to have to prioritize what types of swarms 
they deem most necessary. This type of filter for proliferation, and the ability to address it, has 
been referred to under the context of intangible technology control, which takes into account 
the difference between controlling the flow of specific technologies compared to controlling the 
flow of knowledge and skill (Stewart, 2016). Although information knowledge might be able to 
flow relatively easier than physical materials, because swarm technology software will be so 
characteristic of the specific hardware, simple software transfers or espionage recovery will not 
easily or quickly be able to be applied to the technologies on hand. Additionally, the utility of 
such information transfers could be made more difficult by including software features making 
the swarm system highly dependent on hardware components that are extremely difficult to 
access or that require intensive user knowledge. 
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 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As was promised at the outset of this paper, it is through affording greater consideration to the 
social and technical barriers identified for swarm development that more targeted policy ap-
proaches can be identified to mitigate the highest priority risks introduced by drone swarms. 
Based on the assessment of social barriers presented in this analysis, social pressures may 
play an appreciable role in preventing the proliferation of swarms, and heightened focus should 
be given to swarm types that are deemed to be particularly disruptive. Furthermore, based on 
the technical barrier of the intensive systems engineering requirement and the limitation on the 
transferability of one swarm’s technologies to another, the sheer rate of proliferation across 
different applications is unlikely to occur as rapidly as the current body of literature would sug-
gest. Thus, efforts focused on restricting specific types of applications in the civilian sphere 
may be more useful than previously assumed, such as those that are more directly transferra-
ble and easier to adapt to military purposes. Because Giles’ argument makes a strong case for 
social factors having a large influence on swarm implementation, and thus bolsters the strength 
of the social construction of technology theory, the international community should establish 
norms and treaties early on that restrict the swarm behaviors that pose significant threats. Early 
establishment of such norms and treaties could ensure that the technologies for restricted types 
of swarms are not developed before the treaties and norms can be established. However, in 
order to ensure that such dialogue and recommendations gain traction beyond the policymaker 
and academic fields (and expand into the military fields), arguments need to emphasize the 
impact that drone swarms will have on the military community as well.  
Additionally, even though swarms are considered dual-use, because they must be repurposed 
for each individual use, development in the civilian sphere by private companies for civilian 
purposes does not necessarily translate to a rapid proliferation of swarms in the military do-
main. This is substantiated by Verbruggen’s research on LAWS and the impact of civilian in-
novation on military development. Specifically, Verbruggen identifies the obstacles blocking 
easy flow of innovation from the civilian sphere to the military sphere, including the degree of 
modification required for military purposes (which in the case of armed drones would be signif-
icant), and the cost for modification (Verbruggen, 2019). However, it is worth noting that the 
swarms relevant to Giles’ and Verbruggen’s arguments are predominately heterogenous 
swarms, or more complex swarm systems, thus it would be worth identifying the different risk 
pathways posed by heterogenous swarm systems with variable individual drone components 
and more basic homogenous swarm systems with each drone component operating similarly, 
the latter of which may be less restrained by social barriers. Because use of homogenous 
swarm systems composed of drones with simple military modifications is most likely, scholar-
ship should focus on identifying likely swarms to be developed with these characteristics and 
the impact of these specific swarm types. 
Based on the threats identified and the assumption of a slower rate of proliferation than previ-
ously anticipated, at least for complex, heterogenous swarm systems, the areas for arms con-
trol agreements should be ranked based on disruption level in order to establish what types of 
limitations must be prioritized. Since there is significant evidence that swarms could decrease 
the strategic stability of other technology systems, arms control agreement negotiations should 
begin with restricting swarm use near nuclear weapon or missile defense facilities. This may 
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ultimately lead to the conclusion that swarms must be banned entirely, if effective verification 
and regulation mechanisms are not found to limit them from accessing specific areas. Also of 
immediate importance is the determination of areas or systems that could be impacted by low-
complexity swarms, as those are the swarms that will likely proliferate more rapidly and broadly; 
this would include systems where swarms could be applied in sheer magnitude without neces-
sarily having complex functions for individual drones in the swarm (for example, overwhelming 
a missile defense system).  
Additionally, since there is significant societal concern regarding the implementation of auton-
omous systems, technical and policy experts must continue discussions to determine accepta-
ble levels of autonomy, and potential metrics to monitor and verify such levels. Early agree-
ments could focus on limiting specific types of hardware or software technologies that give rise 
to autonomy, or conversely the types of technologies and behaviors that autonomy is allowed 
to be applied to (such as activation of weapons). Beyond diplomatic efforts, the international 
community must also continue to engage the broader public to ensure that a significant social 
pressure would be perceived by militaries that consider adopting swarm technologies.  
Finally, to address the threat of flash wars or unintended escalation, communication channels 
and response plans should be established to determine courses of action once a swarm has 
been hijacked or is experiencing a technical malfunction. Such communication and response 
postures could be established through war-game scenarios or through coalition-building. Im-
mediate transparency would have to be prioritized, especially in an instance of severe crisis 
between two major powers. Additionally, during routine dialogues, countries could set norms 
on what types of responses would be acceptable in instances of escalation that may be the 
result of an accident or hijacking, and which types would be disproportionate or asymmetrical. 
This is especially likely given the high possibility for error in complex swarm operations, espe-
cially if a country or proliferator fails to adequately verify the efficacy of the swarm or perceives 
little benefit in undergoing verification. 
With respect to horizontal proliferation, as Giles argues that systems engineering is a founda-
tional technique required for drone swarms, and as systems engineering has historically been 
treated as a tacit knowledge in military technology development (Gormley, 2008), there are still 
certain avenues to bolster technical barriers. However, as was shown in the previous section, 
the macro-level component of systems engineering, including the intent of the engineers and 
architects, is probably easier to address with arms controls and treaties than the micro-level 
component of the engineer themselves. In other words, it is easier to eliminate an objective 
through restricting use than through restricting certain types of technical expertise altogether, 
especially when the systems produced are dual-use and have arguably good applications 
(Stewart, 2016). Treaties and arms control agreements targeting the system-design stage 
would most likely resemble norm-setting on acceptable use or could take the form of a moni-
toring regime to more strictly compel cooperative behavior. This has more-or-less been the 
approach towards anti-satellite technologies in space, and also is tangentially reminiscent of 
policies that guide countries towards specific types of nuclear reactors. That said, certainly 
access to high-trained systems engineers could be a prohibitive barrier for low-technology 
countries and non-state actors in acquiring drone swarms. Thus, such consideration can help 
address and correct the fear that any nation with access to drone technologies will be able to 
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develop drone swarms. This barrier could conceivably be bolstered by widely-administered 
anti-swarm technologies (with the obvious omission of swarm technologies themselves being 
used as anti-swarm technologies), which would at least increase the complexity in developing 
a survivable and usable swarm and thus raise the requirement for systems engineering capa-
bility. Another option to bolster this barrier is to minimize the potential gain from intelligence 
gathering by making all relevant information on armed drone swarm technologies highly spe-
cific to unique hardware components. By inserting these software-to-hardware dependencies, 
the acquisition of either software-based intelligence would not necessarily allow for easy swarm 
development if the highly specific hardware components are unknown or not accessible. Again, 
consideration should be given to the most prioritized areas, which have the highest risk of 
impact if affected, in which to apply anti-swarm technologies, if such technologies are devel-
oped, or intelligence acquisition blocks.  
 CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that swarm implementation is different from drone implementation in the 
military domain, and thus poses new threats. At their technical roots, swarms ultimately require 
some degree of autonomy to operate. The debate over autonomy in drones has led to consid-
eration, if not constraint, over the allowed level of autonomy for UAVs, UUVs, and UGVs, how-
ever, this would not be possible in the case of swarms. Additionally, swarms pose threats to 
the strategic stability of established technology systems, introduce concerns regarding hori-
zontal proliferation, and threaten the possibility of unintended escalation or flash wars/attacks.  
However, appreciation for the difference between swarms and drones can also serve to provide 
greater nuance on the predicted proliferation potency of swarms. Despite proclamations that 
swarms will be “unavoidable” and “pervasive,” based on parallels drawn to drone proliferation, 
social and technical barriers challenge the likelihood of a rapid proliferation. While the benefits 
that swarms could offer both the military and civilian sphere do make it likely that swarms will 
be implemented at some point, the socio-technical issues identified in this analysis suggest the 
applications will be narrower and more limited than what is believed. Under this new restrained 
view of swarm proliferation, more targeted policy actions have been identified. Policymakers 
should rank the highest priority threats of swarms and target actions to mitigate high-priority 
risks. Particular emphasis should be given to defending, either through regulation or technical 
defense mechanisms, areas in which swarm use would result in decreased strategic stability. 
Additionally, protocol should be set up for response to swarm incidents, as such incidents could 
be accidental, and escalation should be avoided at all costs. Finally, bolstering technical barri-
ers could help to ensure that non-state actors and terrorist groups are unable to acquire 
swarms. 
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ABSTRACT 
Private actors dream of the commercialization of space, scientists dream about discoveries on 
the Moon, Mars, and in deep space, while security experts worry about space as a theatre of 
war. Fears about the militarization of space often make techno-determinist and techno-essen-
tialist arguments. According to these narratives, technology drives politics and technological 
artefacts have inherent and unchangeable characteristics. For example, the recent develop-
ment of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities among space powers like China and India is often 
described as an example of an increasingly febrile security competition. This paper takes a 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach to arms races in outer space. Using a 
case study of Mission Shakti, India’s first successful ASAT test in 2019, we find that while 
Indian officials made some security-related claims about their ASAT project, they were just as 
likely, if not more, to advance status-seeking arguments. This offers possibilities for de-secu-
ritizing outer space. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a boom in human activity in space and a surge of development 
of space-related technologies, with commentators warning of a ‘new space race’ (Pekkanen, 
2019). But this rhetoric is overblown. The structural preconditions are very different from that 
of the first space race, in which the US and the USSR directed huge resources towards science 
and research in order to outdo the other in a mostly ungoverned space. However, that does 
not preclude the possibility of arms races in or relating to outer space. As human activity in 
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space grows, so does the need for governance and conflict management. Unfortunately, ‘hard 
security’ issues are mostly absent from multilateral deliberations on outer space, leaving each 
state to forge its own policy with little coordination and trust-building among rivals. As a result, 
the present system of Outer Space Governance is not suited to preventing or containing arms 
races. This is all the more problematic since space powers have pushed a securitized view of 
space (Peoples, 2010, 2011), and increases in national space capabilities are further exacer-
bating tensions (Handberg, 2018). 
We focus on the example of Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) where there are widespread wor-
ries of a developing arms race. These development are undoubtedly posing risks for relations 
among space powers but they are also based on what Bourdieu calls a ‘doxa’, something that 
is self-evident and taken for granted within a community (Bourdieu, 1977, 164-169), and on an 
essentializing view of technology as being imbued with certain inherent characteristics. In con-
trast, we argue, in line with most of Science & Technology Studies, that the development, pur-
pose and effects of technology are socially situated. Our aim is therefore to deconstruct the 
assumptions behind current discussions about coming arms races in outer space. This is not 
to deny the likely risks of escalation or the existence of security dilemmas in this field, but rather 
to probe how such dynamics emerge in socio-technical assemblages of national security. Fo-
cusing on the highly dynamic field of ASAT, we use the recent example of ‘Mission Shakti’, 
India’s first successful test of a kinetic ASAT system, as a case study of how states develop 
weapons systems not just for reasons of security but also for status-seeking and domestic 
politics. 
 ARMS RACES AND ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE 
There are renewed discussions about war in space, not just involving space. Recent moves by 
the United States government to establish a ‘Space Force’ have to be read as an attempt to 
collect existing capabilities for military action in space within a new contingent of the US armed 
forces (Hunter & Bowen, 2018). Russia and China also have dedicated branches of the armed 
forces with responsibilities for outer space. Discussions about ‘spacepower’ (derived from clas-
sic conceptions of ‘seapower’) have been going on for some time (Bowen, 2019) as are notions 
that space assets need to be protected from aggression (Wolter, 2006). In spite of these ante-
cedents, recent moves seem to signal shifts in discourse and perception that are more open to 
the possibility of warfare in space than seemed previously likely (Pavelec, 2012). However, it 
is not clear whether the buildup of military assets is driven by genuine security concerns or 
whether it should be interpreted as more of a symbolic move underpinning a nation’s claims 
for great power status. The famed ‘nuclear club’ is now complemented by the ‘space club’ 
(Paikowsky, 2017) – a trend that is relevant not just for First World states (Harding, 2013). 
ASAT technology has been envisioned since the early days of spaceflight (Bulkeley & Spinardi, 
1986). The earliest systems were developed by the US and the USSR with the first successful 
Soviet test in 1970. ASAT capabilities have since been developed by other space powers (for 
a comprehensive overview, see Weeden & Samson, 2018). In January 2007, China success-
fully shot down a defunct weather satellite. This set off a series of tests by other nations includ-
ing the United States and Russia. Most recently, in March 2019, India has conducted a suc-
cessful test of its ASAT system (‘Mission Shakti’), using a ground-launched interceptor missile. 
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Other nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea are not known to possess ASAT capa-
bility, although Weeden and Samson note that such capabilities could theoretically be devel-
oped out of existing ballistic missile programs (Weeden & Samson, 2018). It is, therefore, ap-
propriate to speak of an ASAT arms race, although this is entangled with wider dynamics in the 
field of ballistic missiles. 
 MISSION SHAKTI 
The literature on arms races and the security dilemma argues that such processes are driven 
by a mixture of security concerns and uncertainty about other states’ intentions (Khan & Khan, 
2019; Tang, 2009). However, an analysis of the ASAT arms race shows that states are not 
only motivated by security fears. Relevant social groups also attach other meanings to ASAT, 
specifically its symbolic value (in line with the argument by Musgrave & Nexon, 2018). This 
becomes evident in the recent example of ‘Mission Shakti’, the first successful test of an Indian 
ASAT missile. On 27 March 2019, a ground-launched interceptor missile destroyed the Indian 
earth observation satellite Microsat-R via kinetic impact at an altitude of 283 km in Low Earth 
Orbit. The ASAT system was spun off from India’s ABM program and was developed by the 
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), a research branch of the armed 
forces. There are indications that the program received strong support from the Indian govern-
ment and might have even been fast-tracked (also Lele, 2019b, 12-13; see the relatively pes-
simistic assessment of Indian ASAT capabilities in Weeden & Samson, 2018). 
Entering into the ASAT arms race fulfils three distinct objectives for the Indian government. 
First, in line with a security dilemma explanation, there are indications that India was genuinely 
worried about its strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis China (Lele, 2019b; Tellis, 2019). India and 
China have a history of conflict and Indian space assets were vulnerable to Chinese ASAT 
after the latter’s 2007 test. Hence, one of Mission Shakti’s aims was to ‘establish credible space 
deterrence against China’ (Davis, 2019). The BJP, the governing party of Prime Minister Nar-
endra Modi, tweeted ‘India now has the capability to shoot down any satellite that may pose a 
threat to its security in lower orbit’ (@BJP4India, 27 March 2019). In contrast, Pakistan, India’s 
chief regional rival, did not seem to feature much in the decision due to its lack of comparable 
space capabilities, although Pakistani analysts see the test as a move to entrench Indian tech-
nological superiority in space (Khan & Khan, 2019). But public reactions by other states were 
calm. Pakistan and China, the two countries most likely to feel threatened, only warn against 
the militarization of space and risks of escalation in abstract terms, along with Russia. Criti-
cisms focused mainly on the creation of space debris. NASA Chief Administrator Jim Briden-
stine said that creating debris was a ‘terrible, terrible thing [and] not compatible with the future 
of human spaceflight’ (Foust, 2019). If there is an ASAT arms race, it is a relatively relaxed one 
so far. 
Second, ASAT is also, maybe even predominantly, about enhancing India’s status as a global 
power. The grand strategy of the Hindu nationalist government is ‘driven by the pursuit of na-
tional strength and international prestige […] to restore India’s civilizational glory and rightfully 
secure the country a more prominent place in the international system’ (Rej & Sagar, 2019, 
73), and ASAT is portrayed as symbolic capital in evidence of that fact. It is repeatedly stressed 
that India is only the fourth country to acquire ASAT capabilities. PM Modi himself claimed that 
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the successful test was proof that India has now ‘entered the elite club of space power’ (@nar-
endramodi_in, 31 March 2019). Government representatives point out that the effort was com-
pletely indigenous and developed solely by Indian scientists, thereby underscoring further the 
nationalist narrative (@narendramodi 27 March 2019). In addition, India is keen to portray itself 
as a responsible power, highlighting the very low altitude of the target and the head-on ap-
proach of the interceptor missile. The official line was that all debris fragments would decay 
and burn up in the atmosphere within, at most, 45 days. However, independent analysts con-
clude that the impact was not exactly head-on, launching some fragments into much higher 
altitudes, some even above the orbital band of the International Space Station (~410 km) 
(Akhmetov, Savanevych, & Dikov, 2019; Langbroek, 2019). Bridenstine’s comments also point 
towards an emerging norm against ‘unsafe’ ASAT tests. Some commentators think that the 
relatively rapid development of the ASAT system was at least partly driven by a wish to estab-
lish ASAT capability before such tests are regulated or even banned (Porras, 2019; Davis, 
2019). 
Third, the ASAT test also had a domestic politics angle. Some opposition parties frame the 
mission as a political stunt ahead of the national elections in April 2019. An opposition news-
paper criticized Modi for claiming credit for a technology developed by DRDO scientists, whose 
budget he had previously cut, in a program that was started by his predecessor Manmohan 
Singh in 2012 (National Herald, 2019). In response, the BJP accused the previous government 
of dragging its feet on several weapons programs, including the ASAT system, while it was in 
office (@BJP4India, 27 March 2019). The government also uses the political capital generated 
by the test to push for institutional reforms in the military, such as the creation of a Defence 
Space Agency (DSA) to command all space assets formerly attached to India’s army, navy and 
air force, as well as the development of a space doctrine to govern the use of its newly devel-
oped assets (Gupta, 2019; Lele, 2019a). 
In conclusion, while Mission Shakti might look like another step in a typical arms race, the 
picture seems to be more complex than that. The security angle is only one in a complex and 
entangled set of aims and aspirations by key actors in India. The government is also keen to 
present itself as a modern, responsible member of the space club – a step foreshadowed for 
quite some time (Aliberti, 2018). The ASAT test, the DSA, and the space doctrine represent a 
continuation of this strategy. 
 CONCLUSION 
On the face of it, there is great potential for arms races in outer space. Outer space activity has 
always had military connotations and states continue to treat outer space as a military domain. 
Control in/over outer space is also becoming more valuable as its commercial value grows 
(although a weaponization of space might inhibit that same commercial use). International reg-
ulation is thin and ‘traditional’ arms control approaches are hindered by disagreements over 
what even constitutes a ‘weapon’ in the outer space context. Moreover, countries are develop-
ing non-kinetic counterspace and ASAT capabilities that represent the next stage of techno-
logical evolution (Tellis, 2019). All of these factors should give us cause to worry. 
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However, as this paper has demonstrated, states do not develop space weapons only, and 
maybe not even mainly, to seek security in space. Generalizing from the Indian case, we con-
clude that status-seeking is a prominent motive in processes of outer space militarization. 
Weapons systems are symbolically important in that they underpin narratives of national great-
ness and international status. Somewhat paradoxically, this opens possibilities to lessen pres-
sures towards the weaponization and militarization of outer space. If states attach the problem 
of insufficient status to their existing space technology, then there are many possible solutions 
beyond developing further weapons capabilities. Instead, states may be induced to seek status 
through the responsible use of space, the commercial exploitation of space resources or 
through scientific breakthroughs. Current cooperative projects to develop lunar bases or deep 
space gateways can be seen as opportunities in this direction, as is the development of a 
normative framework surrounding ASAT testing. These are but a few examples of how outer 
space can be progressively de-securitized as civilian and commercial activities grow. 
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Abstract 
In the discussion of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in the expert forum of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the interpretation of crucial concepts 
such as autonomy and human control is decisive for the future direction of international hu-
manitarian law. Starting from the perspective of a synthesis of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
and Value-Sensitive-Design (VSD), we aim to analyse the discourse of LAWS and ask for pos-
sibilities to implement Meaningful Human Control.  
 INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK ON LAWS AND MHC 
The debate on the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems 
(LAWS)38 is of increasing importance, with discussions stalling and technological development 
progressing. This investigation, therefore, sheds light on the work of the Group of Governmen-
tal Experts (GGE) of the UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The CCW, 
offering an arena for international cooperation, has dedicated itself to the purpose of finding a 
common ground with respect to an understanding of LAWS as well as the necessary degree 
of human control (UNIDIR, 2018). LAWS have been discussed concerning ethical impacts and 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and their impact on the arms race dynamic and the sta-
bility of international security as well as on human controlling warfare (Altmann & Sauer, 2017). 
From an ethical perspective, the concept of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) supports a hu-
man-centric approach. As autonomous technology is increasingly at the centre of contempo-
rary military innovations, questions of (human) agency and responsibility in warfare have be-
come even more pressing (Hellström, 2013). As stressed by the United Nations Institute for 
                                                     
 
38 The term lethal seems to exclude weapons against material and non-lethal weapons – but military 
parlance can also mean disable or destroy. To include these, the term AWS (Autonomous weapon sys-
tems) is often used. However, the CCW-Debate explicitly uses the term LAWS. 
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Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the concept of MHC may prove useful in the context of de-
velopment and use of (semi-) autonomous weaponry (UNIDIR, 2014).  
Scholars of various disciplines are interested in the question of LAWS and human control. 
Crootof (2016), focusing on the applicability of international humanitarian law and accountabil-
ity, reflects on the inherent imprecision of the concept of MHC, while stressing the need to 
interpret the evolving norm as convergent with existing international law. Amoroso and Tam-
burrini (2019) provide requirements for MHC with respect to humanitarian law. While this is 
important, at least for international legal debates, the legal discourses lack to discuss the de-
sign of technical components. This may be due to discursive boundaries of the disciplines. 
Approaches like Schörnig’s (2019) and Bhuta et al. (2016) paying attention to legal, technical, 
and ethical issues are still rare. To understand the obstacles for human control, it is important 
to take a closer look at computer science and engineering, especially robotics and the require-
ments for the lethal or destructive application. Such publications are frequently interested in 
the development of semi-autonomous drones (Albers et al., 2010; Chao et al., 2010; Scharre, 
2018), machine learning techniques, and human-computer interaction. Often focusing on civil-
ian environments, some scholars pay special attention to crisis situations (Adams & Friedland, 
2011) or warfare technology (Hocraffer & Nam, 2017). Still, many engineering studies are in-
terested in optimizing automatic or autonomous processes and robotics of AWS (Arkin et al., 
2012; Gray et al., 2012).  
In contrast, there are studies dedicated to machine ethics, such as Canellas et al. (2016) or 
Hägele et al. (2017), the latter focusing on risk assessment and not explicitly making use of 
more abstract concepts. Chmielewski (2018) tries to incorporate non-Western values and 
stresses the need for an ethical evaluation of the use of LAWS, referring to IEEE’s “Ethical 
Considerations in Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems” (2016). The cognitive engi-
neering approach by Canellas et al. (2016) is one of the few works which have analyzed differ-
ent understandings of MHC and concrete options realized in human-computer interaction. The 
authors highlight implications for function allocation to autonomous systems vis à vis human 
operators, derived from definitions of MHC. 
In this work, we investigate the technological values incorporated into LAWS, which may be 
competing against each other due to different stakeholders across the CCW arena (Friedman 
et al., 2009). This is plausible as the various variants of LAWS may be seen as part of a dis-
course instead of isolated value-laden innovations. Thus, we pose the question: “How can 
MHC of LAWS by the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons be ensured, 
under conditions of potentially supportive or ambivalent technological values and un-
derlying discourses?” 
We focus on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) as the most relevant 
international body dedicated to the regulation of respective human-machine interaction and 
main organizational forum of the conceptual debate regarding autonomy and control with re-
spect to lethal weaponry. To answer the question of how MHC may be achieved within this 
forum, a discourse analytical approach, grasping mindsets and conceptualizations is a plausi-
ble choice.  
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 VALUE-SENSITIVE DESIGN 
We chose to analyse MHC with regard to LAWS from a synthesized perspective of actor-net-
work theory (ANT) (Law, 2008) and Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) approach (Friedman, 2009). 
Following ANT, as a relational, material-semiotic approach, it offers the possibility to pay spe-
cial attention to interactions between humans and non-humans (Braun et al., 2018; Law, 2008). 
This is especially plausible when analysing human-machine interaction in the field of autono-
mous robots, illustrating the ontological symmetry of so-called actants as well as instances of 
non-human agency (Braun, 2018; Callon, 1984). Second, interested in Latour’s work of decon-
structing laboratories (Murdoch, 1997) and material objects (Latour, 1990), and describing how 
a certain innovation came to be socially dominant, we assume LAWS as a socio-technical net-
work to undergo processes of innovation translation (Hanseth et al., 2004; Tatnall & Gilding, 
1999). Tatnall and Gilding (1999) define ANT “or the ‘sociology of translations’ […] [as] con-
cerned with […] construction and maintenance of networks made up of both human and non-
human actors. […] It explores the ways […] how they compete with other networks, and how 
they are made durable over time”. Shedding light on LAWS’ inscribed attributes, we follow the 
VSD approach by Friedman et al. (2009), acknowledging its merit of shifting analysis from 
longer time spans of processes of enrolment, actor coalitions, origins of assemblages (Callon, 
1984; Law, 2008; Lee et al., 2014) to already materialized values and their relationships among 
each other. VSD yields theoretical and methodological implications by assuming more or less 
abstract values to be reflected in interfaces or software and thus indicate the need for interpre-
tative work (Friedman & Nissenbaum, 1996). Following this approach, we consider the design 
process to be especially relevant with respect to interaction between human operator and 
LAWS, an assumption which is already prevalent in debates about the regulation of autono-
mous weaponry.  
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ABSTRACT 
Small and very small armed uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) and missiles are actively pursued 
in military research and development. Despite limited payload, militarily significant damage 
could be achieved by very high precision, by hitting sensitive spots, and by attacking in swarms. 
Principally, UAVs and missiles down to 1 mm size and below could be built in the future. A 
wide-spread deployment can endanger arms control, destabilise the military situation between 
adversaries, and provide qualitatively new tools for terrorists. From a natural-science and tech-
nical viewpoint, in our new project, the current status and trends will be analysed and used to 
extrapolate developments over a period of 5-10 and 10-20 years. Options for preventive limi-
tations and their verification will be considered systematically, too. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Uninhabited vehicles are increasingly being deployed and used by armed forces, with uninhab-
ited air vehicles (UAVs) most advanced. Since 2001 UAVs have been armed and used for 
attacks by a few states, the number of countries with armed UAVs (in 2017, there have been 
28; World of Drones, 2017)) is steadily rising. These UAVs have wing spans of many metres, 
most traditional missiles are several metres long. 39 The principal possibility of small and very 
                                                     
 
39 Except for shoulder-fired air-defence missiles such as the US Stinger with 1.5 m length and 14 cm 
diameter, (FAS (Federation of American Scientists), 2000). 
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small armed UAVs and missiles was mentioned early, fuelled by emerging microsystems tech-
nology and nanotechnology, but proposals for limits or prohibitions 40 have not been taken up 
so far. In the meantime first small armed UAVs have arrived – the US has introduced the AV 
Switchblade, a propeller-driven aircraft of a few times 10 cm wing span with an explosive pay-
load that is directed over several km into a target using a video radio link. 41 Prototypes of much 
smaller UAVs – so-called Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) – have been developed, e.g. the flapping-
wing Nano Hummingbird in 2011 (unarmed, about 10 minutes endurance (Keennon, Klingebiel 
& Won, 2012)). In 2008 the US Air Force Research Laboratory presented its future vision in an 
animated cartoon showing a centimetres-size MAV that could kill a sniper when in direct con-
tact (AFRL (US Air Force Research Laboratory), 2008); (see also the video by (Russell, 2017)). 
The micro helicopter Black Hornet Nano (Prox Dynamics, Norway), with 12 cm rotor diameter 
and 18 g mass, has been sold in the thousands (Prox Dynamics, 2018). Images of three cam-
eras are transmitted by radio over up to 1.6 km. In 2016 Prox Dynamics was bought by FLIR, 
USA. Much smaller, insect-like MAVs are being demonstrated in research. 42 Components can 
be produced in two dimensions and then folded origami-like permanently or temporarily, alle-
viating mass production (Dufour, Owen, Mintchev & Floreano, n.d.; Ma et al., 2013; Sreetharan, 
Whitney, Strauss & Wood, 2012). 
Much less sophisticated, improvised armed UAVs have been built and used by non-state actors 
using commercial and hobby multicopters as well as home-built fixed-wing UAVs, e.g. the at-
tack on Russian air and naval bases in Syria by militants, (Binnie, 2018; New York Times, 
2018) or the so-called Islamic State (IS) using them as scouts or for attacks with explosive 
charges (BBC, 2016). 
Propeller, helicopter and flapping-wing UAVs are relatively slow, so the possibility of jet propul-
sion exists (it seems that the micro-turbines work on which the US Defence Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) had funded in the early 2000s (Altmann, 2001, Section 4.1.5) 
are still under research (Wikipedia, 2017). A different approach is to make use of animals – 
experiments have successfully controlled the flight of a giant moth (Bozkurt, Gilmour, Sinha, 
Stern & Lal, 2009; see also iBionicS, 2018). 
Using nanotechnology components throughout, UAVs of small-insect size, that is down to be-
low 1 mm, should be possible – fully artificial or by modifying real insects. They could be trans-
ported to the target region by a “mothership”. 
                                                     
 
40 Mainly by (Altmann, 2001, 2006): prohibition of missiles and „mobile micro-robots” below 0.2-0.5 m 
size. 
41 Switchblade: range: 10 km backpack with 15 km-45 km options; weight: approximately 2.5 kg includ-
ing payload, launcher and transport bag; size: fits into rucksack; lethality: precision strike with very low 
collateral damage, (AeroVironment Inc., 2017). 
42 E.g. flapping wing, mass 80 mg, still powered via tether, (Ma, Chirarattananon, Fuller & Wood, 2013); 
100 mg, perching by electrostatic adhesion, (Graule et al., 2016); about 200 mg, moving in water and 
air (Chen et al., 2017). 
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In the area of missiles (using air-breathing-jet or rocket propulsion), smaller systems have been 
developed, too, one intent being the wish to arm smaller UAVs. The Hellfire missile, e.g., fits 
to the US Predator and Reaper combat UAVs, but is much too large and heavy for smaller 
UAVs. 43 Smaller missiles can also be carried by a soldier and shot in a bazooka style. With a 
smaller warhead and destructive radius such missiles need (more) precise guidance. Examples 
are the BAE Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) with 70 mm diameter and 15 
kg mass (Green, 2010), the NAVAIR Spike (57 mm, 2.4 kg) (Lance, 2006) and the Raytheon 
Pike (40 mm, 0.9 kg) (Raytheon Company, 2019) – the latter can be launched from a standard 
grenade launcher underslung under a rifle. 
Principally, using nanotechnological components for casing, propellant, nozzle, sensors and 
control computer/electronics, pencil-sized micro missiles should be possible that would need 
to hit extremely precisely, with e.g. centimetres accuracy (Altmann, 2001, Section 4.2.7). What 
such missiles could achieve – singly, released from a “mothership” and as a swarm – in terms 
of speed, range, endurance as well as damage is unclear. Guided small (e.g. rifle) projectiles 
(e. g. EXACTO (Extreme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance), DARPA (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency), 2015), could fulfil similar roles as small missiles – the main differences are 
the time courses of acceleration and speed. Hybrid systems that combine rocket propulsion 
with propeller, rotor or flapping wings, e.g. for the final approach, are also possible. 
Expectations about the military capabilities of swarms were high already in the early 2000s (e. 
g. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000), recently the interest has increased strongly, there is talk about a 
robotics revolution with swarms (Scharre, 2014, see also Hambling, 2015). The general idea is 
to have a number of vehicles that would act as an organic whole even if the single units may 
have limited computation resources. They could attack a target simultaneously or in a staged 
fashion from many sides, saturating defences. Various methods of defence against swarms 
have been mentioned, not only counter-swarms (Scharre, 2015); whether offence or defence 
would get the upper hand is unclear. The US military has demonstrated adaptive formation 
flying of 103 Perdix micro drones, released from traditional combat aircraft (US DoD (US De-
partment of Defense), 2017) a Navy demonstration of LOCUST (Low-Cost UAV Swarming 
Technology) used tube launchers (Smalley, 2015). The DARPA Gremlins program is to de-
velop reusable UAVs that would be released and recovered by a transport aircraft (DARPA 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 2017). A lighter-than-air “aircraft carrier” has 
also been proposed (Bosma, 2017). Russia is working on UAV swarms as well as China (Ham-
bling, 2016; Tass, 2017). First swarm attacks using “homemade” small UAVs have occurred in 
Syria (Binnie, 2018; New York Times, 2018). The numbers and sizes of swarm elements can 
vary greatly. Human control would only be possible of the swarm as a whole, but fully autono-
mous operation is envisaged, too (e. g. Hurst, 2017). 
                                                     
 
43 Hellfire: length: 163–175 cm, diameter: (without fins) 18 cm, mass 45-48 kg, maximum range: 7 km 
(direct fire), 8 km (indirect fire), minimum range: 0.5-1.5 km (FAS (Federation of American Scientists), 
2012). 
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Concepts for civilian applications of small UAVs abound (e.g. Small UAV Coalition, 2018). Mis-
using or adapting them for hostile purposes is a possibility to be reckoned with. For small mis-
siles and rockets, on the other hand, there are only very few civilians use additional to the 
established ones on the horizon.44  
 THE PROJECT 
With funding by the German Foundation for Peace Research (Deutsche Stiftung Friedens-
forschung; DSF) we shall investigate the technical potential of small and very small armed 
systems in the context of the systematic studies of potential military applications of microsys-
tems technology and nanotechnology; a recent update has found no need to change the as-
sessment or the recommendations (Altmann, 2001; Altmann, 2006, see also Altmann, 2005, 
2017). Armed uninhabited systems in general have been subject to a few systematic studies 
with respect to technological trends, military applications, “strategic/political” consequences as 
well as preventive arms control (e. g. Altmann, 2013; Krishnan, 2009; Sauer & Schörnig, 2012). 
The subset of autonomous weapon systems has been covered in parallel to the increasing 
international discussions, 45 here the problem of compliance with international humanitarian law 
and fundamental ethical questions have been in the foreground (e.g. Sparrow, 2007; Krishnan, 
2009; Asaro, 2012; Stroh, 2016), but increasingly the problem of stability is being discussed 
(Altmann & Sauer, 2017; Scharre, 2016). Detailed studies of preventive arms control for small 
and very small armed systems, differentiating them by the medium (air, land, sea, outer space) 
and by size class, do not exist. This project will provide reliable information on the relevant 
aspects of small UAVs and small missiles, and will treat preventive-arms-control aspects – 
including civilian applications and verification – in more detail than the earlier work. 
 SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
The project will investigate the properties to be expected of ever smaller UAVs and missiles, 
including their use in swarms. 46 The scientific-technical analysis of small UAVs and missiles 
will treat several basic areas: aerodynamics, scaling laws for various properties (such as pay-
load and total mass and the ratio between both, air drag, energy requirements, destructive 
potential), materials (including adaptive ones), engines (including micro-turbines), guidance 
(during flight and terminal homing), sensors, computing hardware, communication by radio (in-
cluding conformal antennae, and possibly by other principles, maybe laser interrogation,47 soft-
                                                     
 
44 Established: weather sounding, life-line shooting to a stranded ship, firecrackers, hobby rocketry; po-
tentially new: very small space rockets. 
45 In particular, the informal and formal expert meetings in the context of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons CCW (UN (United Nations), 2018). 
46 While the focus is on armed systems, unarmed ones will be covered as well, since modifications for 
carrying or forming a weapon are possible. 
47 As had been discussed for "smart dust" (Pister, Kahn & Boser, 2001). 
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ware/algorithms, system integration, production technologies, with a special view on 3-D print-
ing and on 2-D structuring in such a way that 3-D systems are formed by complex folding 
(origami). 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EXPECTED RESULTS 
The main questions of the project are: 
 What is the extent of deployment in relevant countries of small armed UAVs and small 
missiles and what is being done in research and development? 
 What properties and capabilities of small armed UAVs and small missiles are to be ex-
pected in the near future (in 5-10 years) as well as the medium-term future (in 10-20 
years)? 
 Will small armed UAVs and small missiles bring particular dangers (for arms control/inter-
national humanitarian law, for international security/military stability, for humans/environ-
ment/society), so that preventive limitations are recommended, and if so, how can such 
limitations be designed and compliance be verified? 
These questions are to be answered by interdisciplinary research with a strong science and 
technology component. 
Following the research questions, the project is to pursue three goals, correspondingly, in three 
partial projects. 
 GOAL 1 SURVEY OF THE STATUS IN DEPLOYMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 
OF SMALL ARMED UAVS AND SMALL MISSILES 
Based on data bases, scientific and Internet publications, small armed UAVs and small missiles 
deployed and used worldwide will be listed with their properties, with a look at non-armed sys-
tems that could be provided with or used as weapons. Activities by non-state actors will be 
included. As far as possible from publicly available sources (including conferences, technical 
reports, grey literature), development and research efforts and goals will be collected and re-
ported. Swarms and countermeasures will be covered as well. 
Goal 2 Extrapolation of the properties of future small armed UAVs and small missiles 
Based on the research and development efforts identified, on planning documents and fore-
casts, the properties and capabilities of small armed UAVs and small missiles to be expected 
in 5-10 years and in 10-20 years will be explored. Technical as well as military-operational 
aspects will be covered. Limits from the foreseeable technology status (e.g. power supply) as 
well as from principal laws of nature (e.g. aerodynamics) will be considered. Swarms will be 
treated with limited effort only, more work will be devoted to countermeasures. 
 GOAL 3 SMALL ARMED UAVS AND SMALL MISSILES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL 
Small armed UAVs and small missiles (existing as well as to be expected in future) will be 
assessed under the standard criteria of preventive arms control (Neuneck & Mölling, 2001, 
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(Altmann, 2005, Section 4.2). The different kinds that will have been found under goal 1 or 
come out as possible or plausible under goal 2 will be judged with respect to: 
 Existing or intended arms-control treaties; international humanitarian law; weapons of 
mass destruction; 
 Military stability between potential adversaries; arms races; proliferation; 
 Human health, environment, sustainable development; societal and political systems; the 
societal infrastructure. 
Because it is to be expected that strong dangers under one or more of the criteria will be found, 
limitation or prevention options will be considered systematically, taking into account the differ-
ent kinds (e.g. by size, payload, speed, weapon effect), civilian uses, potential criminal/terrorist 
uses. Verification methods and means will be conceived and evaluated under various aspects, 
among them: providing sufficient assurance of compliance and sufficient probability of finding 
relevant violations, minimizing negative effects on civilian uses, limiting military as well as civil-
ian intrusiveness. 
 CONCLUSION 
Small armed UAVs and missiles will likely increase in importance, in military capabilities as well 
as in numbers of types and of systems, in particular if they act in swarms. For political decisions 
of countries about what to do in this area – whether to participate in a more or less unrestricted 
arms race, or to act for preventive limitations – well-founded knowledge about the possible 
developments and their dangers is needed, as is presentation of potential limitation and verifi-
cation options. 
The project will produce a systematic overview of the present status and the future trends (time 
horizon 10 years and 20 years, worldwide) of small armed UAVs and missiles, followed by an 
assessment under preventive-arms-control criteria and a presentation of options for limitation 
and verification. The results will be made available internationally by scientific publications, 
conference contributions and dissemination to decision makers and officials. 
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It has become almost a dictum that arms control48 is in a crisis. But whenever the arms control 
community feels that rock bottom has been reached, things get even worse. The fact that after 
the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, which eliminated land-based intermediate- and short-
range missiles, the Trump administration is also very likely to not prolong the New START 
treaty on strategic nuclear weapons (Gramer and Seligman 2019), is a case in point here. While 
much of the current problems can be related to political differences and a lack of political will,49 
one has to ask how new technologies factor into these problems. Emerging technologies, and 
especially, but not exclusively information technologies, are changing the military landscape 
dramatically. Networked warfare has become one of the buzz words of the last decade(s), first 
within Western democracies (under the label of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or Trans-
formation; McNaughter 2007) but with other technologically advanced states following soon 
(Newmyer 2010). In addition, autonomous weapon systems (AWS) based on complex expert 
systems and AI have become a hotly debated topic, less so within the military community but 
by think tanks (e.g. Schörnig 2010; Scharre 2018), non-governmental organizations (Human 
                                                     
 
48 In this text, arms control is understood as a rather broad concept, including disarmament measures 
(i.e. the reduction of weapons), stability measures (i.e. limitations- including controlled armament) as 
well as transparency measures , e.g. confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) or regular 
information exchange (Müller and Schörnig 2006). 
49 Harald Müller argues that different states of relations between states, ranging from hostility to security 
community, offer related options for arms control. While opponents, for example, are only likely to agree 
to limit their armament rather than disarm, states with mostly cooperative relations are willing to accept 
far-reaching transparency (Müller 1996: 405-408).  
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Rights Watch 2012; Heinrich Böll Foundation 2018) and a concerned public. Critics of so-called 
lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) fear that in the not so far future, computer algo-
rithms rather than human operators will decide upon life and death, that these systems will not 
be able to uphold international law and will lead to a significant acceleration of warfare (e.g. 
Heinrich Böll Foundation 2018). While advocates of automated weapons reject many of these 
arguments, most agree, however, that weapon systems which use artificial intelligence en-
hanced by machine learning, would be too risky to use given the unpredictability and intrans-
parency of the decision making processes of such systems.50 In sum, new emerging technol-
ogies might have a severe impact on threat perceptions, military operations and crisis as well 
as strategic stability (Altmann and Sauer 2017).  
What makes matters worse, is that many of these emerging technologies render well-known 
and proven techniques of arms control useless. Simplifying a bit, arms control during the Cold 
War was essentially based on bean-counting planes, missiles, tanks and so forth. Since the 
rapid advances in computing power and information technologies experienced since the 1990s, 
however, the capability of a certain weapon system is more and more defined by software and 
constant information exchange rather than its hardware. Instead of focusing on quantities, arms 
control has to focus on quality (Schörnig 2015; Fey 2016) or content itself with confidence and 
security building measures – CSBMs (Altmann 2019). So, rather than just having to deal with 
the lack of political will limiting arms control options, technological developments are making 
the prospect of successful arms control agreements even bleaker. 
On the other hand, however, new and emerging technologies can help to overcome certain 
problems classical arms control regimes face. It is a specific problem of arms control that it can 
fail even if all participating parties have an interest in it, when all sides distrust the others to 
stick to the agreement. All parties fear that if they comply whereas the other side cheats they 
will end with a significant disadvantage reducing their security (Waltz 1979). From an arms 
control perspective, international treaties to limit or reduce weapon systems must always be 
backed by working and trustworthy verification procedures, which are key to the acceptance of 
any arms control regime in an anarchic international system.51 Verification can be understood 
as the “process of gathering and analyzing information to make a judgement about parties’ 
compliance or non-compliance with an agreement. It aims to build confidence between the 
parties, assuring them that their agreement is being implemented effectively and fairly” 
(UNIDIR 2003: 1). Especially when the relations are tense, the need for reliable (for the verifier) 
and acceptable (for the verified) verification measures is paramount for the success of arms 
control. Verification, therefore, usually walks a tight rope. On the one hand, it has to ensure 
that the verifying party gets enough certainty about the opposing side’s behaviour to accept 
limitations on its own armament. On the other hand, verification must to be not too intrusive, as 
intrusive measures can be used for espionage, revealing military secrets to the verifying party 
                                                     
 
50 Several personal conversations with military personnel.  
51 In the discipline of international relations, “anarchy” does not mean a lawless situation with anyone 
fighting anyone else but simply the fact that there is no higher entity above the nation state ensuring a 
state’s survival. In an anarchic international system states a basically facing a self-help system (Waltz 
1979).  
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which could lead to a military disadvantage or even a surprise attack. So, rather than ensuring 
100% certainty, verification has to balance these contradicting claims, provide all parties with 
sufficient information without being too noisy and drive up the costs of cheating, both in eco-
nomic as well as political terms, to unacceptable levels. Furthermore, successful verification 
provides enough early warning time for an appropriate reaction should one partner cheat nev-
ertheless (Wiesner 1986) and, in extreme cases, legitimizes coercive measures (e.g. national 
or international sanctions) to bring a deviating party back into compliance (Daase and Meier 
2013). 
In reality, however, verification is easier said than done. While there is a debate about reforming 
the Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime, the Biological Weapons Convention 
still lacks any verification mechanism and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. The Open 
Skies Treaty allows inspection flights over all European countries, the US and Canada with 
especially certified planes to enhance transparency and trust. These planes, however, are of-
ten denounced as “spy planes” by the media52 and even some scientific outlets.53 And when it 
comes to autonomous weapons, some experts blame the lack of any reliable verification sys-
tem for the stalling debates in the UN context (Horowitz 2016).  
In sum, verification is a hotly debated issue in many realms of armament. But it is obvious, that 
certain new technologies like drones, new sensors and AI-based systems offer the potential to 
improve at least some of the existing regimes or to facilitate future ones.  
One case in point is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans all nuclear test 
explosions - underground, underwater, in the atmosphere or in outer space.54 It has been 
signed by more than 180 states and ratified by more than 16055 but has not yet come into force 
as some mandatory states have yet to sign.56 However, in anticipation of the treaty, the CTBT 
Organization, the CTBTO, has already been established and has already set up an Interna-
tional Monitoring System (IMS) consisting of 336 stations in 89 countries to detect any nuclear 
explosion world-wide by infrasound, underwater sound, seismic activities and radionuclide con-
centration. Already as early as 2010, scientists proposed using machine learning technology 
“that could provide both incremental and comprehensive value for event detection by increas-
ing the accuracy of the final data product” (Russel et al. 2010). It is intuitively comprehensible 
that machine learning, which is very well suited for statistically based pattern recognition (more 
and more often surpassing human abilities), can help to distinguish, for example, between nat-
ural and man-made seismic activity, helping to avoid both false positives (leading to wrong 
                                                     
 
52 E.g. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-spy-plane-flying-over-sensitive-u-s-military-sites/. 
53 https://warisboring.com/a-russian-spy-plane-is-being-allowed-to-photograph-u-s-military-sites/.  
54 https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/reference/outreach/objective_and_activities_2007_web.pdf.  
55 https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/. 
56 The so-called Annex 2 states which have yet to sign are: DPRK, India and Pakistan, while China, 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed, but not ratified.  
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accusations and political tension) as well as false negatives, where a potential threat goes 
undetected. On the other end of the spectrum, machine learning technology has been put to 
use to help distinguishing between anti-personnel mines (APMs) and flattened tin cans. When 
earth penetrating radar is used in the process of demining, APMs and flattened cans present 
very similar radar echoes. So, flattened cans produce false positives, significantly slowing down 
the process of demining. With the help of self-learning algorithms, the process is eased con-
siderably (Lück 2019). Yet another example is the use of satellite imagery, paired with machine 
learning to identify missile sites57 – or other (potentially) military sites of interest. These short 
examples show in an exemplary way how new technologies can enhance the significance of 
available data beyond human assessment. States should have an interest in introducing these 
technologies to enhance verification.  
Yet states are rather reluctant to accept new technologies for verification purposes. And here 
the second aspect of verification – intrusiveness – comes into play. Trusting software to only 
assess what the regime allows is a tricky issue. How can it be guaranteed, that the new tech-
nology is tailored so narrowly to fit a specific verification purpose that no safety concerns are 
valid? One case in point is the Open Skies (OS) Treaty. The treaty allows “four types of sensors 
with which observation aircrafts could be equipped, including optical panoramic and framing 
cameras, video cameras with real-time display, infra-red line-scanning devices, and sideways-
looking synthetic aperture radar”.58 The cameras had to be analog for a long time and it was 
as late as 2014 when Russia was the first country to certify and install digital equipment on one 
of its OS planes (Spitzer 2014, 2018). While the result was to allow digital equipment in the 
end, the fear of not being able to cope with the wide range of opportunities new technology is 
offering, often leads to a very conservative and reluctant approach. The main resulting question 
therefore is, how this fear can be overcome to reap the rewards new technology is offering for 
verification purposes. In other words: the second level problem of how to ensure transparency 
within the instruments which are used to create first level transparency has to be solved. In the 
case of AI-driven arms control, the obvious approach would be to demand explainability in arms 
control algorithms. But this might actually lead to a paradox: Measures ensuring explainability 
in machine learning for arms control purposes might help developing acceptable machine 
learning AI suitable for autonomous weapons in the end. So much more creativity is needed, 
to ensure tailored technologies suitable for verification purposes.  
One thing is clear, however: Decision makers who lack the political will to foster arms control 
should not be given the chance to hide behind technological excuses for inaction. 
                                                     
 
57 https://spacenews.com/with-commercial-satellite-imagery-computer-learns-to-quickly-find-missile-
sites-in-china/. 
58 https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-open-skies/. 
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Is the governance framework fit for the next phase in the space age? The answer to this ques-
tion proves difficult. While scientists look for answers in the skies about the universe and Earth 
alike, a wide variety of new actors are becoming engaged in pursuing their interests in outer 
space: ‘New Space’ corporations dream of exploiting resources or to colonize heavenly bodies, 
the old space-faring countries dream of new ‘space firsts’ for political capital or to dominate this 
new domain, and countries new to space-faring are looking forward to become part of the ex-
clusive space club marking great power status in the 21st century (Paikowsky 2017). The mul-
titude of developments has been dubbed the commercialization, democratization, and militari-
zation of outer space (Pekkanen 2019). All of these possibilities are heavily interlaced with the 
advent of new technologies – new launcher systems, miniaturization, and fragmentation allow 
for easier access and thus easier use of outer space. Simultaneously, the rules to engage 
space and to keep peace still rest on the ‘five treaties’ 59 that successfully governed outer space 
operations in the past 50 years and which were able to prevent peaceful cooperation. But sev-
eral of the newest challenges like commercialization and democratization were never covered 
in the treaties, and the recent actions of China and the recent anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) 
test of India of March 2019 might lead to a new wave of militarization and securitization of outer 
space.  
My dissertation attempts to answer how new technologies stimulate ordering processes by 
actors. Due to new technologies, new actors are engaged in pursuing their interests in outer 
space. Actors create order and governance unilaterally or multilaterally that serve their needs 
– they are ‘ordering’ outer space.  
                                                     
 
59 The most important one is the „Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies“, or in short OST (Outer 
Space Treaty), from 1967, which is flanked by ARRA (1968), LIAB (1972) and REG (1975). The most 
recent treaty, MOON (1979), was not fully ratified.  
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I employ two approaches. While scholars of classical geopolitics argue, that the materiality of 
geography is fixed and dictate the behaviour of actors, scholar of critical geopolitics argue, that 
places do have a distinct materiality, but its usage is constructed through knowledge, dis-
courses, and ideas. They create order – the rules, institutions, activities, and strategies in dif-
ferent historical periods (Agnew und Corbridge 1995, 15) which at one point lead to the creation 
of Governance, defined as the “definition of actors, rules of operation, principles of interaction, 
and widely shared assumptions about trade, force and diplomacy.” (Agnew und Corbridge 
1995, S. 16). The existing outer space governance rests on the five treaties and has been 
successfully prevented conflict in outer space while serving the interests of the old space-faring 
nations, but new technologies shift the interpretation of outer space as a place for human ac-
tivity. The shifting understanding and implication of outer space is best addressed by scholars 
of Critical Geopolitics who argue that the knowledge about spaces is the prerequisite to do 
things in spaces (Ó Tuathail 1997). In this perspective, a place becomes a place once actors 
attach meaning to it. For instance, once capabilities become available to make use of outer 
space, actors are inclined to ‘territorialize’ these spaces (Lambach 2017). The knowledge about 
outer space has been around for quite a while, but recently new technologies – understood as 
applied knowledge – enable actors to pursue their interests anew. That means that technology 
is the reason why outer space and its governance is becoming contested.  
In much of the literature on international politics, technology is treated as a given fact. Of 
course, some historicity is implicated but once an actor is in possession of say, nuclear weap-
ons, he is treated as an actor of many different qualities, an actor of the ‘nuclear club’. This 
view is complicated, because technologies do not materialize out of thin air, technologies are 
constructed by people and in the case of high-technology it is unlikely that it happened without 
the knowledge of the states. In fact, the Apollo space program is thought to be one of the most 
important events that changed how states (here the U.S.) were involved in research and de-
velopment of new big-scale technologies (McDougall 1997). The study of technology in IR had 
some early works (Skolnikoff 1993; Herrera 2006) and is recently rediscovered by scholars of 
IR (McCarthy 2018). Most of the studies are heavily influenced by Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). For my work, I understand technology both as the product and the driver of 
societal processes, for which a social constructivist approach of technology (SCOT) is best 
suited. Technology here is not confined to the narrow conception of technology as an artefact 
with a determinist usage or materialist capability, but as part of societal processes. Technolo-
gies follow a path of path-dependency and contingencies that mirror the determinist view, but 
are influenced by choices made by designers or consumers (Manjikian 2018, 27), an issue 
much especially problematic in the case of dual-use goods. The advent of technology thus 
influences the discourses surrounding outer space.  
My basic argument is that new technologies change the way outer space is viewed. New tech-
nology lowers the threshold to do things in space. First, it enables new actors to do things in 
space – both states and non-governmental entities. Second, it allows new activities in outer 
space. Because of this, actors attempt at ‘ordering’ – they try to create or change the govern-
ance in a way that favours their interests, either by creating hard or soft law or by influencing 
discourses about outer space. This can clearly be witnessed in human spaceflight. Asteroid 
mining is an example. Harvesting asteroids is thought to be a solution to the growing hunger 
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for raw materials and minerals. Because the OST did not clearly specify the circumstances of 
mining asteroids and because of legal uncertainties the U.S. Congress (2015) and Luxembourg 
(2017) passed laws that would allow corporations in their countries to keep minerals harvested 
in outer space, thus fostering further investment and research, but undermining effective gov-
ernance, too (Man 2017). Simultaneously we can witness discussions surrounding the creation 
of a ‘space situational awareness’ (SSA) that would help coordinate the intensified activities in 
outer space and address the issue of space debris.  
In security issues we witness similar developments. In 2001, a commission warned the U.S. 
public of a possible ‘space pearl harbour’, if the U.S. would not develop counterspace capabil-
ities (Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organi-
zation 2001). Only in 2018, U.S. president Donald Trump announced the creation of a sixth 
branch in the U.S. armed forces, one specifically designed “to fight and win wars”. While it is 
not surprising, that at one point outer space would be subject to deepened security concerns 
(Wolter 2006), it is a clear indicator, that the change is more of a recent one and can be read 
as an attempt to pool the outer space capabilities that are dispersed throughout U.S. govern-
ment entities (Hunter und Bowen 2018). In June 2019, the NATO announced that it will draft a 
strategy paper to account for heightened security concerns stemming out of Russian and Chi-
nese counterspace capabilities (Peel 2019). Attempts to harness the possible militarization 
were not yet successful (Gindullis 2016).  
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ABSTRACT 
In light of the increasing efforts to develop military swarms, it is important to increase our un-
derstanding of the opportunities for human control over swarms. This paper will translate the 
technical engineering literature on swarms to a political context, in order for the international 
community to better understand what the implications of military swarms will be. This paper will 
set out what swarms are and how they work, and what we already know about the challenges 
to (Meaningful) Human Control, as well as the potential solutions. It is followed by a review of 
the state of the art in the swarm’s robotics literature highlighting the various challenges to Hu-
man Control and Human-Swarm Interaction. The technical literature shows that operating 
swarms are highly cognitively demanding. Humans struggle to keep track of many units at the 
same time and accurately predict the exact effect of their commands, especially under latency 
and low bandwidth. Furthermore, emergent swarms are inherently unpredictable and impossi-
ble to verify and validate. As the limits to adjusting swarm behaviour after launch provides 
limited space for operational control, the opportunities for human control should be maximized 
during the design phase. This would be helpful from both a strategic and a humanitarian per-
spective. 
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Comparison of Seismic Signals of 
Tracked Vehicles on Asphalt and 
Sand Road 
HUBERTUS SONNTAG AND JÜRGEN ALTMANN 
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[#42-EXT.-ABSTRACT]  
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
When a treaty is concluded to create or keep peace in a certain area, different types of sensing 
can be used for verification whether the involved parties comply with the treaty. Such sensing 
can be visual, acoustic or, as in this case, seismic. 
The data used in this work come from measurements that took place in 1992 at Amersfoort, Nether-
lands, and were carried out by the ’Bochum Verification Project’ (Altmann 2004). There were 
two types of tracked vehicles, one was a ’Leopard 1’ main battle tank (MBT) and the other was 
a ’YPR765’ armoured personnel carrier (APC). There were two vehicles of each type, to also 
have the possibility to find out whether there are type-specific characteristics or not. Further, 
there is interest in the differences between the various types. The vehicles were driven on an 
asphalt and a sand road, with different velocities in two directions, to achieve more knowledge 
about the properties of the vehicle signals. It is also important to see how well the sensing works 
further away from the vehicle path and to determine up to which distance signals are still usable 
for verification. 
Geophones were set up in various distances to measure how the signal changes with distance. 
On some of them, the most distant ones, there were short disturbance pulses in the measured 
signals. To have an appropriate data quality, these pulses were removed with a program using the 
’short time average/long time average’ method that is often used to detect earthquakes. This 
program can detect and erase outliers of the data, based on characteristics of the undisturbed 
signal. 
Seismic waves from tracked vehicles are caused by the piston movement in the engine, the 
force on the track elements rolled over to be the road wheels and the movement of the vehicle 
over rough ground. Also, the acoustic signals, caused by the exhaust pressure pulses from the 
engine and the driving of the tracks by the sprocket wheels cause seismic waves when imping-
ing on the ground. 
We are evaluating the measurements made with velocities of 20 and 40 km/h in two opposite direc-
tions, east and west. The evaluation firstly focused on the amplitude of the soil velocity. Secondly, 
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the spectral power was computed and plotted against the frequency, to see where there are 
noticeable parts in the spectrum and to get two important frequencies from it. One is the fre-
quency of rolling over the track elements νT, the other is the rotation frequency of the engine 
crankshaft νE. In the spectrum there are also harmonics of these two frequencies, where it is 
remarkable that usually for the MBT the fifth multiple of νE is the strongest of the engine series, 
as shown in figure 2. This is because the 10-cylinder engine has five cylinders for each of its two 
exhausts. From νT and νE the vehicle velocity and the engine rotation rate, respectively, can be 
determined. For the calculation of the velocity the length of the track element lT is multiplied with 
νT. For the passes on the asphalt road the velocity could be gained from infrared breakbeams 
across the road, too. 
For the amplitude the signal strength is plotted against the distance between the road and the 
sensor, as shown in figure 1. In the figure the maximum peak-to-peak value of seismic velocity, 
that is the absolute value of the difference between the highest and the lowest measured value 
of every sensor, is shown for passes of the APC. The data show that the amplitudes with 20 
km/h speed are somewhat higher than the ones from 40 km/h. 
Our preliminary evaluations have not shown significant differences between the different grounds. 
The final conclusions will need further analyses. 
 
Figure 1: Maximum peak-to-peak values of vertical ground velocity versus distance during 
passes of APC 1 on the asphalt and the sand road. At the right the nominal speed in km/h, 
the direction (only west in this case) and the road type are indicated. 
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Figure 2: Power spectrum of vertical soil velocity from an MBT driving over the asphalt road 
with 40 km/h in western direction. It is measured with a sensor 60 meters away from the road, 
at the time of passing the sensor (around the closest point of approach). The frequency of 
rolling over the track elements νT = 38.4 Hz and its multiples are marked with triangles, the rota-
tion frequency of the engine crankshaft νE = 17.1 Hz and its multiples are marked with circles. 
Note that the fifth multiple at 85.5 Hz is the strongest of this harmonic series. 
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and Preventive Arms Control in 
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[#43-PAPER]  
ABSTRACT 
This contribution addresses the growing interaction between military and civilian applications 
of science and technology as well as efforts to control it. Challenges of new technologies in 
complex conflict landscapes require novel approaches of preventive arms control combined 
with political and legal frameworks that tackle the dual-use problem in the early phases of 
research and development. Missile and space technologies serve as examples. 
 CHALLENGES OF CIVIL-MILITARY AMBIVALENCE AND DUAL-USE IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Civil-military interactions have shaped the history of science, technology and war (Altmann et 
al. 2017). In the past, the military was often suggested as a pacemaker of technology develop-
ment, even though the spin-offs remained less than expected. In the 20th century, advanced 
technology has become an essential element of both the economy and national security. While 
the dichotomy between civilian and military technology was more pronounced during the East-
West conflict when large-scale science and technology became part of the military-industrial 
complex, the boundaries eroded after the end of the Cold War. Scarce resources and lack of 
public acceptance, combined with converging demand profiles, supported the dual-use of tech-
nologies that have actual or potential military and civilian applications, systematically exploiting 
the ambivalence of science without being transparent (Liebert, Rilling & Scheffran 1994). The 
military benefited from research in the private sector by taking advantage of civilian goods and 
saving on development costs. The strategy of “commercial-off-the-shelf” development puts 
more emphasis on spin-in: taking advantage of economies of scale, a technology developed in 
the civilian-commercial sector is used for military purposes. Modern semiconductors, nuclear, 
laser, bio, space, digital, computer and communication technologies, to mention a few, are 
employed not only in civilian products but also in weapons. However, civilian products were not 
optimized for military tasks and an advantage over opponents was not guaranteed since the 
technology was available on the international market. 
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Until today scientific knowledge and technical know-how are essential preconditions for weap-
ons development and sources of proliferation (Scheffran 2006). Countries that want to keep 
their advantage in military technologies or prevent negative impacts on their security are more 
ready to control exports of “sensitive” technologies to “critical” countries. Major suppliers have 
agreed that certain technologies which are devoted to the development and production of 
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological) and related dual-use items, 
including delivery systems, should be subject to strict export controls. When the Wassenaar 
Arrangement replaced the COCOM list in 1996, the export control focus shifted from an East-
West to a North-South context, including technologies for weapons of mass destruction based 
on the Trigger List of the London Nuclear Suppliers Club, the Australia Group for chemical 
weapons, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (Brauch et al. 1992).  
The shift towards actual warfighting has promoted a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (Neuneck & 
Alwardt 2008). The United States seeks to strengthen its supposed technology lead against 
potential competitors and focuses on scientific and technological capabilities being developed 
worldwide that have the potential to significantly enhance or degrade US military capabilities in 
the future. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the declared “war on terror”, the pa-
rameters changed again. The old certainties have disappeared, but the need to control the 
proliferation of weapons technology has not. The new security environment is much more am-
biguous and the list of potentially dual-use technologies much more comprehensive. 
As a result of globalization, complex crisis phenomena and diffuse enemy images have 
emerged, which are confronted by a modernized military with concepts of "extended security" 
(Scheffran 2008). Societies are drawn into interconnected wars that provide a justification for 
new armament and connect civilian and military infrastructures. Without clear dividing lines, 
armed forces act in boundless wars, against all attempts of non-proliferation and arms control 
which are increasingly obstructed by confrontation among the major powers. This is accompa-
nied by a privatization of security services and modern mercenary armies. Fractioning the struc-
tures of violence inflicts great suffering on the civilian population, destroying social and political 
structures, and creating new sources of dissatisfaction and violence through networks from the 
local to the global level. 
 CONFLICTS AS DRIVERS OF THE ARMAMENT DYNAMICS 
Today's crises and conflicts create new justification for armaments and military interventions. 
New technicised wars project comprehensive networking, robotization, and automation of the 
battlefields in air, water, and on the ground, in space and cyberspace (Springer 2018), right 
through to the hybrid wars on the home front, in social networks, and in the media world (W&F 
2019). This concerns modern transport, information and communication systems across the 
globe as well as micro, nano- and biotechnologies in the smallest spaces. Digitization and ar-
tificial intelligence combine globalization with the miniaturization of violence, as manifested in 
the information wars on our computers as well as in the projected war of drones, robots and 
killer microbes (Reuter 2019). As a result, the war is moving into our neighbourhoods, homes 
and human bodies, which are interwoven with global structures through technical systems. In 
this way, global (in-)security and human (in)security are linked. 
CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS, DUAL-USE AND PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
228 
Interventions with high-tech armaments find their counterpart in post-modern forms of violence 
and terrorist networks that use civilian structures for destructive purposes. Airplanes, vehicles, 
ships, reactors, the chemical industry, the Internet or power grids can not only be the target of 
violence, but can also be weapons of their own, thanks to the amplification effect of technical 
systems. Accordingly, the war against terrorism pervades Western societies. The Internet gives 
civilians access to vast amounts of information that makes them potential combatants in cyber 
warfare. When the entire society is affected by hybrid conflicts, the classic division between 
soldier and citizen loses its importance. Civil-military cooperation gives the military new leeway 
to include civilian resources (Scheffran 2018). 
 PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
A response to the challenges, calls for technology assessment combined with a realistic anal-
ysis of the threat, with a view on reducing the extent to which investments in new technology 
may increase the danger of weapons proliferation. The consequence would be a more stream-
lined approach towards technology control that restrains the most dangerous technologies and 
seeks international cooperation in other fields of dual-use technologies. A similar approach 
between “shield or share” (Stowsky 2003) has been suggested to manage the transfer of dual-
use of technologies and demonstrate how practical measures could stimulate the transition 
from a confrontational relationship to one which would be based on cooperation. Initiatives 
would involve confidence- and security-building measures and a multilateral agreement, to en-
sure the transfer of dual-use technologies while curbing destabilising military use. Where to 
draw the line depends on political attitudes and the security context.  
In order to escape the logic of interconnected wars, alternatives are needed to break up am-
bivalences (Scheffran 2018). Since the criticism of military intentions is often countered by 
reference to possible civilian benefits, it is important to ask for alternatives with less military 
relevance and more civilian benefits (Scheffran 1997). In addition to the concept of preventive 
arms control (Altmann et al. 1998), an ambivalence analysis is helpful, which contributes to 
more transparency at the interface of civil-military research and development and identifies 
nodes where development paths can be separated on the basis of concrete parameters, as 
is usual in armaments and export control (EC 2015). In doing so, differences between civil 
and military need to be made clearer rather than blurred, and the social and international 
framework conditions of decision-making processes are to be revealed (Liebert, Rilling & 
Scheffran 1994). Hence civilian structures in the area of science and technology should be 
strengthened, and the educational impulse of science as well as the widespread rejection of 
open military research in the scientific community. Important is the public discussion on such 
issues, related to the civil clause movement (Braun et al. 2015). Ultimately, it is about a sci-
ence that works on social tasks and alternatives and is oriented towards the goals of a peace-
ful, sustainable and just world. 
 THE CASE OF MISSILE AND SPACE TECHNOLOGIES 
Important questions to be examined on the basis of specific case-by-case analyses concern 
the soundness, consistency and efficiency of armament programs. The general framework 
CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS, DUAL-USE AND PREVENTIVE ARMS CONTROL IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY   
229 
can be demonstrated for space and missile technologies (Scheffran 2006). Conditions have 
also changed for space systems and related rocket technologies. With the increasing privat-
ization and commercialization of outer space and the emphasis on missile defence and space 
dominance, spaceflight moved again to the centre of the international security debate (Bulletin 
2019). The “missile threat” from emerging military powers such as Iran, North Korea, India 
and Pakistan combines and competes with the nuclear threat. In both fields, dual-use is an 
essential problem that requires international control efforts to diminish the security risks. For 
proponents of missile defence and space dominance, outer space is inextricably linked to 
warfare, which would preclude any international control. For others, outer space is a common 
heritage of mankind that needs to be protected by international law for peaceful and sustain-
able uses (Bender et al. 2001). A Code of Conduct to strengthen space security has been 
suggested as well as a multilateral “Treaty on Common Security in Outer Space” and a pro-
hibition of space weapons with multilateral satellite monitoring and verification systems as 
well as a protective regime for peaceful space objects based on immunity rules for satellites, 
such as a ‘rules of the road’ (Hagen & Scheffran 2003). Such political and legal frameworks 
need to be combined with concepts for preventive arms control that tackle the dual-use prob-
lem in the early phases of research and development.  
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The Stewardship Race 
ALFRED NORDMANN 
INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY, TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT 
DARMSTADT 
[#44-PAPER]  
ABSTRACT 
The following pages outline a research program for IANUS in the coming years. It is not the 
only research program for IANUS but one that sets it apart from other forms of science-and-
engineering-based peace research. It is meant to complement and contextualize current 
IANUS-related work on software engineering and cybertechnologies as well as work elsewhere 
on nuclear or biotechnologies. To the extent that it is addressed to natural scientists and engi-
neers, this research program offers a timely perspective for collaborative work in the spirit of 
IANUS, FONAS or UCS – but one that goes beyond the consideration of weapons systems or 
specific technologies and their military or civilian use. 1 The ambition to offer a timely perspec-
tive is the ambition to engage specifically in the historical situation of the early 21st century. 
This ambition is at risk of course. Still, in the midst of identifying new challenges, we might find 
ourselves cast into yet another world which poses a whole new set of problems.  
 THE SITUATION 
The Bradbury Science Museum is “Your Window into Los Alamos National Laboratory”. To the 
visitor who enters it physically or by way of its URL (www.lanl.gov) it is readily apparent that 
one is not looking from the outside in. Instead, visitors are drawn into the insider’s perspective. 
The museum speaks for the National Laboratory and serves to underscore its demonstration 
of nuclear power, capability, and might. But this demonstration is not one of military or strategy 
might, it does not concern a stockpile of arms and the capacity to strike here or there around 
the globe. In more ways than one the museum is a window into the Laboratory’s mission of 
“Stockpile Stewardship”, that is, the “mission to solve national security challenges through sci-
entific excellence.”  
The museum helps us understand what this means. The scientific excellence in question is not 
that of building and assembling nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It is excellence at 
                                                     
 
1 The programmatic proposal evolved from IANUS discussions over the last several years. As such, it 
has many authors who should be mentioned, among them Matthias Englert, Jens Geisse, Anne Har-
rington, Annette Ripper, Christina Schües, and Sonja Schmid. — Like most programs or manifestos, the 
following text is short on references to the scientific literature. 
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producing meaningful information from indirect evidence. This is how the problem is stated: 
We (the Los Alamos National Laboratory) need to report to the President of the United States 
about the quality and readiness of the nuclear arsenal – but we must do so without the benefits 
of actual tests. Therefore, we need to accrue immense knowledge of materials and how they 
age, and we need to bring this knowledge into highly complex simulations not of the “theatre 
of war” but of the conditions over time of fissile material, its casings, its storage methods. A 
highly generalized yet greatly advanced engineering and modelling competence is required to 
stay on top of things as they just sit around in their storage facilities. 
“Stockpile stewardship” thus amounts to very general as well as specific capacities of mainte-
nance, monitoring, and management. Not only the President but the whole world has to trust 
that the stockpile is in good hands with the scientists at the National Laboratory – safe in times 
of peace, ready for times of war. In a democratic society, this includes social technologies of 
communication and debate – the Bradbury Science Museum exhibits those just like any other 
modern museum of science and technology. Not only does it demonstrate the basis of trust in 
scientific excellence, but it also provides space in the exhibition for critics of their program, 
including citizen groups in New Mexico who worry about the lab in their backyard. “We hear 
you,” the National Laboratory appears to be saying, “and thus we confidently include you in our 
mission of being good stewards of a dangerous technology in a precious and vulnerable envi-
ronment.” 
A film in the museum finally features the long-term legacy and vision of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. Eloquent testimonials are provided especially by former Secretary of State William 
Perry, one of the so-called “Four Horsemen” who have been promoting a World Free of Nuclear 
Arms. Even once we have achieved this goal, Perry says in the film, we will need the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, perhaps more so than ever. For, when the arms have vanished 
from view entirely and are no longer physically present, the competence of building and main-
taining and monitoring nuclear arms must not be lost. It is the ultimate deterrent – now and in 
the future. 
Though it may seem like a long time ago, William Perry’s promise of a World Free of Nuclear 
Arms was taken up by Barack Obama. And quite in line with Perry and his compatriots, Obama 
also saw the need to underwrite this promise by strengthening engineering competence not 
only in the field of nuclear engineering.  
Nuclear disarmament, in other words, goes along with the armament of civil society – which 
remains a civil society but which has to now shoulder all the responsibilities of good steward-
ship. It must be a society that can handle dangerous materials and technologies, that is resilient 
in times of economic, environmental, or infrastructural crisis, that is not only a knowledge-soci-
ety but has learned to deal with the limits and absence of knowledge, that does not delegate 
questions of security to its politicians and questions of safety to its engineers, but that evolves 
a comprehensive “safety culture”. It is by its safety culture that a nation is tested and judged, 
fairly or not. On the assumption that a good safety culture can thrive only in an open and just 
and democratic society, fissile materials cannot be entrusted, supposedly, to certain countries 
like North Korea or the Iran. And on the assumption that Germany has advanced engineering 
capabilities and stewardship skills as well as a resilient civic culture, it is in effect a nuclear 
power just like the United States. Possessing nuclear arms or not is no longer the decisive 
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criterion at a time when the arms race has been superseded by the stewardship race which 
revolves around demonstrations of scientific and economic, managerial and socio-technical 
capability. The self-imposed criterion of excellence by the leaders in the stewardship race 
amounts to the simple question: “Is this a safe country for dangerous technologies and destruc-
tive capabilities – are these technologies in good hands, in the right hands?” 
 THE PROBLEMS 
It is one thing to identify and analyse the stewardship race, quite another to critique and, ideally, 
to orient, constrain, or otherwise influence it. It is not openly conducted as a “race” – or only to 
the extent that the capabilities in question also protect markets and gain advantage in a global 
marketplace. 2 Also, the capabilities in question are not subject to disarmament. A militarized 
society where citizen decide to police their nation and exhibit belligerence might be pacified 
and civilized – with programs to trade guns for cell-phones, with incentives for public transpor-
tation as opposed to individualized Humvees. In contrast, a well-developed safety culture is 
generally seen to be a good thing as citizens take responsibility and monitor the operation of 
critical technologies in their environment – even if this is the best defence against attacks on 
infrastructure and even if this implies the gathering of know-how on launching such attacks – 
working knowledge of highly complex socio-technical systems, in particular, knowledge of se-
curity breaches and their manageability are major elements of the stewardship race. 
Even though the development of stewardship capabilities and an attendant safety culture are 
all-encompassing and highly prized, it is necessary to develop a critical stance that acknowl-
edges the predicament. On the one hand, the question “Does our society provide a safe oper-
ating environment for highly complex, potentially dangerous technologies?” needs to be raised 
and its answer not simply presumed: What are the criteria for arguing that technologies which 
pose risks for safety and security are in good hands with our police, our intelligence community, 
our army, our regulatory system, our organization of industrial processes, or our import/export 
rules and regulations? On the other hand, the problematic assumptions need to be exposed 
which lead us to raise the questions in the first place. 
The prominence of the question owes to an abdication of politics, that is, of deliberate and 
negotiated mechanisms for building trust, e.g., by way of lawful relations and legal instruments 
such as treaties, agreements, commitments and public scrutiny. The wide distribution of re-
sponsibility throughout safety cultures is to offer a technological and managerial compensation 
for this abdication of politics – which, arguably, cannot be compensated. 
 As we may be witnessing today, the international system of security is becoming more 
vulnerable to erratic action that eludes an all too subtle game of deterrence through pre-
paredness or stewardship. 
                                                     
 
2 A more detailed presentation would highlight the ways in which countries like China demonstrate good 
stewardship in order to participate in the global economy and gain reputation as a trustworthy actor on 
the international stage. 
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 The stewardship race delivers a sense of safety and security at the national level but is 
constantly challenged as to its legitimacy when one nation claims, in effect, cultural supe-
riority over another, and similarly when states claim to have achieved the always impeach-
able status of providing a safe, reliable, trustworthy operating environment. 
 In the meantime, individual engineers, workers, citizens as contributors to and presumed 
guarantors of the safety culture are underprepared for their role and overtaxed by it – they 
have to function reliably to ensure the maintenance of safely operating socio-technical 
systems and are at the same time committed to shift gear at any time from the position of 
permanent heightened vigilance to that of whistleblowing. 
 THE AGENDA 
On the basis of this diagnosis, where is a research program for IANUS and for science-and-
engineering based peace research? Only a few points can be mentioned here in a very prelim-
inary fashion: 
 The diagnosis does not allow for a limited focus on particular weapons systems and their 
development. In fact it does not provide a meaningful differentiation between an aggres-
sive and defensive stance or even for the distinction between war and peace: Those who 
are engaged in the stewardship race might be interested in peace but in a permanent state 
of war, vying to be a most developed safety culture that is trustworthy within society and 
the global community and that is able to absorb significant shocks to the system. 
 Assuming that responsible stewardship aims to preserve or create peace, one of the main 
questions is to ask what it means for technological development and an articulated safety 
culture to be committed to the value of peace. Just as we may ask what are the criteria for 
judging an engineering approach to be “sustainable”, we should take on the question of 
how to evaluate a safety culture as one that adheres to „peace“ as a public value. The 
discussion of how Sicherheitskultur can be transformed into a Friedenskultur may well 
involve the European Commission or national research councils in the task of establishing 
“peace” as a core (European) value for Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). 
 Redundancy and independence/autonomy (German: Autarkie) are technical and mana-
gerial virtues for safe-guarding critical infrastructures. An international system of safety 
and security, in contrast, relies on mutual commitments and dependencies. Is the best 
way to make ourselves less vulnerable really to shut ourselves off as far as possible – to 
achieve total self-sufficiency and isolation if necessary? This question implies that one 
needs to discuss gas-pipelines from Russia to Germany or the Chinese construction of 
the 5G networks for advanced industries in the context of science-and-engineering-based 
peace research. Some worry about these as unacceptable vulnerabilities, others see them 
as guarantors of peaceful mutual relations. This may turn out to be question of design – 
how to design contractual relations, how to ensure mutuality, how to design the collabo-
ration of engineers and of the technical structure itself – how to evolve a transnational 
safety culture. 
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The abdication and restitution of politics and diplomacy, the integration of “peace” into the 
canon of RRI, the design of transnational socio-technical systems, the criteria for peace-ori-
ented safety cultures (i.e., Friedenskulturen), the education and socialization of engineers, 
managers, citizens that are to sustain these cultures – all of this requires the active participation 
of scientists and engineers along with peace researchers and philosophers of technology. 
IANUS should provide a forum for this, one that encompasses international research activities 
and dialogue on the one hand, practical engagement with a new generation of citizen-scientists 
and engineers on the other hand.  
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APPENDIX 
Group Photo  
  
Group photo of the 100 conference participants 
from over 50 organizations, ranging from the natu-
ral and engineering sciences (physics, biology, 
chemistry, computer science) to the humanities 
and social sciences (political science, peace and 
conflict research, psychology, philosophy). 
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Visual Impressions from the 
Conference 
 
Opening of the conference by Prof. Christian Reuter (TU Darmstadt) with Prof. Malte 
Göttsche (RWTH Aachen), Dr. Jürgen Altmann (TU Dortmund) and Dr. Mirko Himmel (Uni-
versity of Hamburg) (from left to right) 
  
Keynote by the American chemical weapons expert Dr. Paul F. Walker, winner of the Right 
Livelihood Award, Director of the International Green Cross and currently Senior Visiting Fel-
low at IFSH in Hamburg 
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